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This papeJ."" was initiated as a study of the reacti.ons of 
-
the various $taple crop regions of the South to the tariffs 
of 1828 through 1833. At fi~st it was asswqed that: economic 
f:acto~s determined the regional reactions tpward the ta,:iffs. 
Fo~ instance, the Piedmont cotton re~ions of South Carolina 
aq.d Georgia we:pe suffering from a depressi,on SQ the people 
were naturally opposed to the possible added burden of tar-
iff duties. In the sugar cane regions of Louisiana the 
planters, conversely, needed protection against the influx 
of sugar cane from the West Indies, aoth of these positions 
were no:rmal, exemplifying a natural economic reaction to the 
tariffs. However, the author soon discovered that a focus on 
economics was too limited since further stuQies showed that 
not all regions of the South reacted according to the dic-
tates of their regional staple crop economy. It appeared 
that opposition to or support for the tariffs .~as based on 
numerous other. factors, both personal and political in nature. 
In the coastal regions of .South Carolina and Georgia many in-
dividuals retained their wealth during the depression y~ars 
and had less need to oppose the tariffs, yet they were more 
adamant than the indigent upland areas in their opposition 
to protec~ion and their support for nullification. 
iii 
The introduction of personal and political factors 
raised many more interesting questions. For example, why 
should the mountain region of one state be more favorable to 
tariffs than the mountain area of a neighboring state? Why 
was Georgia, the state most closely resembling South Carolina 
geographically ~nd economically, not ready to follow the 
Palmetto State's lead in effecting the remedy of nullifica-
tion? Why were the newer states of the Southwest in agree-
ment with President Jackson when he censured the South 
Carolina nullifiers rather than with their southern agricul-
tural neighbor? Were personalities, not economic factors, 
the real causes for some of the abnormal reactions to the 
tariffs? Were r,gional jealoqsies within a state also ·~ 
majo.r ·.factors in causing the unusual reactions? Why did some 
localities use the political tool of nullification as a 
weapon against the federal government's power, while other 
areas vehemently denounced such action and, in turn, sup-
ported the Union? And finally, why did South Carolina react 
so violently to the question of p~otective tariffs when some 
of the other states were just as economically depressed? 
These questions and others are expounded in this paper 
which has a threefold purpose. First, it is the desire of 
the author to present a narrative of the various reactions 
within each southern state to the tariffs of 1828, 1832, 
1833, and the Force Bill. Second, the author hopes to ana-
lyze the varied economic, political, and social reasons for 
the reactions. Third, the author hopes to alleviate the 
; 117 
commonly held belief that the South as a whole opposed prQ~ 
tective tariffs and supported nullification. 
Thus the author proposes and tests these hypotheses: 
(1) the South did not exhibit a totally negative teaction to 
protective tariffs although it was an agricultural region; 
(2) the reactions to the tariffs were based mainly on the 
economic needs of the environmental unit--whether urban, 
Tiqewater, Piedmont, mountain, or other; (3) non,. economic 
interests cannot be discounted for they outweighted economic 
logic in a few situations; and (4) South Carolina, although 
the leading state in advocating nullification, was itself 
not totally unified on the tariff issue. It should be noted 
that the term "economic," though generally referring to the 
specific agrarian or non-agrarian economy of each area, also 
includes the need for internal improvements, the desire for 
Indian removal so new cotton lands would become avail~ble, 
and other·related factors. 
In order to test these hypotheses, tpe author's method-
ology consisted of studying the individual economies of the 
different physiographio regions of eight soµthern states, 
noting the reactions of the people and their congressmen in 
each of the areas to the four measures noted, and then ana-
lyzing the reasons for such action. The southern congress-
men's speeches, debates, and votes in Congress provided the 
best source of information about the logic behind each reac-
tion, while newspapers, biographies, correspondence, and 
'\7 
other sources also aided the author in gaining insight into 
the mood of each region. 
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
. • . I see no prospect of a satisfactory adjustment 
of the Tariff. Some impression has certainly been 
made by the movements in Carolina, but not suffi-
cient, I fear, to compel the oppressor to let go his 
grasp. All history proves . • . reason is perfectly 
impotent to stay the course of injustice and oppres~ 
sion. 
John C. Calhoun to Richard K. Cralle~ 
April 15, 1832l 
In 1832 many southerners were excitedly talking of nul-
lification, secession, rebellion. They viewed the North as 
an oppressor, bent upon subjugating the southern people both 
politically and economically. To remind them that their 
luxurious standard of living, their depleted soil, their one-
crop economy 1, and their overproduction of cotton might be 
causing the region's ills would only evince indignant refu-
tations, They quickly informed anyone with such notions that 
the real cause for southern problems was the tariff. South~ 
ern apologists pointed out that one need only look at 
Charleston harbor to view the death of a community, for al-
though the waterfront had once been alive with activity, many 
ships now languished idly in the quiet South Carolina sun. 
lLetter .of John C, Calhoun to Richard K. Cralle~ Apr. 
15, 1832, J. Franklin Jameson (ed.), The Correspondence of 
John C. Calhoun, in Annual Report of the :American HistarICal 
AsSo'c"Ia ti on for 1899 GWashlngto'i;i.., "15'::-; 'C7; 19-00) ~ JI - · - r 
pp. 317-318.- - .. " 
1 
2 
Ships which did sail to Europe with cotton and other southern 
crops were northern vessels controlled by northern merchants, 
and planters whose crops were transported were dependent up .. 
on northern capital to finance the venture. The declining 
incomes of southern planters, they contended, were due not 
only to the profits taken by the middlemen, but also to the 
added burdens of the recent tariffs which the northerners had 
imposed upon the South--tariffs which levied high duties on 
foreign imports brought to Southe~n ports. Since the South . 
was an agrarian region with very limited industry, many con ... 
sume:r goods had to be purchased from Europe or the North.2 
If European goods were excluded by tariffs, northe~n items 
must be purchased, yet they were more costly and often of in-
ferior quality. Should the Eu~opeans retaliate and counter 
the American protective tariff :,policies with restrictive acts 
I . 
of their own, southerners mighf be faced with fu~ther taxes 
on their cotton when it reached English or French ports. Any 
strongrninded South Carolinian knew George McDuffie's forty-
bale theory by heart in 1832, and could readily explain to 
all listeners that forty bales of every one hundred bales of 
cotton exported went to make up the profit of northern mid-
dlemen and to costs imposed by the federal government. This 
system must be corrected. The policy McDuffie and his fol-
lowers desired was free trade, a system in which no imposts 
2The United States was predominantly rural in the early 
nineteenth c~ntury. The proportion of the total population 
living in cities of 2,500 or more was 5.1 in 1870, 7.3 in 
1810, and 7.2 in 1820. Sixteenth Census of the United States 
Population, I, 18, pp. 20-21, - -
I I 
3 
were levied, but which allowed articles to be imported and 
exported free of any duties. Yet all their pleas and exhor-
tations to reduce the tariff and substitute free trade had 
gone unheeded during the 1820's. Now they must act. 
This mood of fear, concern, and anger toward the north ... 
ern protectionists and the national government was of fairly 
recent vintage, having arisen only after the War of 1812. 
Prior to this time, in the years between 1789 and 1815, there 
was little reason for division because the economic similar-
ities of the North, West, and South produced a greater re-
gional affinity--at least in regard to tariffs. The North 
was not the manufacturing center it would become in later 
years; the West was not densely settled; and the South was 
not yet a "planter's paradise" except in the coastal Tide-
water. In fact, the entire country tended to be a land of 
St\lall farmers. New England was noted for its commercial 
activity and small home industry, but most of its people 
still worked the rock-strewn soil. Residents of Pennsylvania 
and New York were also husbandsmen with some involvement in 
home industry, and the other western states which stretched. 
t;:o the Mississippi River we.re just emerging ~s grain produc ... 
ing entities, Even the South, the best farming region in the· 
country, was distinctively different from what it would be in 
a few years, for cotton was not yet "King." Eli Whitney's 
cotton gin, invented in 1793, was truly revolutionary in its 
implications, but not until after 1814 did cotton expand. into 
the Piedmont and frontier lands of the lower United States. 
4 
The somewhat similar economic make-up of the three re-
gions was not the only factor minimizing tariff controversies 
in the era before 1816. Although several impost measures be-
came law, southerners believed the acts passed--with the ex-
ception of the Tariff of 1816--were basically for purposes of 
revenue and not for protection. Nevertheless, they watched 
each successive tariff bill with concern. The sou~herners 
raised no serious objections to the first tariff of 1789 
which levied specific duties upon thirty-six enumerated 
articles and imposed average duties of 5 per_ cent ad 
va:.forem, and they accepted the twenty-seven other acts mod-
r 
ifying duties upon foreign imports which were passed between 
1789 and 1816. 3 Nevertheless, they noted with concern the 
gradual increase in duties, especially the "Mediterranean 
Fund" act of 1804 which placed average ad valorem rates at 
12\ per cent,,, and the 'act of 1812 which doubled all duties 
'' 
to 25 per cent ad valorem.4 Since this latter measure was 
passed to meet the costs of the war, southern politicians con-... ·. 
sidered it a temporary action for revenue purposes only, and 
as a result many people of the South and the West, under the 
influence of the "War Hawks," heartily supported the bill. 
The 1812 act was destined to be the last tariff measure 
readily acceptable to southerners, and conversely, the last 
moderately protective bill supported by northerners. 
3Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies 
Nineteenth.'.Century, (New York, 1966), I, p. 111. 




reversal of attitudes was due to the changed American eco-
nomic position at the end of the War of 1812. Both the North 
and South were different. In the North, the commercial in-
terests transferred their capital from shipping and fishing 
enterprises to infant manufacturing ventures because during 
the arrested trade period of 1807-1812 and the war period of 
1812-1815, normal import activities were curtailed. Most of 
the funds went into woolen and cotton textile industries but 
returns in some enterprises were often disappointingly low 
since overhead was high, workers lacked experience, and pro-
duction costs rose. In order to develop, many manufacturers 
agreed, they needed to retain the exclusionary practices of 
the war years. English merchants and manufacturers, on the 
other hand, sought to reclaim their old American markets in 
1815 by dumping a surplus of goods into the United States at 
such reduced prices that they could not be undersold.; an 
action which, if successful, threatened to destroy the youth-
ful industries of New England. Many New England politicians 
and industrialists announced that a protective tariff which 
would prohibit the influx of these foreign goods was needed 
to save them. 
The South, too, developed new economic traits after the 
war. The cotton culture now enveloped much of the region as 
the farmers and planters moved into the Piedmont and uplands 
of South Carolina and Georgia and began infiltrating the 
frontier states of the Southwest. Total production increased 
rapidly pot only due to the efficiency of the cotton gin, but 
6 
also as a result of the introduction into the South of a 
Mexican variety whose bolls opened more widely and which 
could be picked more easily than the earlier varieties of up-
land cotton. Consequently, the amount of cotton picked by a 
slave in a day doubled, and adult slaves were usually able to 
pick from 150 to 200 pounds of seed cotton daily.5, As a 
result of the expansion of areas of production, the tremen-
dous profits which accrued, and the enhanced personal pres-
tige of the slaveowners, the cotton culture became entrenched 
in the South. Free trade was now more important to them than 
ever because the small New England mills could in all likeli-
hood never consume the enlarged southern supply of raw cotton. 
The southerners, although realizing the growins strength 
of the agricultural economy of their region, were uns~~e of 
themselves in 1816 when a new tariff--the first protective 
tariff in American history--came under consideration. Cotton 
goods, which were of greatest concern to the farmers and 
slaveowners of the South, were made subject to a general ad 
valorem duty of 25 per cent; but it was further provided that 
a specific duty be added so that "all cotton cloths, whose 
value shall be less than 25 cents per square yard, shall be 
taken and deemed to have cost 25 cents per square yard, and 
shall be charged accordingly. 116 Some southerners supported 
5clement Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization, 
1790-1860 (New York, T901), p. 215." 
6Frank w. Taussig, The Tariff History of the l,Jnited 
States (New York, 1967) ,p. 76. 
7 
the bill because of their post-war patriotic mood, their fear 
that the British might renew the war, and their convictions 
that the South, too, would soon have its own textile centers. 
Even so eminent a congressman as John C. Calhoun supported 
the act. Sut in general, the South gave much more opposition 
than help to the effort to sustain the manufactures brought 
into being by the war. Southern representatives in the final 
ballot voted thirty-one to fourteen against the bill, with 
seven abstaining. Eleven of the negative votes came from 
North Carolina.7 
The South's hesitant and limited support of protective 
ta~iffs ended in 1819 as a new disaster--the panic of 1819--
beset the country. All former commitments to nationalism 
ended as the people turned their attention to the needs of 
their own region. The price of cotton fell from 33 cents a 
pound in 1818 to 8 cents in 1819, and the depression gave no 
evidence of lifting.8 The marked contrast in incomes made a 
tremendous impact on the southern mind, and cotton and tobacco 
raisers and others looked about for th:e source of their prob-
lems. They found four scapegoats on which to place the 
blame: the northern bankers, the New York and Philadelphia 
comn;iission houses, the Yankee peddlers, and the protective 
tariff. Since these forces stemmed from the North, the South 
reacted defensively by reverting to a sectionalist stand 
7charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun:. Nationalist 
1782-1828 (New York, 1944}7I>.-118. 
8Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization, p. 29. 
8 
aimed at protecting their own agrarian interests, increas-
ingly convinced that industry would never materialize in most 
southern f)tates. 
Southerners moved quickly to curb new tariff le$isla-
tion. They were successful in 1820 when the mam,ifacturers, 
farmers, and ~iners of the North and West asked not only for 
p~otection against foreign textiles, but also against im~ 
ports of iron, molasses, raw wool, flax, hemp, wheat, and 
corn,9 Southern opponents of the measure were aided by New 
England merchants, ship owners, _and distillers. The first 
two opposed duties on hemp, flax, and iron because they were 
essentials in the shipbuilding industry, while the distillers 
renounced the measure because the duties on molasses would 
hurt their r~ industry. 
Although the measure proposed in 1820 failed to pass 
Congress, the protective issue was not dead for a new element 
inserted itself--politics in the form of new regional polit-
ical alignments and power. The Eighteenth Congress was the 
first body elected under the reapportionment of Congress 
following the census of 1820. New York, Pennsylvania, and 
' . 
the Old Northwest--states overwhelmingly in favor of protec-
tion--gained twenty-eight seats. The South added only six 
members. Eight of the twelve seats added to the Senate after 
1810 went to tariff-supporting regions. 10 Protectionist 
71. 
9raussig, The Tariff History.£! the United States, p. 
10..--wil tse, John C. Calhoun, I, p. 286. 
9 
interests, cognizant of their new political position, confi-
dently prepared to offer a new tariff measure, while the 
South began to considei- its position '):l.ppeless both p.oliti ... · 
! ~ -
cally and economically. 
The South's apprehensions were quickly confinned as the 
House Committee on Manufactures introduced a protective tar-
iff bill in February, 1824. The proposed measure established 
rates on cotton and woolen goods at 33 1/3 perlcent ad valo-
rem, rather than the current 25 per cent rate, and urged. 
duties for many of the same interests listed in the proposed 
measure of 1820. The congressional debate. which ens~ed was 
one of the most qeated discussions yet heard in Washington as 
the southern agrarians and northern merchants, shipbui,lders, 
and distillers verbally battled the Mid-Atlantic and Western 
manufacturers and grain producers who wanted to establish and 
protect their home industry. Southern arguments seemed 
fruitless, for the bill passed the House of Representatives 
107 ... 102, and the Senate 25-21. 11 An analysis of the vote 
shows that it was sectional: t;he western and middle states 
sqpported the modification and the South opposed; New England 
remained divided in sentiment. The nature of southern opin-
ion is best represented by the vote of southern con~ressmen; 
fifty-seven opposed the bill and one favored it. The two 
states of Pennsylvania and New York were the keys to passage 
11rbid., pp. 288-289. 
10 
of the act since they gave a 50-9 vote in favor of the bill 
with one abstention.12 
The Tariff of 1824--the highest protective measure to 
date--was weighted in favor of the manufacturing, farming, 
and mining interests of the west;:ern, mi4dle, and northern 
states, yet strangely enough, New England woolens manufac-
turers did not benefit from the bill. In fact, their econom ... 
,,-le si,tuation. 'to "$bme extent deteriorated because the new 
tariff duties of 33 1/:3 per,_.cent ~d valorem on woolehs was 
offset by a duty of 30 per cent on raw wool; an article which 
had previously been admitted at duties of 15 per cent ad 
valorem. 13 Their condition was further threatened by the 
new British trade laws effected in 1824. These acts virtual~ 
ly abolished England's duty on raw wool imports, and as a 
result, the lower price for raw material enabled British 
producers to manufacture and to sell goods cheaply. By 1825 
an influx of inexpensive British woolens was saturating 
American markets, and the American wool manufacturers were 
again menacea. 14 
Cotton producers of the South shared the misery of the 
woolens manufacturers although much of the rest of the coun-
try was enjoying returning prosperity. Cotton prices fell 
pp. 7!~~~~ssig, The Tariff, History of ~ United States, 
lJibid., pp. 75, 79. 
14william W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War (New York, 
1965), p. 117. .......,.. 
from 32 cents in June to 13 cents in October, 1825, They 
continued to fall until they reached a low point of around 
11 
8 cents in 1827. As the depression continued, agrarian 
spokesmen constantly denounced the tariff which propped up 
prices for goods they had to buy on the protected market 
while, at the s~e time, they were selling raw materials on 
an unprotected market. Senator Robert Hayne of South 
Carolina announced in Congress" .. , we will p.ot hold our-
selves bound to maintain the system, 1115 and the South 
Carolina legislatu:t;"e passed a resolution in 1825 branding the 
protective tariff system unconstitu~iona1.l6 
Southern objectiop.s to further protective measures went 
unheeded as the H,ouse Committee on Manufactures t"esponded to 
the plea of the woolen manufaqturers by presenting a new tar-
iff measure to Congress for cons'U:ierati,on in 1,827. The bill 
did not change the 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem l;"ate on manu .. 
factured woolens, but established three minima of 40 cent:s, 
$2.50, and $4.00. All such manufactures exc~pt worsted 
stuffs and blankets costing less than any of these minima 
were to be assessed as if they cost the highest sum desig-
nated in that bracket. The foreign goods which usually cost 
around $1.00 would thus be almost prohibited since they 
would be ~ubject to duty as if they cost $2,50.17 
lSAnnals of Congress, 18 Cong,, Il sess., II!, p~ 732 • .......... . . 
16Freehling, Prelude to Civil War~ p. 117 • 
. ~· ~
17Register of Debates, 19 Cong,, II sess., Ill, p, 732~ 
.. ,,, ~
12 
The proposed tariff of 1827 met strong opposition in 
botq houses of Congress, The House of Representati,ves final .. 
ly passed the measure by a vote of 106-95, but when the bill 
was sent to the Senate it became deadlocked, John C •• calhoun~ 
.: . .' 
the Vice President of the United States, finally cast a tie-
breaking vote to defeat the measure,18 
The southerners were elated at their success, but the 
protectionists, embolde.ned by the narrowne~s of their defeat, 
decided to continue their fight. They invited all "friends 
of protection" to 4ttend a convention in Harrisburg, Penn .. 
sylvania,and to propose new tariff schedules. As a result, 
protectionists representing several economic interests ar-
rived, and many of them suggested puties on items which would 
benefit their local constituencies,· Thus by broadening their 
basis of suppo?t, the protectionists hoped ~o accomplish 
their goal of writing a bill which could pass Congress. At 
the concluaion of their meeting in 1827, the delegates sent 
a memorial to Congress, petitioning for protection and sug-
gesting the framework for a new tariff.19 
The proceedings of the ijarrisburg Convention were 
watched carefully by the presidential contenders of 1828: 
John Quincy Adams, the protection:J,.st incumbent, and Andrew 
Jackson, the Democrat whose position on the tariff was un-
clear. Needing an issue, each decided to use the tariff 
18 Ibid., pp. 496, 1099. 
19Freehling, Prelude !2_ Civil ~, p. 122. 
13 
issue to his own advantage, Adams and his supporters decided 
to favor protection openly in order to win strong support in 
New England 9 but :Jackson and his political allies :l\fe.re con ... 
fronted with a problem. Many individuals in both the south-
ern free trade wing and the northern protectionist wing of 
the Democrat party favored the Tennessean, not knowing his 
tariff beliefs; so Jackson would be taking a great risk if 
he took a strong stand on the issue. The Old Hero decided to 
follow a noncommittal policy by stressing his 1824 position 
when he had declared himself in favor of a "judicious e~am­
ination and review of the tariff question. 1120 As a result, 
the manufacturing states continued to regard hiilt as a pro-
tectionist, and the South remained confident that he was not 
in sympathy with that program. 
While Andrew Jackson maintained silence, his su~porters 
~-especially those in New York--laid the groundwork for the 
Tariff of 1828. 21 The meas~re, as presented to Congress, 
represented the fruits of the Jacksonian political alliance 
between New York and Pennsylvania, the West, and the South, 
and took the form of a scheme to drive a wedge between people 
who wanted protection for manufactured goods and those who 
wanted protection for raw materials. Duties so carefully 
20Robert V. Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson 
(Philadelphia, 1963), p. "!54. --
21Martin Van Buren's efforts to elevate Andrew Jackson 
to the presidency are ably presented in Remini, Robert V., 
Martin Van Buren and the ~aking of the Dem.ocr'1!tic Party. New 
York: ~w. ·Norton &~., Inc. ,1970:" 
14 
worked out by the Harrisburg Convention were rejected, and 
duties demanded by the woolen manufacturers were reduced to 
a level no longer prohibitory. The duty on raw wool was 
raised so that it would aid the producers of Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, and western Virginia, but it would injure the domestic 
manufacturers who purchased wool from foreign sources. The 
heavy duties placed on hemp, molasses, and iron worked to the 
det~iment of New England shipbuilders, merchants, distillers, 
and fabricators of machinery, but favored the iron and hemp 
interests of the West. The New England wool manufacturers 
were most disgruntled by the bill placed before them because 
it changed the 40 cent, $2.50, and $4.00 minima proposed by 
the Harrisburg Convention by inserting the $1.00 minimum 
valuation, This made the bill less prohibitory since ~ost 
foreign goods imported were in the cheaper brackets. The 
measure, as written, placed the woolen interests in the awk-
ward position of opposing the protective measure for which 
they had asked.22 
The plan seems to have been for southerners to oppose 
.. 
the final bill and for the Jackson supporters ip. Pe~!'.lsylv'ania, 
New York, and the West to vote for the bill. New England 
congressmen concern~d with the problems of woolen manufac-
turers would presumably vote against the measure, thus de-
feating it and causing great damage to the Adams' 
22Register of Debates, 20 Cong.,~I,ses~., IV, pp. 1727-
1729. For a complete coverage of the:• tariff debate, see 
lbid,, pp. 1729-1909, 1924-2086. 
administration. Jackson, in turn, would still retain an 
ambiguous position on the tariff question. 
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The strategy, as ingenious as it was, ultimately failed. 
As _Hepry Clay stated in a letter dated February, 18285 "The 
Jackson party .•• do not [sic] really desire passage of 
their own measure, and it may happen in the sequel that what 
is desired by neither party commands the support of both. 1123 
I''.'.',;' 
Clay's words were prophetic, for the House of Representatives 
passed the bill 105-94, and the Senate supported it by a 
vote of 26-21 after a minor amendment was added which led 
several New Englanders to support the obno~ious act until a 
better one could be devised.24 
The southern free trade advocates were astounded when 
the Tariff of 1828 became law. Its duties of 50 per cent ad 
valorem on cottons and woolens were considered outrageously 
high, and it was feared more restrictive clauses might cause 
Great Britain to seek raw cotton elsewhere. Such prohibitory 
rates on foreign made clothes would enable industrialists of 
the North and West to set prices as they saw fit, and the 
South would soon be bankrupted. Only one hope remained: the 
newly elected President, Andrew Jackson, was still considered 
by many southerners to be an advocate of free trade. He 
would surely ask Congress to lower the tariff. 
23wiltse, John C. Calhoun, I, pp. 369-370. ---
24Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 2471-
2472, 786. -
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Any hopes for tariff reduction by President Jackson were 
in vain. Not only did he allow the Tariff of Abominations to 
continue, but he also developed a strong dislike for the 
southern hero, John C. Calhoun. Jackson's refusal to press 
vigorously for tariff revision did not go unheeded by the 
extremists of the South; especially those in South Carolina, 
Their emotional tirades kept southerners aiert to the dangers 
facing them, and also convinced some northerners that a 
moderate ta;r:iff reduction might be in order. 
In 1832, after four years of bickering, the rariff of 
1832 eme~ged from the Committee on Manufactures. Although 
the new act cut anticipated tariff revenues about five mil ... 
lion dollars, only about one-fourth of the duty reductions 
applied to protected products. Average rates were reduced 
to an aver~ge of 25 per cent, but the 50 per cent rates on 
cottons, woolens, and iron were largely retained.25 The 
measure was, paradoxically, both lower and more proportion ... 
ately protective than the Tariff of 1828. 
Reaction to the Tariff of 1832 varied. Many of Presi~ 
dent Jackson's avid supporters accepted the act as a less 
protective measure, but the Calhoun partisans and southern 
extremists denounced it as worse than the Tariff of Abomina ... 
tions. Some South Carolinians readied themselves for battle 
and raised the standard of nullification. A specially called 
nullification convention at Columbia, South Carolina, hastily 
25Freehling, prelude to Civil War, p. 248. _,__ 
17 
passed the Ordinance of Nullification which maintained the 
tariff laws were unconstitutional and null and void in their 
state.26 Several groups in Charleston collected arms and 
munitions with which to uphold the new state law. Andrew 
Jackson, just as determinedly, presented a Nullification 
Proclamation which denounced state sovereignty in regard to 
tariffs, and requested a Force Bill which, if passed by 
Congress, would give the federal government authority to col-
lect by force imposts in South Carolina. 27 
At the height of the crisis cautious leaders on both 
sides of the issue began to search for a solution to the pre-
dicament. The best answer appeared in the form of a compro-
mise tariff, authored by Henry Clay. His measure proposed 
lowering tariff rates gradually over a period of nine years. 
It appeared acceptable to a majority of people on both sides 
of the issue, so after nine years of dispute, Congres_s passed 
the Tariff of 1833, Hopefully, the country would settle 
back to a normal way of life. 
The Compromise of 1833 temporarily brought the tariff 
debate to an end; but in that same year American historians 
began their voluminous recording and interpretation of the 
era. From the textbooks placed before younger students to 
the specialized works presented to students of history, one 
26state Papers £!! Nullification, pp. 28-33, 
27 James D. Richardson, : ~ed.,_ A ComBilation of the Mes-
~ and Pa~ers of the Presidents-(Was ington, D:" G.-;- TS'9"7-
1909) ,--pp. 1 04-iIT9-;1173-1195. · 
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standard interpretation of the tariff interlude emerged: the 
southern cotton planters, faced with declining prices and 
exhausted soil, blamed their misfortunes on northern-imposed 
protective tariff measures and sought to obtain redress 
through nullification. Further, the historians tend to place 
Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun in the role of protagon-
ists, and all others seem to fade into the background. 
The standard interpretation of the tariff controversy 
of this era is of value, but is limited in its explanation 
as to the stand taken by southerners in tariff policies. It 
leaves ~nanswered certain questions which are of interest to 
the economic historian. For example, how did the provisions 
of each tariff affect the South? Was the entire South af-
fected in the same way? Was southern opposition to the tar-
iffs unanimous? What were the reactions of the various 
economic sub-groups of the South? Were the people engaged 
in a single economic pursuit all in agreement that the pro-
tective measures were anathema? 
These questions are usually left unanswered by histori-
ans because they concern themselves with the cotton culture 
of extremist South Carolina to the exclusion of other south-
ern economic units. Yet they should not cast the South in a 
single economic mold; the divergent physiography and the 
multiplicity of sources of livelihood minimizes the validity 
of any such assumption. The fertile Tidewater of the Atlan-
tic coast, the less fertile Piedmont plateau, the mountains, 
valleys, and various soil types prevented such unity. 
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Further, the terrain and soil dictated the type of crop 
which could be raisep. Some crops, such as cotton, tobacco, 
rice, and corn traversed state boundaries; others, such as 
sugar cane, limited themselves to a single state. 
Assum;Lng then, that the South was a heterogeneous eco-
nomic Degion and that each economic unit reacted to the pro-
tective tariffs and the Force Bill in the light of its own 
needs and interests, it appears that ~me should study each 
interest-.group separately to determine true beliefs and 
stances concerning the various measures. The voting records 
of the many southern congressmen are especially enlightening 
in this regard, for after discerning the economic livelihood 
of a given region, and cQrrelating .. the ecoqomic area· with the 
~; . 
favorable and unfavorable votes cast on. each measure, one 
sees a definite pattern of regional beliefs emerge. But per-
haps the most interesting conclusion is that economics is 
often so intermeshed with politics that the two cannot be 
easily separated; and sometimes political loyalties and 
personal beliefs overpower the economic logic of a specific 
situation. For this reason the study of the southerners' 
political and economic reactions to tpe tariffs of 1828, 
1832, 1833, and the Force Bill are best Stl,ldied on a state-
by-st:ate basis before final conclusions.can be made. 
CHAPTER II 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
The question is no longer one of free trade, 
but liberty and despotism. The hope of the country 
now rests on our gallant little state. Let every 
Carolinian do his duty. 
John c. Calhour to Waddy Thompson, 
July 8, 1832 
In 1818 South Carolinians were alive with anticipation 
as the summer wore on and harvest time came, for South 
Carolina was a cotton state and prices were phenomenally 
good--rising 7 cents within two years to a new high of 33 
cents per pound for some varieties of cotton. 2 No longer did 
the planters in the Tidew,9ter have a monopoly on wealth and 
prestige because at last the cotton gin wa~ allowing the up-
land Piedmont to join in the cotton bonanza. (Map 1) Plant-
ers in the Piedmont quickly amassed slaves and land, 
especially in the southern and east central counties which 




lLE!tter of John C. Ca.p1oun tp Waddy T)J.pmpson, July 8;. 
1832, in William W. Freehling, PITelude to ··civil War (New 
York, 1965), p. 249. · ~ ---
2Although the prices varied depending upon the source 
used, the major cotton price statistics are ~ased upon news-
paper -price lists or addresses made in Congress. Another 
major source :Ls George R. Taylor, "Wholesale Commodity Prices 
at Charleston, South Carolina, 1796-18611." Jouraal of Econom-
ic and Business History, IV,(1932}~ pp~- 048-868. 
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plantations which arose were often smaller than those in the 
lowlands since upland soils were less fertile, and the owners 
were the nouveau riche, yet regional je.;:alousy was a thing of 
the past, By 1818 the two regions seemed one in many ways. 
John C. Calhoun, living near the upland town of Pendleton and 
married to a Charleston aristocrat was as much a lowla1:1.'der as 
an uplander. This was true of many citizens, for inter-
regional marriages and the common concerns of cotton produc-
tion acted as bonds, 
The only discord in 1818 appeared within the up1ands 
itself. The northeastern Piedmont and northwestern Tidewater 
districts which lay near the boundal:'y of North Carolina were 
di£ferent from the southern Piedmont lands, both economically 
and politically. There were fewer planters, most residents 
being farmers with smaller land holdings; and ·relatively. few·. 
slaves. They raised some short staple cotton, but tobacco 
was their main crop.3 The major political spokesman for the 
area was Senator William Smith, a representative in state and 
federal government since 1803. Smith was an advocate of the 
Old Republican faith, a believer in the Jeffersonian doctrine 
of states' rights with its corollary of strict construction, 
and a man who thought ~he federal government had no authority 
to pass protective tariff legislation such as that passed in 
1816. Smith and most other Carolinians as well as most 
southerners professed to be Democrats in political 
• j 
3Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, pp. 17-18 • 
. -
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affiliation, yet although verbally supporting the party 
which had traditionally opposed the expansion of the federal 
government's authority, only a few people zealously main~ 
tained their position in the nationalistic era after the War 
of l812. But while others relaxed in the post-war years of 
prosperity, Smith, the staunch defender of ~tates' rights, 
fought against tariffs, internal improvements financed by the 
federal government, national banks, and any other program 
that might weaken the states' reserved powers.4 
Smith, whose main supporters lived in the north central 
part of the state, and Calhoun, of the southern Piedmont, 
were enemies both politically and personally. Smith was 
jealous of Calhoun's popularity in Congress and strongly 
opposed Calhoun's stand in favor of the Tariff of 1816 and 
other measures which seemed to jeopardize the sovereignty of 
the states. Smith's dislike of Calhoun was even more pro-
nounced in later years when William Crawford of Georgia and 
Andrew Jackson of Tennessee--Smith's longtime friends--turned 
against Calhoun.5 
' The dispute between these two politicians of the uplands 
extended also to the Tidewater districts, but in milder form. 
The lowlanders, with the exception of a few northern citizens 
and some Charlestonians, favored Calhoun and his flexible 
4Bio~raphical Directori of the American Consress, 1774-
1961 (Was ington, D. C., 19 1), P:-1625. --
5nuams Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography, 
XVII (New Yorl{,_ __ 1935), pp. 359-361. -
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stand rather than Smith and his unyielding states' rights 
position. They had even more reason than the short staple 
cotton producers of the southern uplands to support the fed-
eral government, Their crop, sea island cotton, was in great 
demand since its long staple produced a better quality of 
cloth than the short staple variety, so they quickly amassed 
fortunes, expanded production, increased their slave hold-
ings, and ~njoyed the prestige of their position, They, as 
well as the wealthy rice planters of the coastal river and 
swamp areas who were enjoying a similar life of luxury, were 
both receptive to the new federal policies and supported John 
C. Calhoun's semi-nationalistic stand rather than supporting 
William Smith's position.6 
There was one other region which supported Calhoun in 
1818--the mountain area. This was a small area in the west-
ern part of the state where the Blue Ridge Mountains 
stretched into the Pendleton and Greenville dist~icts. The 
land was very sparsely settled, causing the people to be 
without representatives from their region since the congress ... 
men were elected from the more populated eastern portion of 
their district which lay in the Piedmont. Although they had 
little influence politically, they supported Calhoun's views 
in 1818 because they wanted any internal improvements the 
national government might provide. Their economy was that 
of subsistence farmers.7 
6charles M. 
1828 (New York: 
7Freehling, 
Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nationalist, 1782-
The Bobbs .. Merrill Co., 1944), passim. 
Prelude to Civil War, p. 86 . ...,.,..... ,, -
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All the physiographic regions of South Carolina in. 
1818 were either thriving or at least hoping to do better 
very soon, but the agrarians' dreams collapsed when a finan-
cial panic struck the country in 1819. It especially hurt 
the cotton producers of the Palmetto State when it was ag-
g~avated in the lowlands by a credit contraction8--a problem 
for the aristocrats living beyond their means--and in the up-
lands by overproduction of short staple cotton as the new 
southwestern states poured 60 million pounds of cotton onto 
the market in 1821.9 At the same time Piedmont croplands 
were hurt by soil depletion and erosion. The depression grew 
worse as the decade of the twenties progressed, and by 1828 
the South Carolin~ans, especially the uplanders who were now 
living amid many deserted and overgrown plantations, turned 
against t~e policies of the federal government in general, 
and the protective tariff policy in particular since they 
felt it taxed too large a portion out of their cotton income 
and benefited the textile manufacturers rather than them-
selves. It appeared Smith had been right all along, 
As the depression spread most Carolinians sought the 
cause of their declining incomes. More than ever, they 
blamed the tariffs. Although iwposts were not the major rea-
son for their economic distress, they overlooked factors such 
as overproduction and soil depletion and directed their 
8rbid., p. 36. 
9Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819-
1829 (New York, 1962), pp. sz,..53-. - - -. - - --
attention solely to the North from whence new demands for 
even higher duties were constantly eminating. 
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In 1824 the New England textile manufacturers success-
fully asked for further protection against foreign imports. 
The duties proposed by the House Committee on Manufactures 
were 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem instead of the 25 per cent 
currently in effect on woolens and cottons. The depressed 
uplanders violently denounced the bill, with George McDuffie, 
the fiery orator from Edgefield, being the most adamant. He 
condemned the bill as favoring one region of the country over 
another and stated that he and his fellow cotton planters had 
invested money in the culture when it was 30 cents a pound, 
but after the speculation which had occurred. it··was now.: down·! 
to 12 cents, and many of his friends were being ruined. More 
would suffer, he stated, if Great Britain chose to retaliate 
by buying their cotton from a country other than the United 
States .10 
Lowland sentiment was also strongly against the tariff. 
The Tidewater's congressional battle was led by Sena.tor 
Robert Y, Hayne and Representative James Hamilton, Jr., both 
of Charleston. Hamilton resented the injustices of the 1824 
bill which aided other states and especially disliked the '.: 
suggested duty on hemp which would aid Kentucky. He cried 
" ... for the benefit of Kentucky, we are about to be taxed 
, • . sixty thousand dollars a year in the small State which 
lOAnnals of Congress, 18 Cong., I sess., p. 1677. 
27 
I represent." He considered this was "tribute" money to 
Kentucky.11 Hayne denounced the assumption that the govern-
ment was capable of regulating industry better than individ-
uals, stating that the tariff threatened the cotton growing 
states with the total loss of their market for cotton, rice, 
and tobacco. These were major trade items since the value 
of exports for 1823 totaled $47,000,000; of that, cotton 
alone amounted to $20,400,000, and the three articles of 
rice, cotton, and tobacco amounted to $28,500,000, or over 
two-thirds of all exports. All objections, though, w~re 
futile, and the 1824 measure became law.12 
In the intervening years between 1828 and 1828 more 
~GaJ;."olinians turned against protective tariffs since they were 
convinced the 1824 act added to the depression. But one 
politician, John C. Calhoun, did not state his views. With 
the state in such an uproar Calhoun was in a difficult situa-
tion; his political career seemed at stake. Some free trade 
extremists wanted him to support their position, but he 
feared he might lose northern political support if he berated 
the tariffs too strongly, and he knew he could not win the 
coveted presidency with southern votes alone. Silence seemed 
. the best solution. Andrew Jackson, The Tennessee presiden-
tial hopeful, was in a similar predicament so he also decided 
to remain quiet on the tariff issue. 
llrbid., p. 1518. 
12rbid., pp. 622, 641-642. 
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Calhoun's reticence to make a statement partially ended 
in 1827 when the northern protectionists asked for another 
protective measure. The resultant legislation, the Woolens 
Bill, passed the House of Representatives but became dead-
locked in the Senate over which the Vice President was pre.-.. 
siding, When the vote was read it showed an evenly divided 
body, so Calhoun, in position to break the tie, cast his vote 
to table and thus kill the bill.13 The Vice President, it 
seemed, was moving over to Smith's position in favor of more 
dire~t and vigorous opposition to the tariff. 
The defeat of the 1827 measure did not stop the northern 
protectionists who quickly sought further legislation. How-
ever, the congressmen from South Carolina quickly joined the 
supporters of Andrew Jackson and devised a measure which~ 
they hoped, would be rejected by all concerned. They secret-
ly penned a bill which seemed protective, but which would 
actually be detrimental to the New England industrialists. 
They wanted the manufacturers themselves to vote it down. 
Jackson hoped to get support from the free traders in the 
South when the bill failed, and from protectionists in the 
Northwest for having written a protective measure_. 
The newly proposed bill, the Tariff of 1828, reached the 
floor of Congress for consideration in January of that year, 
but the South Carolina congressmen said very little during 
the tariff debates in the House and Senate although one would 
13Register £!Debates, 19 Cong., II sess., p. 496. 
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logically assume there would be considerable reaction to a 
protective measure which carried extremely high textile du-
ties of 50 per cent ad valorem. They were generally silent 
as they waited for the Jacksonian plot to be effected al-
though a few mild comments were made for the sake of pretend-
ing they hated the measure. Hayne castigated the proposed 
bill, saying he could not put his finger on one single item 
that would benefit the South, while Smith asked the Senate to 
strike out the section embracing a duty on cotton bagging 
since cotton prices had fallen and the planters were being 
severely h\trt.· Drayton condemned the law as partial, and 
Hamilton went further by declaring the sovereign states had 
never conferred upon the government the power to tax the 
interests of her own citizens for the exclusive benefit of 
industry and the citizens of other states; .-William Martin · 
denied that the proposed duty on cotton was intended as pro-
tec;tion, asserting it was for revenue only.14 But other than 
these few remarks, the Carolinians listened quietly, evident-
ly amused, as the manufacturers vigorously objected to the 
measure. 
However, toward the end of the debates some South "(· 
Carolina '.chengressmen could no longer contain themselves and 
openly taunted the New Englanders, telling them they had 
written a bill so odious even the industrialists would oppose 
14Register of Pebates, 20 Cong., I sess,, pp. 746, 784, 
2324, 243, 2454. 
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•t 15 1 • The Carolinians were, of course, due for a political 
shock, because the New Englanders decided to support the bill 
which even they did not like in all of its clauses, and the 
bill became law, 
South Carolina's reaction to the tariff of 1828 is evi~ 
denced by the congressional votes in opposition to the act; 
those who voted unanimously opposed the measure.16 (Map 2) 
The two·se~~tors, Robert Hayne and William Smith, now a 
Charlestonian, were strongly opposed to the act, Smith had 
always opposed such federal legislation, but Hayne, a planter 
and lawyer whose agrarian interests and political ambitions 
caused him to renounce a bill odious to his constituents, was 
a new convert to the cause.17 
The four congressmen from the Piedmont, the short staple 
cotton region hardest hit by the depression, and the two 
congressmen from the upper Tidewater, the short staple cotton 
and tobacco farming a+ea, also opposed the bill. George 
McDuffie was the extremist of this group, but Warren Davis 
of Pendleton, William Nuckolls of Spartanburg, and Starling 
Tucker of Mountain Shoals also opposed the act. John Carter 
of Camden, a Fall Line city, and William Martin of Barnwell 
151bid., p. 2344. Thomas R. Mitchell told the Congress 
he was pleased that thP.y kept the duty on molasses since 
this would help get the New Englanders to oppose the bill. 
161bid., pp. 2471~2472, 786. 
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in the upper Tidewater were against the measure, but Martin 
was not present in Congress to cast his vote.18 . 
The lowland congressmen were Thomas Mitchell of George-
town, and William Drayton and James Hamilton, Jr., of 
Charleston. Mitchell did not cast a ve>te, but the other two 
voted against the 1828 act. Mitchell and Drayton were mod-
erates who opposed heavy protection but who also eschewed 
extremism in any form, while Hamilton was an extremist whose 
views were similar to those of George McDuffie,19 
In the final analysis, the 1828 congressional tariff 
vote by the South Carolinians presents a fairly unanimous 
picture of opposition to the most protective measure in 
American history. Five of the nine voting against the meas-
ure were from the depressed short staple cotton and tobacco 
regions of the Piedmont and upper Tidewater, and the remain; 
der were from the thriving .coastal rice and sea-island cotton 
region. The vote of the latter group seems rather enigmatic~ 
since the Tariff of 1828 did not affect their products. 
Neither rice nor sea island cotton was plentiful enough as it 
was, and neither northerners nor southerners wanted special 
protection for either. It appears that another factor, also 
economically motivated, caused them to oppose the act: that 
181bid., pp. 1296, 788, 1342, 1731, 667, 127; Register 
of Debates, 20 Cong., I Sess., pp, 2471-2472. -
19Ibid., 2471-2472; Bioara~hical Directory of the 
American Conaress, pp. 1342, 82 , 997; Dictionar'YoTAmerican 
Biography, v, p. 448. --- · 
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reason was slavery.20 The coastal region was filled with 
Negro freemen and slaves, and the whites were outnumbered. 
This situation in itself was no problem, even though Demark 
Ves~y's conspiracy of 1822 was well remembered; the problem 
was the growing protests by northerners who condemned the 
institution of slavery. In all probability, the wealthy 
coastal planters' votes against the tariff were an attempt 
to check the expansion of federal powers in other areas, in· 
eluding laws on abolition, The votes by the affluent ijayne 
and Hamilton F'~flect this logic, In later years William 
Harper, a nullifier, said, 
. . . in qontending against the Tariff, I have al~ 
ways felt that we were combatting the symptom in-
stead of the disease. Consolidation is the disease. 
. • , Tomorrow may witness21 , . (an attempt) to relieve ... your slaves. 
Although the Tariff of 1828 pass~d Congress~ reaction 
in South Carolina was tempered by the possibility that Andrew 
Jackson and John C. Calhoun might become President and Vice 
President, respectively, in the 1828 election. If silence 
could be maintained until these two men took office~ the 
Carolinian free traders were sure the new Chief Executive 
would quickly revise the tariff downward. A few South 
Carolinians could not be convinced to remain silent, though, 
20Two authors ably show the influence of slavery in the 
tariff controversy, William Freehling in Prelude to Civil War 
is especially noteworthy, as is Frederic Bancroft7'°"Calhoun-
and the South Carolina Nullification Movement (Balt1more, 
1'9I8}. . . . 
2lspeeches Delivered in the Convention of the State of 
South Carolina, March, 183T, in Freehling, Prel'\i'Oe to CivIT 
War, p, 256. - · --
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especially James Hamilton, Jr., Robert Hayne, and George 
·~cDuf~ie. These articulate men immediately berated the tar ... 
iff as an inJu>stice, and during their speeches and tours and 
in their newspaper articles set forth the suggested remedy of 
nullification. They recounted statements from Robert !urn-
bull' s articles which had suggested a similar action in 1827. 
Further, they asked John C. Calhoun to write a position paper 
which would show the merits of such a policy.22 Calhoun's 
resultant document, the ~xposition and Protest, ably pre-
sented the views of the nullifiers of South Carolina by stat-
ing that if the federal government went beyond its limited 
powers by passing an act objectionable to the sovereign 
states, they might constitutionally·declare such act null and 
void within their legal jurisdiction. Calhoun, howev~r, did 
not affix his signature to the paper. He was still hoping to 
fulfill his political ambitions.23 
The moderate reaction by many Carolinians in 1828 was 
short-lived~as a vari~ty of disruptive events occurred 
shortly after President Jackson took office. First, the new 
President and his Vice President, Calhoun, soon grew to dis ... 
like each other, thus ending all hopes of presidential aid 
for free trade policies. Second, e~forts to lower the tariff 
in 1830 failed. Third, in 1831 William Lloyd Garrison began 
22calhoun to Pres ton, Jan. 6, 1829, ·Virginia Carrington 
Scrapbook, in Ibid., pp. 158-159. ' · ·' · · · 
23south Carolina Statutes at Large, (1836), p. 247 ff; 
Richard Cralle", ed.', Works of JOFin C, Calhoun (New York, 
1854-1859), VI, pp. 1-57. - -. - ...... . 
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publishing The Liberator, an abolitionist newspaper. Fourth, 
the ~at Turner insurrection in Virginia in 1831 caused fright 
among the southern slaveowners. These and other episodes 
produced a new attitude of defensiveness toward slavery and 
persuaded many South Carolinians that they must reassess 
their position as a state within the federal union. 
The cumulative events of the early thirties convinced 
many moderates that George McDuffie and his group were cor-
rect in advocating nullification, and by the summer of 1831 
a majority of the Carolinians seemed to be leaning toward a 
stronger states' rights policy against the encroachments of 
the federal government. The one notable who was still miss-
ing from the extremists' following, though, was Calhoun, but 
the stream of events and the increasing radicalism of his 
fellow citizens soon forced the Vice President to take a 
stand on the issue in order to keep a semblance of leadership 
among southerners. He evidently had no chance to become the 
next president after Jackson since the President now detested 
him, but he might yet gain a large following in the South so 
in July of 1831 he published the "Fort Hill Letter." This 
open publication printed in the Pendleton Messenger presented 
his views against protective tariffs and placed him on the 
side of the southern extremists. 24 With his open declaration 
several more moderates, trusting Calhoun's leadership, 
joined the nullification crusade. 
24Margaret L, Coit, John C. Calhoun, American Portrait 
(Boston, 1950), p. 235; Crall?,° Works of John C. Calhoun, VI, 
pp. 60-94. -. - - . 
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Although the radicals or nullifiers were most outspoken, 
not all the reaction in South Carolina was negative. A new 
group of South Carolinians led by Daniel Huger, James L. 
Petigru, and Hugh Legare, all lawyers and planters from the 
Charleston area, and Thomas Mitchell and Wil,liam Drayton, 
congressmen, arose to combat the nullifiers. These irunion-
ists" based their opposition to nullification not on any 
sympathy for protective tariffs, fqr they were opposed to 
them, but upon the probability of civil war should nullifica-
tion occur. Favoring compromise over military action, they 
supported the newly proposed Tariff of 1832; a bill intro-
duced into Congress as a moderate measure that might assuage 
southern criticism of protective policies.25 
The Tariff of 1832, in its final form, reduced the 
duties on several items which had been covered by the 1828 
act. However, the approximately 50 per cent rates of duties 
on cotton goods, woolens, and iron products were largely re-
tained, The nullifiers who had contended that a general re-
duction of at least 15 per cent must be obtained were irate, 
saying no effective reductions had been made, 26 The union-
ists had hoped for a better bill, but they accepted the 1832 
act as a step toward lower duties. 
25Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification 
Movement, pp. 93-99. --.- ____, 
26Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff Histort of the United 
States (New York, 1967), pp. 103-105; Chat estonMercury, 
May ll, 1832. 
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The +wenty-Second Congress of the United States which 
pas~ed the Tariff of 1832 was slightly different in make .. up 
from the Twentieth Congress which passed the Tariff of Abom-
inations. 27 (Map 3) Six of South Carolina's congre~smen 
served in both congresses; Senator Hayne, who remained in 
office until December 13, 1832, then resigned so Calhoun 
could fill the position, and Representatives Davis, Drayton, 
McDuffie, Mitchell, and Nuckolls. Newcomers were Senator 
Stephen Miller of Camden and Representative Robert W. Barn-
well of Beaufort, James Blair of Lynchwood (now Bethune), 
John M. Felder of Orangeburg, and John K. Griffin of Milton. 
Four represented the Piedmont; three represented the upper 
Tidewater; and four represented the coastal Tidewater. !he 
mountain fringe was again unrepresented, The vote of these 
congressmen, to the dismay of other southerners who presumed 
all Carolinians were united, was divided.28 lhe representa-
tive~ of the Piedmont--McDuffie, Davis, Nuckoil,ls, and Grif-
,fin--once again voiced their opposition to the 1832 tariff 
measure, Their vote was based upon·McDuffie's influential 
stand and on the upland depression. Desiring free trade 
which would enable them to buy coarse cottons and other goods 
cheaply on the world market while selling short staple cotton 
to Europe, they rallied to support their new Piedmont com-
patriot, John C. Calhoun. 
27Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 
p. 116. . . . 




















































Map 3. South Carolina's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1832 
39 
Northeast of the Congaree River in the region known as 
Smith territory since William Smith and his states' rights, 
anti-Calhoun philosophy had dominated the scene for some 
time, there was some diversity. Smith's converts had in·· 
eluded Miller, Blair, and Mitchell at one time, but the Cal-
hounites drew Miller away from the fold when Smith rejected 
nullification as a solution.29 The two votes of the region 
were divid~d, Senator Miller voting against the Tariff of 
1832 and Representative Blair vo~ing for it. Blair, a mod-
erate who could see both sides of the picture, did not favor 
protection but felt.the proposed tariffs were somewhat lower 
and WO\lld be beneficial in reducing the burden-on his con-
stituents, John Felder ef· Orangeburg, the representative in 
the southe~n portion of the upper Tidewater, voted against 
the act because of his agra;rian belief in free trade, His 
work in agriculture and lumber was important in influencing 
him. 30 
The third region, the lower Tidewater·, was the least 
hannonio\lS aJ;:"ea. The congressional votes were evenly divided 
with Senator Hayne and Representative Barnwell voting against 
the bill and Representatives Drayton and Mitchell voting for 
it. Hayne's stand was based upon his zeal to be a political 
leader and his fear of governmental encroachments on slavery 
in the states. That Barnwell joined him in this fear is 
29Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, pp. 98, 235. 
. ,....._ ' --.... 
. 30Biofraphical Directory.2£ the American Co¥c,J;ess, p. 879; 
Register .2_ Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., pp. 383· ... 3831, 1219. 
I 
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evidenced by his statement in congress that the South could 
not yield to the northern majority or the North might make 
the South change its domestic policy. Barnwell and Hayne's 
votes represented the views of the planters, lawyers, and 
Tidewater artstocracy, 
. .:" 
The Tidewater s~pporters of the proposed modification 
were William Drayton and Thomas Mitchell. Drayton's back-
ground explains much about his reasoning. He was not a 
Carolinian, having been born in Florida. After living in 
England, he finally settled in Charleston. He was an early 
Federalist, and later a supporter of moderately low tariffs, 
. 
but always an unrelenting opponent of anything which might 
hurt the Union. His lucrative law practice allowed him to 
invest heavily in commercial enterprises, thus separating him 
from the agrarian interests of the state. Strangely, his 
foster brother was Robert Turnbull, the nullification advo-
cate.31 Drayton's other ally, Mitchell, was also a unionist. 
He was a political ally of Smith and Drayton and contended 
the new measure was a genuine attempt to give some relief to 
the South. Thus a total of three votes were cast for the 
still protective 1832 tariff bill. 
The discontented Carolinians were primed by the extrem-
ists to react violently should the measure pass, so upon re-
ceiving news of the passage of the new federal legislation, 
Governor Hamilton, determined to try the remedy of 
3lrbid., pp. 3830-3831, 1~19; Charleston Mercury, Au-
gust 18, 1830; Die tionary of Arner,ican Biography, V, p. 448. 
41 
n~llification, ordered the legislature into special session 
on October 22, 1832. He told the group that a special con-
vention should be called .. He told the state congressmen the 
state should nullify the Tariff of 1832 which had been passed 
only for northern and western interests, and asked them to 
authorize a special nullification convention which could con-
sider the feasibility of interposition.32 The delegates were 
receptive, so a committee was formed to write the bill call-
ing for the convention, The committee's bill was quickly 
written and presented to the legislature for approval. The 
measure was adopted overwhelmingly as the lower house passed 
it 96-25, and the state Senate supported it 31-13. 33 They 
scheduled the nullification convention which would make the 
final decision for November 10, 1832, in Columbia, 
The nullifiers finally obtained their major::ohjective:» 
when the Convention met ~and quickly accepted the Ordinance of 
Nullification, a declaration of their state's intention to 
nullify the tariffs, effective February 1, 1833, and to use 
force to protect itself if necessary. 
And we, the People of South Carolina ..• are 
determined to maintain this, our Ordinance and Dec-
laration, at every hazard, do further Declare that 
we will not submit to the application of force, on 
the part of the Federal G~4ernment to reduce this 
State t~_obedience •..• 
32camden Journal, October 27, 1832. 
33Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification 
Movement, p. 126, - - ·· · · · · · 
34statutes at Lar~e of South Carolina (o:o.~urlih'ia ··~; · · ~-.. --, 
1836-1841), I, 3"2"9'ff, inHermanV. Aii'ies, ed~, State Documents 
on Federal Relations: The States and the United States 
"'{Philadelphia, 1906) , pp:-37"-41. - -
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Events moved rapidly following the issuing of the Ordi-
nance as Senator Hayne resigned his position in the Senate, 
and Calhoun resigned his position as Vice President. The two 
then resumed political office as Governor and United States 
Senator,respectivel~ and watched as their fellow Carolinians 
happily pronounced themselves successful, but their elation 
was short-lived because other southern stales did not agree 
to South Carolina's proposal that a southern convention be 
called to decide on the correctness of nullification for the 
South as a whole. Also, President Jackson readied a civilian 
posse in Washington, making it apparent that he was willing 
to engage in battle with the recalcitrants.35 
South Carolina quickly became an armed camp as the leg-
islature gave Governor Hayne authority to accept milita~y 
volunteers, and 25,000 men quickly enlisted in the nullifier's 
army.36 At the same time Joel Poinsett, a Charleston union-
ist and a friend of Jackson, recruited and equipped a similar 
army for the unionist cause. Jackson would have sent troops 
to aid the unionists, but Congressman Drayton and Daniel 
Huger, a leading Charlestonian, advised against it,37 
ay the middle of December all people concerned--the 
President, the nullifiers, and the unionists--began 
35Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, pp. 279-280. 
36rbid., p, 275. 
37J, Fred Rippy, Joel Roberts Poinsett, Versatile Ame.ri-
can (Durham, 1935) , passim; David Franklin Houston, A Criti-
cal )tudy of Nullification in South Carolina (New York, 
ffi6 , p. TIS. 
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reevaluating their positions, fearing that war might begin 
on February 1, 1833, when the Ordinance of Nullification was 
to become effective. Some people suggested a new lower tar-
iff bill as a solution to the dilemma. This recommendation 
was quickly acted upon by Representative Gulian Verplanck 
who introduced a revised tariff bill into the House of Rep-
resentatives in December, 1832. The Verplanck bill which 
called for a 50 per cent reduction of tariff duties by 1834, 
offered possibilities for compromise, but some Carolinians 
objected to the proposal because they felt President Jackson, 
their enemy, supported it.38 Jackson, refusing to be outdone 
by the nullifiers, introduced the Force Bill on January 16, 
asking Congress to grant him power to enforce the tariff act 
in South Carolina.39 
Meanwhile, Martin Van Buren, heir to the presidency 
after Jackson, worried about the effects of the Force Bill 
since the Democratic party that Jackson now led had followers 
in both the North and South. The southern wing supported the 
doctrine of states' rights and might bolt the party if Jack-
son continued to work for military authority against one 
stiate .rather than resting his case by simply verbally oppos-
ing nullification. Van Buren felt opposition to nullifica-
tion was defensible, but that Jackson should ignore the 
greater question of secession, since many southerners 
38Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., pp. 1763, 
3120ff. ~ 
39Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., pp. 244-246, 
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believed the old Kentucky and Virginia resolutions supported 
not only state $overeignty and nullification but secession, 
too. 40 
When Jackson expressed his own convictions against the 
legality of secession and asserted that nullification must 
be put down at any price, as feared, some southern states' 
rights Democrats left the party under the leadership of 
Senator John Tyler of Virginia. 41 Still Jackson, like Cal-
houn, did not want to see a war ensue. The only solution 
appeared to be the proposed Verplanck tariff which was being 
debated on the floor of Congress, 
The Verplanck bill, although extremely lenient when 
compared to the 1828 and 1832 tariffs, was opposed by the 
leading nullifiers since the rates were above their 15 per 
cent formula for settlement as stated at the Nullification 
Convention. However, most Carolinians were prepared to ac-
cept it in principle as a better bill. Calhoun and other 
congressmen wrote home about their fears that it would not 
pass, but Calhoun, who feared his fellow statesmen had moved 
too far to the left, was hopeful that if it did pass it would 
stop the nullification movement. In the meantime the nulli-
fiers, thinkipg there was some hope for relief, decided the 
February 1 deadline for enforcement of the Ordinance must be 
postponed, so on January 21 the nullifiers met in Charleston 
40charles Sellers, ed., Andrew Jackson, Nullification, 
and the State-Rif!ihts Tradition (Chicago, 1963), pp. 50-53. 
4lrbid., pp, 55-56. 
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and voted to avoid conflict as long as Congress was delib-
erating on the tariff. If the Force Bill passed Congress, 
though, Hamilton planned to reconvene the Convention and ask 
f.or the next step after nullification--secession.42 
During this time of activity Calhoun did not remain 
idle. He was concerned about the radicalism of his state 
since, although he had reformulated the doctrine of nullifi-
cation, he was opposed to an act of secession. He feared 
South Carolina was moving in that direction because Governor 
Hayne, Representatives McDuffie and Barnwell, and notables 
such as James Hamilton, Jr., Robert Turnbull, and Thomas 
Cooper, President of the college at Columbia, all were pro-
nounced secessionists~43 He feared the state would secede 
if the Verplanck bill or some other compromise bill failed 
to pass Congress, 
Recognizing Calhoun's concern, Henry Clay approached the 
Senator about the possibility of a compromise tariff. To-
gether they calculated a new measure which might prove par-
tially acceptable to both sides. The new measure, the 
Compromise Tariff of 1833, was introduced into the Senate on 
February 12 while the Verplanck bill was still being cor:tsid ... 
exed by the House. Clay's bill proposed putting many goods 
on the free list and lowering the rates on protected goods 
42Evening Post, Jan. 22, 1833; Charleston Mercury, 
Jan. 23, 1833. ,__...., 
43Margaret Coit emphasizes Calhoun's constant regard for 
the Union in John C. Calhoun, .t\mer;can Portrait; Freehling, 
Prelude to Civrr-War, p. 291. - ... ~
46 
gradually until they reached the 20 per cent level in 1842, 
However, during the first nine years the 1833 tariff would 
remain strongly protective, dropping drastically in the last 
six months. The Verplanck tariff was dismissed from consid-
eration as the new compromise bill caught the attention of 
the congressmen.44 
The Compromise Tariff and the Force Bill moved through 
Congress .together:~.· · The tariff, w:i,th very .~little debate, 
passed the House 119-85 and the Senate 29-16, with the South 
Carolinians registering a unanimous eleven votes of approv-
a1, 45 (Map 4) Those who once wanted secession had awakened 
to both the economic and military problems that might ensue 
from that course, so were amenable to the attempt at media-
tion. The unionists found in this act a way to avoid both 
nullification and secession, so both sides saved face. 
The second bill under consideration, the Force Bill, did 
not receive the same degree of approval the South Carolinians 
had bestowed upon the Compromise Tariff. The United States 
House of Representatives passed the measure 149-47 and the 
Senate supported it 32~1, but the South Carolina membership 
placed a 6-3 vote against it in the House, as the two -se~at­
ors abstained.46 (Map 5) The citizenry understood th~_ ab-
.·~~ 
stentions because they knew that Calhoun and Miller were ,, · 
44Reg~ster .2£ Debates, 22 Cong., II sess,, pp. 477-478, 
7.91. 
45Ibid., pp. 1810-1811, 808-809, 
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Map 5. SouthCarolina's Force Bill Vote, 1833. 
48 
4.9 
using that method to show their opposition to the measure, 
realizing they were in a minority and could not defeat it if 
they voted. But they were amazed that three congressmen gave 
their support to the "Bloody Bill," as they termed it. These 
men, Representatives Drayton, Blair, and Mitchell, were 
unionists and used this means to voice their beliefs in the 
federal union over states' rights. Had their opposition to 
Calhoun not been so strong, they too would probably have ab-
stained from voting. They believed the Union must be pre-
served, no matter by what means, and further asserted that 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison had never intenqed for 
their nullification theories to be construed in the manner 
Calhoun and McDuffie understood them. In their opinion, 
these venerated men would never have supported secession.47 
Although political beliefs motivated the votes by 
Drayton, Blair, and Mitchell, economic factors were important 
underlying causes. Blair was not a cotton producer and had 
not suffered from the vagaries of the economy, while Drayton 
and Mitchell were city dweller$ whose legal practices had not 
been hampered by the Tidewater and Piechnont depression. 
Emotionally, then, they were less involved than Carolinians 
who had felt the pinch of the ebbing economy, 
The South Carolinians, however, were not satiated with 
the logic behind the votes of Drayton, Blair~ and Mitchell 
47charleston Courier, Nov. 7, 22, 1828; Sellers, Andrew 
Jackson, Nullification, and the State-Rights Tradition, 
pp, 33-34. ---~ 
for the Force Bill. The Charleston Mercury published several 
letters to the editor vilifying these men.48 The citizens of 
Columbia burned the three villains in effigy,49 and letters 
poured into the state newspapers from other states,50 either 
in support of or in opposition to the actions of the three 
congressmen. When Judge William Smith, having moved to Ala-
bama, addressed the Union Party of South Carolina through the 
Alabama Intelligencer and s~id that if civil war resulted he 
would be on the side of these men and the Union Party, the 
editor of the Charleston Merc~ry reprinted Smith's letter and 
reviled him, saying he was influenced by his personal hatred 
of Senator Calhoun, Governor Hayne, Mr. McDuffie, and General 
Hamil ton. Sl 
Even though the wrathful harrangues against the Union-
ists' support of the Force Bill pervated the Carolinians' 
thoughts for a while, one thing was changed; nullification 
48see Charleston Mercurt, January-March, 1833. The edi-
tor of the newspaper, Henry ~. Pinckney, was an ardent nulli .... 
fier. He published reports and letters to the editor from 
the various nullifiers and nullification meetings in the 
state, and published addresses sent to his paper from other 
states if they supported his cause. Other nullification· 
newspapers included th~ Pendleton Messenger, (Columbia) 
Southern Times, Columbia Telescole, Camden and Lancaster Bea-
con, Suniter Gazette, Winyew lnte lifencer, and the (Charles-
ton) Eveninf Post. The ~ajor union st paper was the 
(Charleston SOUthern :ratriot; others included the Charleston 
Couri:·ery Greenville Mountaineer, and the Camden Journal. 
49charleston Mercury, March 18, 1833. 
50Ibid., March, 1833. 
Slrbid., March 18, 1833, from the Alabama Journal, 
March 9, 1833. 
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was dying in SO.uth Carolina. The Tariff of 1833 accomplished 
its objective as the moderates of South Carolina and even 
most of the staunch nullifiers accepted it as a reasonable 
alternative to the 1832 measure. Strangely, even the tem-
peramental Geo~ge McDuffie supported the compromise.52 The 
next decision concerned what action to take next. Their 
Ordinance of Nullification was extant, so the next move lay 
with them. On March 11, 1833, the Convention reassembled in 
Columbia and voted to repeal the Ordinance, but to emphasize 
their antipathy toward the Force Bill, they recalcitrantly 
voted to nullify it. 53 President Jackson wisely ignored 
their action. At last, the South Carolinians had a lower 
tariff, and peace was restored. 
In conclusion, after looking at the various tariff 
measures and the Carolinians' reactions to them, there are 
several questions that should be considered. Why did most 
South Carolinians oppose the p:tiotective tariffs? Why did 
some become extremists and suggest the remedy of nullifica-
tion? Why did some groups and individuals support protective 
tariffs? Why did some become "unionists" duX'ing that era, 
forsaking the states' rights position of many of their fel-
low sta~esmen, even though they top usually opposed severe 
rates of protection? Was there any notable regional or 
52aegiater of Debates, 22 Cong,, II sess., pp. 1810 .. 
1811. . . . ' ... 
53Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullifica-
tion Movement, pp. 169-1~ --- · 
~-. 
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economic cqntinuity in the Carolinians' votes for or against 
tariff measures? Did non~economic factors such as personal 
beliefs and heritage or political motivation play a role? 
The first que~tion is of primary importance since a 
majority of the Carolinians opposed tariff legislation; both 
lowlanders and uplanders even though the economy of one area 
was distinctively different from that of the other. The 
people of both sections--the short staple cotton produ~ers 
of the uplands and the rice and sea island cotton producers 
of the Tidewater--felt the force of the depression which 
struck the country in the 1820's and 1830's. Since the de-
pression occurred just as the Carolinians were experiencing 
a rapid economic growth, the economic decline seemed more 
precipitous; both to lowlanders who maintained a f~irly good 
income from their crops but who were caught in a currency 
contraction, and to uplanders whose cotton seemed to have 
lost its value. The tariff b~came the scapegoat for the 
Carolinians' woes, and when the dep:t"ession lingered in their 
state longer than in others they assured themselves of the 
correctness of thei~ logic. 
The trend toward protectionist tariffs by the federal 
government produced general concern and fairly ,8-trong opposi-.. . 
tion on the part of many Carolinians, but it also produced a 
few radicals or extremists whose fierce disputations and 
oratories rang out louder than that of their fellow citizen.· ~ 
ry. Three men, George McDuffie, James Hamilton, Jr., and 
Robert ~. Hayne, headed the list of radicals, but their 
53 
reasons for opposing the tariffs differed. George McDuffie, 
a citizen of the upland town of Edgefield, lived in the 
region which suffered worst from the depression, and due to 
his added personal ambitions and physical frustrations he 
let nothing hinder his vigorous declamations. The other two 
spokesmen, Hamilton and Hayne, lived in the more wealthy 
districts of the Tidewater--an area not as affected by the 
depression--so the cause of their radicalism lies not in 
cotton prices but in the slavery question. The whites were 
often outnumbered by the blacks in the sea islands and coast• 
al region; some slave insurrections had occurre~; and the 
northern abolitionists were asking the federal government to. 
abolish slavery. All these factors produced a degree of con-
cern in the lowlands, and although little was said about the 
slave issue, some determined to fight the federal govern-
ment's authority over state matters. They intended to op-
pose the government's t'igh't'":'t!b•.-impose tariff legislation, 
hoping that would enable them to counteract any further gov-
ernmental attempts to meddle in state. affairs. Hayne and 
Hamilton, both of whom owned many slaves, led the fight for 
the Tidewater aristocrats both because they believed it was 
an economic necessity to do so and because they were desir-
ous of political acclaim. Interestingly, the lower Piedmont 
--the Edgefield and Camden districts .. -which had the most 
slaves showed the greatest degree of radicalism according 
··-
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to the new$papers of the day,54 so the question of slavery, 
though muted, appears to be of extreme importance. 
As in all controversies, there are usually two opposing 
views; the same WS$ true in Sou~h Carolina because the slave 
owners and cotton producers who disliked protection were 
counteracted by two economic sub-groups. These were the 
self-subsistant farmers of the small mountain region and most 
of the merchants in Charleston and the major port cities. 
The farmers whose connnunication with the surrounding areas 
was weakened by the lack of roads sought federal funds for 
internal improvements--money which could be obtained from 
high imposts. They also saw little need to oppose the tar-
iffs because their meager crops were not affected by the 
vagaries of the economy. The merchants also hoped for im-
proved internal improvements which would enable the agrarians 
to bring their goods to market so they, in turn, could trans-
port them to o.ther parts of the country and to Europe. Many 
of the merchants were northerners instead of native Carolin~ 
ians, so were not emotionally involved with Carolinian con~ 
cerns and were not concerned about impost duties which could 
be pa$sed pn to the consumers.SS 
Although most Carolinians opposed the tariffs while a 
few favored them, a third group arose whose actions were more 
enigmatic. These were the people who opposed strong 
54Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 366. 
----. -
SSo, D. Wallace, History of South Carolin& (New York, 
1934), I, p. 364. 
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protective tariffs, yet who voted for some of the impost 
measures their fellow statesmen disliked. These people were 
opposed to the tariffs but more strongly opposed to the rem-
edy of nullification, so they placed themselves in opposition 
to their fellow citizens by supporting Jackson and{the Union. 
These "unionists" resided in the coastal cities and in the 
portion of the state lying closest to North Carolina, A 
resurvey of Maps 3 and 5 shows that William Drayton of 
Charleston, Thomas Mitchell of Georgetown, and James Blair 
of Lynchwood cast votes opposing the Tariff of 1832 and the 
Force Bill. Both of these measures provoked strong emotions 
since the 1832 act was passed at a time when a majority of 
people were strongly antagonistic to further protection, and 
Jackson's Force Bill was despicable to most Carolinians be-
cause of the possible military action which might ensue. 
Still these three men held firm to their anti-nullification 
beliefs and were joined by several other leading citizens: 
. 
Joel Poinsett, Hugh Legare, James Petigru, Daniel Huge~.; 
Thomas Grimke, Benjamin F. Perry, and William Smith.56 
In looking at the state's physiography make-up, and at 
the same time noting the diverse tariff and states' rights 
beliefs mentioned previously, a clearly defined regional pat-
tern of economic, social, and political thought emerges. The 
state was divided into seven major socio-economic regions, 
one being the mountain area, while the other si~ consisted of 
56Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification 
Movement, pp. 93-99. - -
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the southern and northern portions of the lower Tidewater, 
upper Tidewater, and Piedmont. The cities, so complex in 
composition, must be categorized separately, Of these areas, 
citizens of the southern portions of the lower Tidewater, 
upper Tidewater, and Piedmont, as well as much of the north-
ern Piedmont and several city residents, opposed the tariffs. 
The people of the mountain region were more favorable to tar-
iffs, but were not a vocal element. The residents of the 
remaining portions of the lower and upper Tidewater weakly 
opposed the tariffs, being more concerned with maintaining 
the Union, and when necessary, many citizens of these areas 
voted for the tariffs. Economically, then, agrarians of the 
short staple cotton, rice, long staple cotton, and much of 
the small farming and tobacco region opposed the tariffs, the 
latter two being weakest in this respect, while the merchants 
of the city area and some self-subsistant farmers of the 
mountains supported the measures. 
Finally, one should not overlook the importance of 
personalities or personal beliefs and social and political 
motivations when one studies the reactions to the tt!!riffs. 
These non-economic factors often played an important role 
among many outstanding Carolinians. The personal and polit-
ical groupings which might not have occurred had economics 
been the only factor. Although there was a degree of affin-
ity between the citizens of the uplands and most of the 
people of the lowlands, it appears some of the aristocratic 
Charlestonians such as the Legares, Hugers, and others were 
57 
less inclined to follow the lead of the new self-proclaimed 
leaders of the nullification doctrines. However, some of 
these new stewards were so personally influehtial and mes-
merizing in their power that many moderates followed their 
bidding although the less influential leaders would not have 
gained their support. 
Altogether, after assessing the regional economics and 
the tariff reactions, one must conclude that South Carolina 
was actually quite diverse or complex in nature. There were 
many interest groups: the free trade agrarians (cotton and 
rice planters and some small farmers), the non-free trade 
agrarians (mountain farmers), and the free trade nullifiers 
or radicals (McDuffie and his allies), the free trade union-
ists (Drayton and his allies), and the non-free trade union-
ists or protectionists (the merchants). Thus there were 
several incompatible elements and shifting alliances. The 
free trade agrarians were dominant, but the free trade nul-
lifiers proved most vocal and aggressive and gained an undue 
degree of '!lot~rt,ety. 
The unrelenting efforts of the nullifiers influenced the 
Carolinians to take matters into their own hands and go all 
the way to nullification as a personal remedy for the twin 
evils that existed within the state; economic depression in 
the uplands and slave problems in the lowlands. In consider-
ing other states comparatively, one notes that only Georgia 
was as economically depressed and as aggravated by the abo-
litionists' outcries against slavery. Yet Georgia did not 
58 
join her sister state in supporting nullification, and 
Virginia--the state noted for leadership in states' rights 
efforts--also turned a deaf ear to the Carolinians' pleas for 
assistance. Evidently the strength of the sudden depression 
on the ascending economy and the desire to keep the economic 
foundation of the peculiar institution caused the Carolinians 
to stand alone in their attempt to confront the United States 
Government. Calhoun belatedly admitted: 
I consider the Tariff, but as the occasion, 
rather than the real cause of the present unhappy 
state of things. The truth can no longer be dis-
guised that the particular domestick institutions 
of the Southern states ••. has placed them ..• 
in opposite relation to the majority of the Un-
ion. • • • if there be no protective power in the 
reserved rights of the state, they must in the end 
be forced to rebel. . • • 5 7 
Thus the tariff dilennna in South Carolina ended in 1833, 
but the camouflaged question of federal authority over the 
slave institution awaited a future settlement. 
57Letter of John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, quoted in 
Ibid., p. 114. 
CHAPTER III 
VIRGINIA 
Resolved, that (Virginians) continue to regard 
the doctrine of State Sovereignty;and State Rights, 
as set forth in the Resolutions of 1798 ... as a 
true interpretation of the Constitution. . . and of 
the powers therein given to the General Government; 
but that they do not consider them as sanctioning 
the proceedings of South Carolina, indicated in her 
said Ordinance; nor as countenancing all the prin-
ciples assumed by the President in his said Procla~ 
mation--many of which are in direct conflict with 
them. 
Resolutions of the Virginia Legislature, 
January 26, 1833.1 
The 1833 Resolutions set forth by the Virginia State 
Legislature upon the passage of South Carolina's Ordinance of 
Nullification and President Jackson's Nullification Procla-
mation presented a picture of tenacity and moderation, al-
though in the light of Virginia's history many southerners 
e~pected a more radical reaction. Virginia, the home of 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, authors of the Kentucky 
and Virginia Resolves of 1798, considered itself to be the 
zealous guardian of the doctrine of state sovereignty--the 
doctrine which declared that if the Federal Government 
ursurped powers not delegated to it in the original compact 
!Herman V. Am.es, ed., State Documents on Federal Regu-
lations, The States and the United States (Pliiladelphia, · 
1906)' p.1S7. . - -
the states had the right to interpose and declare the undele-
gated acts void and of no force. In turn, the states' rights 
creed had become a type of platform for the Democratic-
Republican party of the South, and during the Twenties and 
Thirties numerous citizens within the Party considered them-
selves to be the supporters of the "Principles of '98." 
Strangely, both Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun felt them-
selves to be upholders of these precepts. 2 
The true importance of the old doctrines were weighed 
and debated during the tariff interlude of the 1820's and 
1830's as free trade agrarians battled northern protection-
·'·. ists over new impost legislation. The wide spectrum of 
interpretation concerning the true nature of the Resolutions 
of 1798 involved two specific things; first, was a tariff 
constitutional in that this was one of the powers delegated 
to Congress, and second, was nullification the proper remedy 
suggested by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison if an action 
by the government was deemed unconstitutional? Some people 
declared the two statesmen had meant to imply that nullifica-
tion was the only remedy possible, while others stated that 
they had propounded secession as the proper solution since it 
would be inconceivable to imply that a state coufd remain in 
the Union and not obey the Union's laws.3 Jefferson, having 
~Charles G. Sellers, Andrew Jackson, N~llification, and 
the State-Rights Tradition (Chicago, 1963), p. 1. 
3John Randolph of Roanoke, among others, was of this 
latter opinion. See Russell Kirk, John Randolph of Roanoke: 
A Study in American Politics (Chicagc:;-:-1964), p. "94. 
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died in 1826, was no longer present to reinterpret his docu-
ment, but Madison survived until 1836 and attempted to rede-
fine his position, contending that the states possessed only 
a portion of sovereign power and that no single state could 
nullify a national law. Further, Madison believed a protec-
tive tariff was constitutional, but doubted its expediency,4 
However, few people were willing to listen to Madison unless 
they were already of the same mind, for by 1832 each indi-
vidual had already developed his own theory, based on the 
individual economic of political needs of his region. Other 
than their differences on proper remedies for unconstitu-
tional acts by the Federal Government, the majority of the 
people of Virginia were in agreement that states' rights and 
a strict interpretation of the Constitution were essential, 
and that the Democratic Party of Jefferson was the only po-
litical entity upholding those creeds. The minority opinion, 
that held by the residents of western Virginia, supported 
federal powers instead of states' rights, but the westerns 
had been a less audible element, historically, so for a time 
their views were considered to be inconsequential. 
The South Carolina free traders, noting the historical 
attachment of the Old Dominion to states' rights, looked to 
her for support. In fact, they believed this state, second 
only to Georgia, was most likely to come to her aid in sup-
porting the Ordinance of Nullification. The Carolinians' 
4Gaillard Hunt, Writings of James Madison (New York: 
1900-1908), IV, p. 183; "Letters to C. J. Ingersol," in 
Niles' Weekly Register, XL, p. 352. 
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based their reasoning not only on historic actions, but other 
factors as well. Virginia was the home of the fiery defender 
of states' rights, John Randolph; it was an agrarian state 
with staples of tobacco and, to a lesser extent, cotton; it 
had a slave situation similar to that in the Palmetto State; 
and finally, Virginia was also experiencing a depression . . , 
Yet with all these factors at work in favor of South Carolina,. 
the Virginians ultimately rejected the pleas of their sister 
state and opposed the legality of the Ordinance of Nullifica-
tion. Evidently, there were other unnoticed but potent 
forces within the Old Dominion which elicited her rather 
amazing stance against nullification. To understand what 
those elements were, one must note the major force--divisive-
ness -or. factionalism within the state. 
One thing was quite evident to the Americans of the day 
--the fact that the people of western Virginia felt set apart 
or separated from the people of eastern Virginia. In South 
Carolina unity existed between uplands and lowlands and there 
was only a small mountain region in the very western part of 
the state, but Virginia suffered at the hands of nature by 
being dissected by two ranges of mountains in the near-
center of the state. These mountains--the Blue Ridge on the 
right and the Alleghenies on the left--were divided by a 
series of valleys, the most notable being the Shenandoah 
Valley. (Map 6) Thus Virginia was segmented into three 
distinct parts, but the problems of the Valley citizens were 
often similar to those which beset the westerners so the two 
<~~~~> V i r g i n i a 
(sheep) 
... . .. ·. 
( smal I farming) 
co • 
All eg hen y o'~-,~~-· ce "\ 
' ~ 0 ~~ ~..... co 
Pia tea u_.~o c;>~,,10~,~ 
• • •• ~ . A 
~ ... ~ ..... 
0~.o~ 0~_'t...o 
~ .. '(;:-' ,, ~-
e,~: Cl ~ () c.0 
,, .,o <b 
~ ~-o o' ~ 
~Q .. e, 0 
(tobacco 
plantations) 
. -~ ,~ 
~ <o 
"' {'-. .. • .· ... 
P·iedmont 
Plateau 
(tobacco) (coal) ........ 
Mountains 
(cotton) 
Map 6. Economy and Topography of Virginia 
v 
°' w 
felt an affinity for one another. The exceptions occurred 
in the Valley areas which had good transportation outlets to 
the east, in which case the people were more atune to the 
views of the easterners. 
This east-west division was sharpened by the poor trans-
portation systems of the day. Lacking proper roads and ca-
nals which would afford them good connections with the 
eastern citizens of their own state, the westerners relied 
on the only good facilities granted them by nature: the 
Kanawha River system and the mighty Ohio River. The former 
river ran through the center of the western area, past Wells-
burg (now Charleston) and emptied into the Ohio. Goods sent 
to market or for export could be floated on barge or boat 
down these two rivers, then down: the Mississippi River to New 
Orleans. It was inevitable that the westerners should feel 
closer to the people across the river from them in Ohio or 
Kentucky than to the people of their own state who lived 
across the mountains to the east. Nevertheless, the western-
ers, being politically affiliated with the east, clamored for 
state and federal aid so that roadi~and canals could be built 
to bridge the mountains. 
The road projects that were desired by the westerners 
were not quickly granted, but even if a good communication 
system had been effected, there were many other hindrances 
to unity which plagued the state. The western economy was 
quite different from that of the east; major crops being 
wheat, rye, corn, and some tobacco. In general, the west was 
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a land of small farmers since the mountainous and hilly 
nature of the land precluded any large plantation economy, 
The valley areas and the river bottom lands provided good 
grazing areas for sheep and other livestock, and eventuaily, 
wool production became a major livelihood for ma~y of the 
people of the north and west transmontane region, especially 
around Wheeling.5 Two small textile factories were estab-
lished in Wheeling.6 Several of the westerners were engaged 
in three non-agrarian pursuits: coal and iron ore mining and 
salt production. The major coal mines and iron ore areas 
were located in the northern portions of the west and the 
Valley, although minor veins were uncovered in several other 
places. Wheeling cut three hundred tons of nails annually 
and rolled one thousand tons of iron.7 The miners strongly 
advocated federal internal improvement programs so they could 
more easily transport their. goods to the North. The other 
resource, salt, was found beside the Ohio, but especially 
along the Kanawha River, an area which was a pathway to the 
West. The salt trade and the fertile river lands invited 
people moving westward to reside for a time along the Kanawha 
5The introduction of a new breed of sheep 1 the Merino, 
proved quite valuable in northwest Virginia. ·'Charles Henry 
Ambler, West Virginia, The Mountain State (New York, 1940), 
p. 224. - -
6charles Henry Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, 1776-
1861 (New York, 1964), p. 116. · ·~ 
7rbid,, p. 116. 
to work in the salt mining industry, the only western 
industry which used much slave labor.8 
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The'western Virginians, due to their economic interests, 
supported protective tariff policies, believing they needed 
strong prohibitions against foreign goods in order for their 
meager enterprises to grow. The iron industry, noted for 
making nails and rolled and bar iron, was not yet large 
enough to supply the country, but many westerners wanted the 
federal government to limit' .the foreign supply of iron to 
insure a stronger demand for their products. The salt indus-
try was more highly developed than the iron, but these pro-
ducers also wanted to limit the foreign supply which was 
coming into the area through New Orleans and up the Ohio 
River. The sheep herders wanted to curtail the importation 
of foreign wool and woolens goods so they could expand their 
herds and businesses and help supply the home market. As a 
result, most of the citizens of western Virginia increasingly 
supported protection, especially after 1824 when their pro-
ductive activities increased •. ~lthough the change from 
agrarian free trade views to a high tariff belief was grad'-
ual, one western congressman initiated the trend in 1824 by 
supporting the measure of that year, and in the years to come 
the entire west changed to become advocates of protection.9 
8rsaac Lippincott, "Early Salt Trade in the Ohio Valley," 
Journal of Political Economy, XX_(~939), p. 1029. 
9Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., I sess., p. 2310. 
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The differences that appeared in the transmontane dis-
tricts, although economic in nature, caused the westerners 
to support the Federalist or National Republican political 
party--the group which espoused protective tariffs, federal-
ly financed internal improvements, and home markets for in-
dustrial products, but sometimes the westerners crossed party 
lines to support Democrats if they believed the candidate 
supported legislation favorable to their interests. In 1824 
the westerners worked to defeat William Crawford, the Demo-
crat states' rights , ..candidate supported by the easterners. 
They got Henry Clay's followers and John Quincy Adams' fol-
lowers in their region to unite behind Andrew Jackson, be-
lieving he was opposed to aristocracy and conservatism which 
were the characteristics of their eastern neighbors. 10 Both 
Jackson and Crawford lost the election, but the westerners 
were delighted that the victor was John Quincy Adams, a sup-
porter of all the policies they approved. The easterners 
were displeased since the states' rights candidate they had 
supported, Crawford, had not only lost the election but had 
been afflicted by a stroke which would end his political 
career.11 
Adams' political views, not clearly defined at the time 
of his candidacy, were presented in his inaugural address as 
lOFor a survey of the Virginians' alignment behind the 
various candidates, see Richmond Enquirer, May-November, 
1824. 
llJ. E. D. Shipp, Giant Days: The Life and Times of 
William H. Crawford (Americus, Ga. , T909J,p .'"'114. 
he advocated a program of enlarged government spending. 12 
Items such as internal improvements were especially stressed, 
and it seemed he favored a new protective tariff, althou~h a 
measure with average ad valorem duties of 33 1/3 per cent had 
just been enacted in 1824. 
The people of eastern Virginia objected to a strength-
ened federal program not merely because of their own historic 
doctrine of states' rights but because of their own strong 
;"''economic interests which were very different from those of 
the ·west. Eastern Virginia was tobacco country with cotton 
as a secondary staple. Since colonial times the Virginians 
had been noted for their expanding agrarian economy, the use 
of slave labor, and the large Tidewater and Piedmont planta-
tions, However, between 1800 and 1830 there were clear evi-
dences of economic decline. The wasteful system of tobacco 
and cotton culture depleted the soil and wore out the lands. 
People and capital moved westward, past Virginia, and wealth 
was drained from the east.13 Even the corn and wheat lands 
were nearly exhausted by the unscientific farming methods. 
John Randolph of Roanoke, writing in 1814 to Josiah Quincy, 
bewailed the decline of the seaboard planters, declaring that 
the region was sunk in obscurity. 14 Charles Mercer, speaking 
12George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (New 
York, 1952), p. 8. - - - -
13Niles' Weekly Register, XLIV, p. 411; Annals .Qi 
Congress, 16 Cong., I sess., p. 1392. 
14Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819 ... 
1829 (New York, 1962) , p. 59. ___,_ - - - - ____,.. 
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to the ,Virgin~a convention in 1829, estimated that in 1817 
~:-~, ':· ' • •,,.. .,i/~,':· ', . • >:- . '. 
land values in Virginia aggregated two hundred and six mil-
lion dollars, and slaves averaged three hundred dollars, 
while in 1829 the land values averaged ninety million dol-
lars, and slaves had fallen to one hundred and fifty dollars 
in value.15 The cotton crop, though much smaller than the 
amount produced by South Carolina or Georgia, totalled 
around 8 million pounds in 1811, twelve million pounds in 
1821, and twenty-five million pounds in 1826, but then re-
ceded until it was down to ten million pounds in 1834.16 The 
panic of 1819 added to the Virginians' woes as their incomes 
declined even more. Some planters tried to convert from 
tobacco to cotton, hoping they could replenish the soil by 
changing to the second major staple, but the shorter Virginia 
growing season hampered many of them from achieving success 
except in the region bordering on North Carolina.17 Ulti-
mately, with the lands lying idle, but with nearly a half 
million slaves on hand, the once wealthy planters turned to 
a different mode of income--the sale of surplus slaves to the 
newer states of the Southwest.18 
The depressed economy of "the. east caused many eastern-
ers to be even more zealous guardians of the doctrine of 
15Ibid,, p. 59. 
l6rbid. , p. 52. 
17Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 115. 
18Turner, Rise of the New West, p. 57. 
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states' rights--a doctrine which would prohibit the federal 
government from using federal monies for internal improve-
ments and which would not allow the Congress to pass more 
protective tariffs. They believed either of these programs 
would plunge them deeper into debt. Many easterners even 
went a step further than simply opposing expenditures by the 
national government; they also refused to sponsor building 
programs within their own state, especially if it would bene-
fit the west. They did not want to spend money on a region 
other than their own. They carried their attitude a step 
fa~~her, as they had done since colonial times, by trying to 
prevent the west from having a large representation in the 
state legislature; it was not until 1829 that the westerners 
were able to achieve a democratic representation pattern.19 
B~ 1828 the westerners and easterners had firmly estab-
lished, but divergent, ideas concerning President Adams, in-
ternal improvements, tariffs, and party politics~ The 
westerners were becoming predominantly National-Republicans 
' while the easterners were Democratic-Republicans--the party 
of Jefferson. The General Survey Bill of 1824, providing for 
road projects which were termed of national importance, 
alienated the easterns a step further from Adams when, during 
his administration, he asked for some roads which were not 
deemed essential.20 Strangely, by 1828 the easterners and 
l9Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, pp. 137-174. 
' -
20Re~ister of Debates, 18 Cong., I sess., I, pp. 1296-
1311, 146 . -
··''71 • 
westerners had reversed their fonner positions in regard to 
presidential contenders; the majority of easterners favored 
Andrew Jackson for the next Democratic-Republican candidate, 
while the westerners supported John Quincy Adams or Henry 
Clay.21 The easterns, although they realized Old Hickory 
was more friendly to "commoners" than to themselves, felt 
Jackson would oppose internal improvements, would favor a 
low, or as he said "judicious tariff," and might oppose the 
bank monopoly which they disliked. Adams t' presidential pro-
grams had ingratiated him in the eyes of the westerners 
whose major objecti6n concerned internal improvements so they 
were almost totally for him and his party. 22 It was during 
this moment of pre-election decision-making that the Jackson-
ian supporters, led by Martin Van Buren, worked to effect a 
scheme which would enhance Jackson's chances for the presi-
dency, while at the same time retard those of Adams. This 
plan emerged as the Tariff of 1828. 
The Virginians' attitudes toward the Tariff of 1828 were 
divided. The act was extremely protective, almost to the 
degree of prohibition on some items since it established 
average ad valorem duties of around 50 per cent, The eastern 
Virginians hoped, as Jacksonians, that the northern manu-
facturers would find the measure objectionable and, along 
with the rest of the South, vote it down. The western 
21Richmond Enquirer, November 28, 1828. 
22Re~ister of Debates, 18 Cong., I sess., III, pp. 1285, 
1320, 131 • ~ 
Virginians who had sent delegates to the Harrisburg Conven-
tion in 1827 to petition Congress to retain protective duties 
on woolens and salt, supported the tariff.23 They wanted a 
high duty on woolens to preserve the sheep-raising and w9olen 
industries against British competition, and a salt duty be-
cause this item was being brought to New Orleans as ballast 
for ships and distributed along the Mississippi and Ohio 
Rivers by steamboats,24 
The 1828 tariff, in its final form, gave protection to 
wool, woolens, cotton goods, iron, and several other items. 
Although the textile manufacturers of New England were un-
happy at the duty on wool and the poor system of minima list-
i·ings on woolens, the western Virginians and Pennsylvanians 
were pleased. They felt they could supply the North with 
wool and iron and expand their enterprises, This support of 
protection by the westerners is evidenced in their congres-
sional tariff vote in 1828, a vote which was quite different 
from that of the agrarians throughout the rest of the 
South.25 (Map 7) 
In 1828, Virginia representativea cast three votes for 
the "Tariff of Abominations"; these votes were cast, however, 
by representatives from the western portion of the state--an 
area suggesting, in its extent and boundaries, the present 
23Niles' Weekly Register, XXXII, pp. 388, 417~ 
24Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 203. 
25Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 2471-· 
2472. - . 
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state of ·West Virginia. This area sent a solid slate of 
.National-Republicans to Congress to represent them: Isaac 
Leffler of Wheeling, William Armstrong of Romney, and Lewis 
Maxwell of Weston.26 Leffler, representing the iron int~r­
ests of the north, was a lawyer in Wheeling before his 1827 
election to Congress. 27 He made the only comment on the 
floor of the House from his district as he worked to gain 
protection against foreign iron. 28 Armstrong, a lawyer and 
a former Democrat, represented the sheep and iron interests 
of the northeast. He chose to remain silent during the de-
bates as did Maxwell, the most noted National-Republican of 
the group.29 Maxwell, who represented the salt, wool and 
internal improvement interests of the west, was not a new 
convert to this political party as were many other Virginians, 
but had supported governmental programs during most of his 
career. 30 
Although the west had only three congressmen, all voting 
for the bill, the east had twenty-one, none of whom favored 
the act.31 This division shows a strict sectional cleavage 
1961 
26Bio~raphical Directorl_of the American Con,ress, 
(Washington, D. C., 196 ), pp. 1208, 488, 12 8. 
27Ibid., p. 1278. 
1774-
28Register ..Q.£ Debates, 20 Cong,, I sess., IV, p, 2697. 
29Ibid., passim. 
30Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 
1278. - --
31Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 786, 
2471-2472. - . . 
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in regard to excessively strong protective tariff. Of the 
twenty-one votes, four did not vote, but seventeen cast de-
cisive votes against it. These congressmen will be noted in 
more detail later, but it is important to note the general 
uniformity of the east ~n this year. The coastal region, the 
Tidewater, the Piedmont, and even Alexander Smyth of Wythe 
and Robert Allen of the transitional mountain and valley area 
opposed the measure. Smyth, born in Ireland, was a Democrat 
who had directed an unsuccessful campaign against Canada in 
the War of 1812. He was in ill repute with many Americans, 
but his constituents thought highly of him. 32 Allen, also a 
Democrat, was engaged in agriculture in the fertile area of 
the Shenandoah Valley. This portion of the Valley was gen-
erally atune to the beliefs of the east due to the better 
agrarian economy; although this eastern orientation did not 
always hold true. 
The votes of these eastern congressmen were cast with a 
great deal of confidence because they were Jacksonians and 
they believed a majority of opposition votes would be cast 
against the tariff so that it would not become law, Only 
four congressmen from the east made major contributions to 
the debate, though the extremely lengthy speeches of Nathan~ 
iel Claiborne and Mark Alexander seemed to make up for the 
others,33 Alexander stated the bill was constitutional in 
32Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 
1628, 472; Dictionary of American Biography, XVII, pp, 373-374. 
33Register of Debates, 20 Cong,, I sess., IV, passim. 
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laying and collecting taxes, but that it violated the spirit 
of the Constitution. He said,"There is sometimes a fatal 
delusion in speculating too much on the weakness of those 
whom we tend to oppress. 1134 Claiborne spoke for the tobacco 
interests in opposing the principle of the bill. He said, 
"Some gentlemen suppose that we, who are opposed to this bill 
are opposed to all tariffs, but this is not so. Who is not 
opposed to a moderate, judicious, and Constitutional tariff? 
No one."35 Philip P. Barbour, an accomplice in the Jackson-
ian scheme, tried to explain his part in the formation of the 
Committee on Manufactures. He said he understood his duty 
which was to compose the Committee with a majority of people 
opposed to tariffs, and had attempted to perform that duty 
by placing men on the committee who were from regions which 
seemed favorable or unfavorable to manufacturers but was sur-
prised to find that things turned out differently and that a 
protective measure appeared. As for himself~ he assured his 
constituents that he was "violently opposed to the American 
System."36 Barbour's words were intended for his constitu-
ents who might not realize the true intentions of the com-
mittee he and the Jacksonians had purposely chosen~-men who 
34rbid., p. 2414. 
3Srbid., p. 1791. 
36Ibid., p. 2413; Niles'Weekly Register, XXXIV, p. 137. 
would write an extremely protective and objectionable 
me&sure.37 
When the Tariff of 1828 passed Congress, men such as 
77. 
Barbour were chagrined, but with the disservice rendered to 
Adams when the measure was passed under his administration, 
they felt confident that they could look forward to better 
years once Jackson was elected so their reactions were fair-
ly moderate. The easterners were· not completely certain of 
I 
Jackson's stand on several issues, but many felt he was the 
best candidate available in the absence of William Crawford. 
The westerners had by this time reversed their former sup-
port of Jackson and favored John Quincy Adams, the staunch 
advocator of internal improvements. Jackson, the eastern-
ers' choice, won the election.38 
The years of Jackson's first administration, 1828-1832, 
were years of change in Virginia's economic and political 
history; the end result being the fragmentation of the east 
into ''pockets" of political thought. By 1832, when the next 
tariff was enacted, the old cleavage between west and east 
was still noticeable because the westerners continued to vote 
in a solid pattern, but there was an evident difference of 
opinio,n within the east itself. (Map 8) In order to 
37Although Niles' Weeklt Register and other papers cov-
ering the tariff reactions o the South are filled with ada-
mant editorials against the 1828 measure, the majority of 
comments came from South Carolina. The Virginians remained 
relatively quiet. 
38Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 28, 1828. 
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understand the 1832 tariff vote, these eastern incongruencies 
merit consideration. 
The first area of particularism in eastern Virginia was 
found in the northern part of that section--an area which was 
represented by Charles Mercer of Leesburg, and later Aldie.39 
(Map 8) This Loudoun County region was, by 1832, definitely 
National-Republican in political affiliation since the people 
of this area wanted to strengthen their economy by effecting 
better transportation systems across the state. The system 
decided upon was a Chesapeake and Ohio Canal which would al-
low the northern part of the state to develop as a corrnnercial 
center.40 Mercer was at one time the president of the Ches-
apeake and Ohio Canal Company, but he was removed when Presi-
dent Jackson tired of his anti-administration remarks.41 
Mercer was well liked by the westerners because of his sup-
port of internal improvements, and secondly, because of his 
desires to transport former slaves who were then free to a 
colony in Africa.42 The westerners, having few slaves them-
selves, were not inclined to promote this institution.43 
Mercer was less favored by the people directly to the south 
of his district who held opposing viewpoints. 
39Biographical Directory of the American Congress, pp. ·132-0;.. 
1321. ---- . - ' 
40Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 123. 
41John Eaton, President Jackson's closest friend, super-
ceded Mercer as President of the Chesapeals,e ,,and Ohio Canal 
Company. National Intelligencer, May 22, .lune 6, .Jutua:~8, 1183(}'. 
42charleston<Mercury, April 12, 24, May 1, 17, 1830. 
43Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 186. 
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The second eastern area which seemed set apart from the 
rest of the state and the Mercer area was located in the 
northern fall line and Piedmont in Orange, Culpeper, and sur-
rounding counties and a portion of the upper Shenandoah Val-
ley. The prevalent attitude here was one favoring states' 
rights a n.d anti-tariff sentiment due to the agrarian nature 
of the tobacco-planting area. The people were Democrats and 
were represented by John Patton of Fred~ricksburg, John 
Barbour of Culpeper, and William Gordon of Lindseys, and the 
upper Shenandoah Valley was represented by Robert Allen who 
was influenced by the traditional regional beliefs of his 
eastern neighbors. This was also the area once represented 
by congressmen John Taliaferro of Fredericksburg and Philip 
P. Barbour of Gordonsville--two notable leaders of and 
staunch supporters of the Democrat Party.44 Philip Barbour, 
probably the most representative of this group, was one of ';i. 
the earliest political leaders from this section to attack 
federal internal improvement policies and other governmental 
programs which would lead to a monopoly or would cause the 
tariff to be increased. He was an ardent strict construe-
tionalist, a lawyer, and for a time, a supporter of Jackson 
as leader of the Democratic party.45 
A third area of sentiment, one which was more national-
istic than Philip Barbour's states rights element, lay below 
pp. 
44Bio~raphical Director* of the American Congress, 
1434, 13, 472, 1687, 51 . . 
45Ibid,, p. 514. 
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the Barbour district, just mentioned, and in a horizontal 
path above Richmond. This area was the center of Thomas 
Ritchie's influence. Ritchie, although never a congressman, 
wielded a great deal of power among citizens around Richmond 
by editing a widely circulated newspaper, the Richmond En-
guirer, 46 He had purchased the paper in 1804 and was asked 
by Judge Spencer Roane, his cousin, and President Thomas 
Jefferson to do federal printing oriented toward the 
Democratic-Republican Party. Ritchie's paper, which he 
edited for forty-one years, generally presented his views to 
the people. He supported Jackson and Van Buren, opposed 
Henry Clay and John Calhoun, and backed some measure& de-
manded by the westerners such as internal improvements and 
greater democracy in representation. The westerners, in 
turn, gave him strong support.47 One man, William Rives, 
present in the rwentieth Congress and the latter part of the 
Twenty-Second Congress, lived tn the western fringe of the 
"Ritchie District" at Milton and echoed Ritchie's pr~':.: 
Jackson, Democratic, anti-tariff sentiments.48 He was also 
opposed to the bank, as was Jackson, and proved to be one of 
Jackson's strongest supporters, but he, like many others, 
46charles Henry Ambler, Thomas Ritchie, A Study of 
Virf;inia Politics (Richmond, 1913), passim. - · · -
47Arthur Charles Cole, The Whig Party in the South 
(Washington, 1913), p. 21; DTCtionary of American Biography, 
XV, pp. 628-629. . . 
48rbid., pp. 636-637; H. H. Simms, The Rise of the Whigs 
in Virginia (Richmond, 1929), p. 64. 
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later :,left the Jackson camp.49 J. J. Roane of Rumford Acad-
emy and Joseph Chinn of Nuttsville also belonged to this 
faction which was rather nationalistic on some issues.SO 
A fourth distinct region lay in the vicinity of Rich-
mond, slightly to the west and south. This Amelia and Pow-
hatan County area was a coal mining area and, as such, 
favored protective tariffs.51 The region was small, but it 
contributed to the industrial nature of Richmond, the strong-
est manufacturing city of Virginia. William Archer of Elk 
Hill represented the people from this area. He was at first 
a Democrat, but due to some of the exacerbating actions of 
Jackson, became a Whig in later years. 52 Alexander Steven-
son, representing Richmond, the C~pitol and leading city, 
was a former lawyer and a Democrat and was well respected by 
congressmen from states other than his own. He favored 
states' rights, though more moderately than some of his fel-
low Virginians. Nevertheless, his vote was never placed on 
any of the major bills of the era, for the members of the 
House of Representatives chose him to be Speaker, a position 
which would allow him to cast only tie-breaking votes.~~ 
49Dictionary of American Biography, XV, pp. 628~629. 
SOBiographical Directory of the American Congress, 
pp. 1524-1525,., 
/ 
SlJournal, House of Representatives, 22 Cong., I sess., 
p. 1023. . . . 
52Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 
p. 486. . - _,_..,. - -
53Ibid., p. 1654. 
8~ 
To the south and east of Richmond lay the lower Chesa-
peake Bay area which was represented by Senator John Tyler of 
Gloucester and Richard Coke of Williamsburg, a rather aristo-
cratic and states' rights tobacco region. Tyler was esper 
cially noted for his anti-tariff position and strong belief 
in state sovereignty.S4 
Just below the Tyler district lay the Norfolk, Virginia 
Beach area which fronted the Atlantic Ocean; an area repre-
sented by Senator Littleton Tazewell and Representative 
Thomas Newton, Jr., both of Norfolk, and William McCoy of 
Franklin. This region was considered the truly democratic 
area of the east because it had been settled by people who 
were less pretentiqus and who often felt affinity toward 
their North Carolinian neighbors.SS However, this area was 
rather divided in sentiment regarding tariffs, with Tazewell 
being the most pronounced opponent of protection and one of 
the strongest states' rights advocates. All were in agree-
ment in political party affiliation, though, and supported 
the Democratic party.S6 
The lower portion of Virginia, the Piedmont and the 
southwestern Valley area, was basically a farming region 
whose citizens opposed protective tariff legislation and sup-
ported states' rights. Although all were Democrats, Thomas 
S4rbid., pp. 1737, 718. 
ssrbid., pp. 1696-1697, 1387, 1290. 
S6cole, The Whig Party in the South, p. 7. 
Bouldin of Charlotte was m6st outspoken. He opposed en-
croachments on reserved state powers and strongly opposed 
protective tariffs and internal improvements. He, as well 
8.4 
as most of the other people in the Piedmont, opposed any 
government inclinations to meddle in a state's slave policy.57 
Thus, when Jackson was elected in 1828 it appeared he 
had a fairly strong following in easte~n Virginia, the por-
tion of the state which had strongly supported him in the 
election, and especially the Ritchie area. The weakest sup-
port came from the Mercer area, the central Potomac, and the 
Virginia Beach region. The east, except for these latter 
three zones, felt Jackson would do their bidding and support 
strict construction of the Constitution and a concomitant 
reduction of the tariff, 
Although the eastern Virginians waited, Jackson, by 
1832, had done nothing to alleviate the tariff stress suf-
fered by southern agrarians. Virginia's tobacco depression 
was still occurring, causing them to consider the 1828 act a 
hardship.SB Finally, in 1832, in reaction to the outcries of 
the South, a new tariff bill emerged from Congre•ss, but the 
bill, contrary to expectations, retained some of the protec-
tive features the South opposed.59 Southerners were again 
57Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess,, VIII,,· 
pp. 3210, 3235, "3b72. 
58Turner, ~of the New West, pp. 52-57. 
59Frank Taussig, The Tariff History..£! the United States 
(New York, 1967), pp. T01-105. 
enraged at the northern domination of tariff policy and at 
the thought that the government sponsored a permanent pro~ 
tective program. 
One other factor was added to the 1832 tariff debate--
the question of nullification. Since 1828 the radical ele-
ment of South Carolina had pushed the cause of nullification, 
and by 1832 had gained countless followers. This possible 
action by the South Carolinians against the governmental 
tariff influenced some of the Virginians' 1832 tariff votes, 
as will be noted. (Map 8). 
The Virginians' congressional tariff vote of 1832 was 
more evenly divided than that of 1828, with eleven votes in 
favor of the protective measure, ten against, and three not 
voting.60 Again the western region cast a united vote in 
favor of the bill due to their desire for protection, but 
also to e:H\phasize their opposition to nullification. In the 
east the three more nationalistic regions, previously men-
tioned, presented a vote favorable to the tariff. These in-
cluded first, the vote of Mercer, second, the Roane and Chinn 
votes, and third, the Archer vote. Three other eastern votes 
supported the measure; those of Thomas Newton, John Mason, 
and Nathaniel Claiborne. These men's ballots were cast to 
show their opposition to nullification more than to give 
solid support to protection. In looking at the east and 
west, one sees that four westerners supported the 1832 act 
60Resister of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, 
pp. 1219, 3830-31r3'1. 
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while seven easterners favored it. (Maps 7 and 8) This vote 
shows a change of position since 1828 because no easterners 
had backed tariffs then. The total of eleven yea votes and 
ten nay votes show that there was a growing change in eco-
nomic and political thought in Virginia and an increasing 
division of sentiment. 
After the passage of the Tariff of 18~2 the Nullifica-
tion Ordinance of South Carolina caused increasing concern. 
Most eastern Virginians did not like the existing tariff, but 
neither were they too interested in annulling a federal law 
or separating from the Union. They had a decision to make, 
though, because South Carolina asked for support in calling 
a southern convention, and Andrew Jackson, after stating a 
lower tariff might be in order, threw the firebrand of fed-
eral powers over state sovereignty by presenting his Nulli-
fication Proclamation and Force Bill which maintained the 
federal authorities had the right to enforce the tariff in 
South Carolina. 
The decision regarding the first issue, a lower tariff, 
was an easy one to make since few wanted a civil war and 
since a majority did want a favorable tariff bill. The con-
gressional vote on the suggested remedy, the Tariff of 1833, 
which lowered imposts over a nine-year period, shows a great 
degree of accord.61 (Map 9) The westerners unanimously 
favored the bill because it would prevent disunion, an action 
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which would seriously injure them, and the east, with two 
exceptions, also voted unanimously for the bill. Stevenson's 
speakership position again did not allow him to vote, so the. 
only vote in opposition to the bill came from Charles Mercer. 
Mercer did not let the threat of nullification deter him from 
opposing a lower tariff which would detract from the present 
protective syst'em, The revenues from such measures were im-
portant to his constituents who desired canals and roads. 
The most important congressional vote was that on 
Jackson's Force'Bill of 1833, since the basic Virginia doc-
trine of state sovereignty seemed at stake. The President 
appeared to be rejecting the validity of the old document by 
asserting that not only was South Carolina erroneous in in-
voking it, but that the federal government could justifiably 
use force to curtail such recalcitrant states.62 The ques-
tions of the constitutionality of a protective tariff as well 
as the constitutionality of Jackson's actions were debated. 
Was using force against a sovereign state a usurpation of 
power? Was nullification the proper remedy suggested by the 
"Principles of '98"? And, finally, was nullification- ... but 
not seces•ion--obje~tionable to Madi~on and Jeff~rson? 
There ~ere no unanimous answers on the part of the Virginians 
because of the already strong fragmentation, but the major 
62Ibid., pp. 1810-1811. The House vote for the final 
passage of the Force Bill was not given by names, but the 
vote was given on the question of engrossing and reading for 
a third time. The information .given is based on that vote 
of March 1, 1833. 
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divisions of sentiment can be observed in their voting pat-
tern. (Map 10). 
The gamut of political thought showed all types of atti-
tudes in Virginia in 1833; National Republican unionists, 
unionist Jacksonian Democrats, states' rights nullifying 
Democrats, and states' rights secession Democrats. The west-
ern part of Virginia was unanimously in favor of the "lHoody 
Bill" or Force Bill since the people there were National 
Republicans who opposed separating from the Union. Charles 
Mercer's eastern National Republican area was of the same 
view. The nationalistic area of Virginia Beach also sup-
ported the Force Bill. These people, but Senator Rives 
especially, were Jacksonians. Rives felt baJ;iks and tariffs· 
-~~constitutional but not necessary at the time.63 Although 
·he was opposed to the tariffs, he also opposed nullific.;ition. 
He and Ritchie were not pleased with Jackson's actions, but 
continued to support him through the ordeal. Rives, never 
one to hide his views, stated on the floor of Congress: 
It is my misfortune to differ from my worthy 
and honorable colleague, as well as from. other hon· 
orable senators coming from the same quarter of the 
Union as myself • • • • No one is • • • more thor-
oughly opposed to the American System than myself 
•.. but what, Sir, will be the consequence if 
South Carolina be permitted, without opposition, to 
nullify the revenue laws of the Union? • • , The 
example would inflict a mortal wound on the Consti-
tution. The Government would thenceforth be vir-
tually dissolved, and we should inevitably fall 
back into the ana~chy and confusion of the Articles 
of Confederation.o4 
63Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 207. 
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As the question grew more emotional, the first two groups 
mentioned--National Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats of 
Rives' caliber--united to form the Union Party.65 
The remaining Democrats were not in agreement although 
they were opposed to Jackson's Force Bill as obviating the 
sovereignty of the states. They disagreed on the method of 
remedy, with one group suggesting that Virginia align with 
South Carolina in supporting nullification and one group op-
posing such an action as contrary to Jefferson's intended 
purpose. The latter group, in turn, suggested secession as 
the only constitutional remedy,66 The nullifiers, of the 
two, were most radical, for the seceders were not ready to 
act and hbp.ed the final step could be avoided. The nulli-
fiers, however, rallied arounq the vocal leaders who demanded 
immediate action. The major nullifiers were scattered 
throughout P<?rtions of the Piedmont, and some resided in the 
Tidewater; the most adamant ones lived nearer to the North 
Carolina border. Thomas Bouldin, Thomas Davenport, John 
Barbour, William Gordon and Governor John Floyd were among 
the group which favored nullification. Bouldin, the main 
exponent of this doctrine, once said in Congress, "The power 
to protect manufactures belongs not to (the federal) govern-
ment, but is a usurpation. 11 67 He later was more precise: , 
·,. ...... ")," . . 
65Ambler, Sectionalism'",!nVirginia; p; 209: 
66Ibid., p. 209; Niles' Weekly Register, XLIV, p. 162. 
67Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., VIIr, p. 3210. 
Mr. Chairman, my Constituents are, in a high 
degree, the friends of law and order; their attach-
ment to the Union of these States, on the principles 
of the Constitution, has no limits whatever. But 
they cannot for simple Unigg's sake give up that 
Constitution itself. . 
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The nullifiers, though ambivalent, were held in check by 
those who said only secession was constitutional and that 
Jackson's Force Bill was definitely unconstitutional. These 
secessionists included Senator John Tyler, a very influential 
party man, P, P. Barbour, William Gordon, and others. 69 In 
fact, John Tyler was the only senator to cast a negative 
vote against the Force Bill since other southerners in the 
Senate opposed it but chose to refrain from voting.70 Sen-
ator Rives, the other Virginia senator, as noted, voted for 
the bill. The outcome of the nullifier-secessionist senti-
ment was the formation of the States' Rights Party of 
Virginia, The party's strength lay in the region south of 
the Rappahannock River and east of the Blue Ridge Mountains, 
although, of course, not all people of this region were in 
agreement,71 The outcome of the tariff and nullification 
controversy was a political realignment within the state, a 
trend toward hatred of Jackson and his "dictator" methods 
·•' 
68Ibid,, p. 3235. 
69Niles' Weekly Register, XLIII, p. 249; 
Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., IX, pp. 368-377, 
1897. 
70rbid., p. 688. 
Re~ister of 
16 3' 1761:" 
7lcharleston Mercurg' January 4, 1833; Ambler, Section-
alism in Virginia, p. 21 , 
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on the part of the States' Rights Democrats,72 the complete 
break by John Tyler and his followers from the Jacksonian 
Party which h~d supported the despised Force Bill, and the 
emergence of the Whig party--an "umbrella party" which held 
many discontented, anti-Jackson southerners.73 
In studying the Resolutions of Virginia once again, one 
notes that they considered the Resolutions of 1798 as the 
true interpretation of the Constitution, opposed South 
Carolina's Ordinance of Nullification, and opposed Jackson's 
Force Bill. The convention which wrote this document was 
dominated by the States' Rights secessionists, though men of 
differing beliefs were also on hand.74 This is one reason 
why South Carolina's nullification pleas were disc~unted; . 
the nullifiers did not dominate. 
In conclusion, it is apparent that the Virginians had 
as many reasons as the South Carolinians did to react ad-
versely to protective tariff legislation; the major ones be-
ing the agrarian nature of their economy, the prolonged ' 
depression, and the agrarian-related institution of slavery. 
The majority of transmontane citizens reversed their former 
free trade position during the Twenties and began to support 
protection in order to aid their mining and wool producing 
72The Virginians' opposition to the Force Bill and their 
resultant anti-Jackson realignment can be seen in Niles' 
Weekll Register, XLIII, in which various Virginia newspaper 
artic es are quoted, pp. 249, 285-286, 345. 
73cole, The Whig Party in the South, pp. 20-21, 29. 
74Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, pp. 215-217. 
industries and to enable the federal government to return 
some of the monies, thus gained, to them in the form of in-
ternal improvements. The majority of cismontane residents 
favored low imposts, yet many variables were added to their 
situation which caused several groups to alter their position 
and to, at times, support protection. These variables con-
cerned such questions as nullification, secession, union, 
states' rights, political and personal alliances, and intern-
al improvements. In turn, the divisiveness of the east pre-
vented united action when Virginia was asked to support South 
Carolina's call for a southern convention. It seemed that 
the sub-regional units of thought were the outstanding 
factors to the different people, while tariff legislation 
became almost secondary. 
The Virginians' rather mild reaction is especially 
interesting since one would expect a region suffering so 
intensely from the depression to erect strong defenses 
against a heavy impost system. The depression was so grave 
that even James Madison and Thomas Jefferson were placing 
their homes on sale to pay their debts. Evidently, there 
were some sociological factors involved in their actions 
which caused them to accept the situation as it was without 
looking for a scapegoat. The Virginians had suffered from 
eroded lands and declining prices for years, while South 
Carolina's decline was extremely precipitous, so the people 
had by the 1830's adjusted to their problems. If the depres-
sion had come as a sudden shock to them, they too might have 
supported nullification. 
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The same conditions account for the Virginians' reac-
tions toward the institution of slavery and its place in 
America. While the South Carolinians were using the tariff 
as a camouflage to shield their state and its institutions 
against any legislation by the federal government, the 
Virginians were anxious to rid the state of many slaves and 
freemen by colonizing them in Africa, selling them to other 
states, or having the federal government buy them and trans-
port them to another area. They had less need of slave 
labor than the cotton states since fewer hands could work 
the tobacco fields. 
These factors and others previously mentioned account 
for Virginia's varied reactions to the various tariff contro-
versies of the 1828-1833 era. The southern Piedmont and 
Tidewater citizens--those nearest South Carolina--supported 
nullification, but the rest were too involved in political 
and constitutional rhetoric to come to the aid of their 
sister state. As the Resolutions of the State of Virginia 
showed, Virginia took the middle road. 
CHAPTER IV 
NORTH CAROLINA 
The Committee will not assert that Congress 
have no power, under the Constitution, to lay duties 
on imports, which are intended to operate as a pro-
tection to manufactures; they maintain, however, 
that the exercise of such a power, as contemplated 
by the Woolens Bill, is a direct violation of the 
spirit of that instrument .•.• It is conceded, 
that Congress have the express power to lay imposts; 
but it is maintained, that that power was given for 
the purpose of revenue, and revenue alone .... 
Report of the North Carolina 
Legislature, January, 18281 
Only one state in the country, North Carolina, had the 
distinction of having an unblemished free trade record in 
1828. When the first protective tariff passed Congress in 
1816 the Carolinians cast all eleven of their votes against 
it. This vote, out of a total of thirty-one opposition votes 
from the South as a whole, and their unanimous disapproval of 
the proposed tariffs of 1820 and 1824, showed the steadfast-
ness of the North Carolinians' antagonism to protection and 
at the same time portrayed the laxity of the other southern-
ers in maintaining their free trade system.2 Many of the 
1Herman V. Ames, ed., State Documents on Federal Rela-
tions, The States and the United States (PhTiadelphia,-r9TI6), 
pp. l48-=r50. - -
2charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nationalist, 1782-
1828 (New York, 1944), p.--z;oz;.-
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other southerners, including John C. Calhoun of South Caro-
lina, favored some of the measures before them, asserting 
that the country needed funds for military improvements after 
the War of 1812, and that the South would have its own indus-
try within a few years. To these liberal minded leaders, 
North Carolina seemed to be conservative and negativistic 
without reason. 
By 1827 the pronouncements by the southerners who had 
supported much of the protective legislation ended, and they 
reverted back to the strong states' rights po:s:i'.tion of an 
earlier era when the South objected to all that was libertine 
in regard to federal policy. Suddenly, the unwavering ob-
structionist tactics of the North Carolinians merited recon-
. sideration and were worthy of praise, while the weak and 
wavering positions of many renowned southern leaders had to 
be reassessed to determine whether they were truly for the 
South or against it. Even John C. Calhoun, realizing that 
the South was losing its position of political leadership and 
economic stability, transformed himself from a semi~ 
nationalist to a states' rights free trader in order to carry 
the banner for many of his southern brethern. 
Calhoun's belated entry into the field of obstructionist 
politics did not handicap him or the other southern extrem-
ist leaders who reviled many of the new federal policies. By 
1827 he and his fellow South Carolinians were casting about, 
looking for southern allies who would help fend off the fed-
eral government from its attempt to levy high imposts on the 
South for the benefit of the manufacturers of the North. 
They presumed strongest support for their cause would come 
from the states of Georgia, Virginia, and North Carolina, 
all of which were agrarian states with economic problems and 
with states' rights, free trade tendencies. 
The South Carolinians' suppositions that the North Car-
olinians would aid them in the fight against the tariffs were 
gratified in 1827 when representatives for the northern manu-
facturers presented the Woolens Bill to Congress for approval 
in 1827. Governor Hutchins Burton of North Carolina declared 
in his November message to the General Assembly, "The dig-
nity and interest of the state requires that North Carolina 
should not be silent," and requested the body to adopt an 
anti-tariff report.3 The Assembly, acting upon his request, 
adopted a statement renouncing the Woolens Bill as a viola-
tion of the spirit of the Constitution, maintaining that the 
manufactures in the United States were not an object of gen-
eral interest, but of local interest. They asserted that the 
federal government had protected the producers by laying an 
enormous duty on the South which "palsies every effort of the 
agriculturist, withers the product of his industry, and 
greatly impairs foreign cornrnerce. 11 4 
North Carolina's Report of the Legislature, written in 
January, 1828, was penned with the knowledge that the Woolens 
3Niles' Weekly Register, XXXIII, p. 283. 
4Executive Documents, 20 Cong., I sess., III, No. 62. 
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Bill of 1827 was but the initiatory step in a new series of 
attempts by the North to gain their desired goals. Although 
the act failed of passage by one vote, that cast by Vice 
President Calhoun, the protectionists seemed greatly stimu-
lated to make renewed efforts to achieve their objective, and 
conversely, the free traders were just as resolute in their 
determination to suppress future protection movements. Al-
though it appeared the free traders could not prohibit pro-
tective tariffs from being presented to Congress for 
consideration, a negative strategy seemed to be in order; 
they could present a protective measure to Congress, as re-
quested, but would make it so extremely protective and dis-
tasteful to the interests who had advocated protection in the 
first place that no one would support it. This ingenious 
strategy was carefully effected in 1828 as the Twentieth 
Congress convened. 
Politics played an important role in the tariff contro-
versy, and was, along with the natural aversions to the tar-
iffs, the dominant force behind the scheme to write a tariff 
which would be objectionable to all. A majority of the south-
erners from North Carolina and elsewhere were Democratic 
Republicans, or as they were often called, Democrats of the 
Jeffersonian tradition, and they hoped to use the tariff is-
sue to arouse support for a Democrat, especially Andrew 
Jackson, while causing the Federalist or National Republican 
administration of John Quincy Adams to come into disfavor. 
However, whether a presidential position was involved in the 
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controversy or not, the North Carolinians would have main-
tained their opposition to protection. 
North Carolina's aversion to protective tariffs was 
based on several historical, political, personal, and econom-
ic factors. The democratic tradition of frugality and 
laissez faire was deeply entrenched in the minds of the cit-
izenry by 1828 as· the populace asserted the federal govern-
ment should refrain from interfering with the policies of any 
state. Such laissez faire, states' rights doctrines, they 
felt, had been usurped by President John Quincy Adams, and 
they were anxious that no further encroachments be made. 
They took as their mentor the renowned North Carolinian, 
Nathaniel Macon, who was the epitome of states' rights lead-
ership. Macon, born in what later became Warren County, 
North Carolina, was at one time so staunch in his advocacy of 
parochialism that he advocated rejection of the Constitution 
of the United States. He became a close friend to Thomas 
Jefferson, except for a short time in 1806 when he supported 
Jefferson's opponent, John Randolph. As a young politician 
and party leader, he had been anti-Federalist to the extent 
he detested Alexander Hamilton and all his federal measures 
and other federal acts including the Alien and Sedition 
Acts.5 He especially opposed the growing tendency of the 
federal government to interfere with the issue of slavery. 
At a time when many southerners were not yet alarmed about 
5oictionar~ of American Biography, XII, pp. 157-159. 
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the future of slavery, Macon castigated the Misaouri Compro-
mise of 1820, stating that this was but the first step in an 
attempt to free all slaves. Macon often stated he opposed 
the institution of slavery on moral grounds, but due to the 
debts incurred by his family, had to maintain the slave labo:r; 
system on his tobacco plantation by the Roanoke River in ord-
er to survive.6 Four years later, in 1824, he supported the 
strongest states' rights candidate available, William Craw-
ford of Georgia, for the presidency, and in succeeding years 
continued to favor legislation and political leaders who 
would work to preserve the rights of the states.7 
Macon and his arch-conservative policies were well 
suited to the times and temperament of his fellow Carolinians 
who, because of the enormity of the economic problems within 
their state, believed they could not stand the added burdens 
of a protective tariff. The insolvency of the state seemed 
insurmountable because nature had not been kind; the moun-
tainous nature of a portion of the state, the shallow and 
often dangerous river system, and the coastal obstructions 
prevented both internal and external transportation from 
developing,· The often unfavorable climatic conditions and 
the infertile soils of much of the state forestalled the de-
velopment of a major staple crop culture. The legislative 
committee of North Carolina stated in 1830 that they were a 
'1961 
6Bio~7aphical Directori of~ American Consress, 1774-
(Was ington, D. C., 19 l");" pp. 1250-1251. 
. ' - . ' . ' , ' ~ . -. . 
7nictionarx of .. Aine:i;ican Biography, :Xft~ pp.· 157-159. 
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state "without foreign commerce for want of seaports, with-
out a staple, without manufactures; in short without any 
object to which native industry and active enterprise could 
be di~ected."8 Actually the state had a staple crop of 
tobacco in the north and especially the middle eastern sec-
tion, but the level of production was small in comparison to 
that of other states.9 The same was true of cotton which was 
raised in the portions of the state bordering on South Caro-
lina; 10 10 million pounds of cotton was produced in North 
Carolina in 1826, as compared to 70 million pounds in South 
Carolina and 75 million pounds in Georgia. 11 The people not 
occupied with these two cultures were occupied in other 
agrarian and non-agrarian pursuits which included raising 
corn, beans, peas, and some livestock, making naval stores, 
and exporting lumber, but many of the Carolinians existed on 
the level of self-subsistent farmers.12 
The climatic and transportation problems affecting the 
state seemed insurmountable. Certainly nothing could be done 
about the climate which prevented them from raising a lot of 
cotton, a crop that took a long growing season, but several 
Baugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, A Histor?: 
of a Southern State, North Carolina (Chapel Hill, 1954), p. 29~. -- . . . . 
9Hugh Talmage Lefler, The Presidential Election of 1824 
in Nor.th Carolina (Chapel HiTl, 1939), pp. 7-8. · · - __,..... 
lORaleigh Register, November 13, 1818, June 30, 1820. 
llFrederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 18l9- · 
1829 (New York, 1962), p, 52. ____,__ - - - - -
12Register of Debates, 20 Cot;Ig., I sess., IV, Pl?· 2110-2118. 
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Carolinians at times sought ways to overcome the transporta-
tion liabilities along the coast, an area which had no good 
commercial ports. The towns of Wilmington and Beaufort pre-
sented possibilities for future development, but in general, 
no large ships could enter the coastal region. The sand bars 
provided a continuous natural barrier from the northern part 
of the state to Bogue Inlet which was about three-fourths of 
the way down the coast. Supplies that were exported had to 
pass through Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, thence southward 
to either Ocracoke Inlet or Beaufort Inlet to reach the At-
lantic .13 The swamps to the Northeast were a further hin- .. 
drance, and the few navigable rivers which flowed eastward 
across the Tidewater into the coastal waters emptied into the 
Sounds. The rivers stretching upward across the Tidewater 
into the Piedmont were valueless as a connective between the 
two regions because no locks or canals allowed goods to reach 
the lower level in safety. As in other states, the mountains 
presented the ultimate handicap to transportation and com-
munication, so the state was, in essence, weak and divided.14 
Much of the state's limited commerce was carried on through 
the neighboring states of Virginia and South Carolina rather 
than through commercial centers in the ea'st. Trade that did 
occur in the east was limited to small coastal vessels bound 
13Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina, p. 314. 
14Lefler, North Carolina History Told .£y Contemporaries, 
pp. 199-201. --
for the West Indies rather than the larger vessels f~om 
Europe or the North.15 
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The weakened economy of the state enmeshed the citizens 
in a negativistic cycle: they could not make much money, so 
they did not want to expend money, even to better their 
transportation facilities. In 1817 the state revenue from 
taxes, public land sales, and bank stocks was $98,000, 
$4,500, and $36,000 respectively. These meager revenues, in 
comparison with those of other states, led the government to 
limit its expenditures so that a total of $132,000 was ex-
pended annually for all purposes in the period between 1813 
and 1835. After the salaries of the state officials were 
paid, little was left for the needed roads and canals.16 
Although these economic difficulties were state-wide, 
there were pockets or localities which were more wealthy than 
others and which had distinctive agricultural and political 
interests--interests which would become important factors in 
their tariff attitudes when the tariffs of 1828, 1832, 1833 
and the Force Bill were presented for consideration. (Mapll) 
One major area, the northeastern Tidewater, an area including 
the counties of Pasquotank, Camden, and others, was noted for 
its lumber, but especially for its rather backward nature and 
its small farm crops such as corn, beans, and peas.17 This 
15Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 2116-
2118. . ~ 
16Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina, p. 303. 





















region, more than any other eastern area, was handicapped by 
the distance to the trade outlets and by the swampy nature 
of the coast. Some of the farmers maintained a few slaves, 
but the quantity of black laborers was small in number when 
compared with other coastal areas. Many of the citizens of 
the area became less obstructionistic in regard to federally 
financed internal improvements, although they usually main-
tained their states' rights position on other issues. This 
portion of No'rth Carolina was, in later years, the major Whig 
stronghold of the east.18 
The other portions of the Tidewater, running in a north-
south direction, were divided into the tobacco lands, the 
naval store and mixed farming area, and the cotton and rice 
region. The first of these areas, the tobacco lands, were 
centered around the Roanoke River Valley, especially in 
Edgecombe County, and, in smaller degrees, in the counties 
further southward, 19 On the coast as a whole, a -second major 
income came from naval stores which were notable in the 
Tyrrell and Hyde County vicinity, while much of the general 
production of the Tidewater centered around corn, other small 
grain crops, and the raising of hogs.20 Much of the eastern 
area, the Tidewater region lying below the northeastern area 
first mentioned, was, with the exception of the Albemarle 
18 -
Ibid, , p. 329. 
19s. H. Hobbs, Jr., North Carolina: Economic and Social 
(Chapel Hill, 1930), passim. 
201efler and Newsome, North Carolina, p. 370. 
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Sound area, the strongest Democratic stronghold of the state, 
the richest area of the state, the area of North Carolina 
which had a fairly good staple crop economy of tobacco and 
cotton, and the portion of the state which had the most , 
slaves. The rice zone along the southeast coast also was 
fairly opulent and had numerous slaves. 21 Nevertheless, the 
people of the Tidewater of North Carolina were never as 
wealthy as the planters in the other southern seabord states. 
The Piedmont, another distinctive area of North Caro~ 
lina, was also subdivided in economic make-up. The region 
was noted for the two staples of tobacco and cotton, which 
were produced in smaller quantities than in the neighboring 
states, and for the basic small farm crops of the upland 
fanners. The tobacco region was centered in the counties 
along the Virginia border; the poorer fanners who raised 
corn, other grain crop, and livestock lived in the center of 
the Piedmont; and the cotton producers lived in the counties 
along the South Carolina border. The three Piedmont regions 
were also divided politically as years passed because the 
tobacco and cotton,areas maintained their allegiance tb the 
Democrat party while the central corn-growing region became 
a Whig stronghold.22 
21R. H. Taylor, "Slaveholding in North Carolina: An 
Economic View," The James Sprunt Historical Publications, 
XVIII, nos. 1-2. 
22Lefler, The Presidential Election of 1824, p. 160; 
Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina, p. 3701 Arthur Charles 
Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington, 1913), p. 4. 
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The mountain area of western North Carolina was more 
related to the central Piedmont than to the rest of the state 
since it too was a small farming region with a near-
subsistence economy. Very little trade was carried on due to 
the poor transportation facilities, and since each farmer 
raised most of his own goods, there was almost no slave 
labor. Cattle, hogs, whiskey, corn, wheat, and fruits were 
the mainstay of the people. This area, like the central 
Piedmont, turned to the Whig party in later years. 
In 1828 -when the Tariff of Abominations, the tariff 
devised by the southern, western and northern supporters of 
Andrew Jackson as a presidential contender, was presented to 
Congress for consideration, the small regional idiosyncrasies 
had not yet emerged strongly enough to take political form: 
North Carolina was still a one-party state. 
The general opposition to tariffs, the Democratic po-
litical affiliation of the populace, the historically con-
servative nature of the state, and the enormity of the 
proposed tariff rates all worked together in causing the 
North Carolinians to reject the Tariff of 1828. The schedule 
which placed average ad valorem duties of about 50 per cent 
on imported goods seemed atrocious to them, and consequen-
tially, all of the North Carolinians appeared unanimous in 
their opposition to the tariff. 
North Carolina's congressmen, fifteen in number, placed 
their solid vote against the Tariff of 1828. 23 (Map 12) All 
23Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., pp. 2471-2472, 786. 
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of these men resided in the Tidewater and Piedmont, with no 
representatives coming from the mountain region. Lemuel 
Sawyer of Elizabeth City represented the Albemarle Sound 
district. He was more democratic-minded than the future 
representative from this area would be, having supported 
Presidents Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, and having en-
dorsed their theories of economy and strict construction of 
the Constitution. 24 Senator Nathaniel Macon of Warrenton, 
Willis Alston of Hyde Park, Macon's nephew, Senator John 
Branch of Enfield, Daniel Turner of Warrenton, and Thomas 
Hall of Tarboro represented the northern tobacco area;25 
while John Bryan of New Bern and Gabriel Holmes of Clinton 
represented the eastern ~aval store, farming, and 1umber 
region.26 
In the northern -,:Piedmont, the tobacco region was repre-
sented by Lewis Williams, a noted Democrat who served his 
state in fourteen congresses from 1815 until his death in 
1842, and Augustine Shepperd of Germantown. 27 Samuel Carson 
of Pleasant Garden and John L.ong of Longs Mill represented 
the central farming area;28 Daniel Barringer of Raleigh rep-
resented the central fall line farming area; 29 and John 
24Bio9raphical Directory of the American Con~ress, p. 
1565; Dictionary of American BTOe;raphy, XVI, pp. 94-395. 
25Bio~raphical Director! of the American Congress, 
pp. 1250-l 51, 475-476, 588- 8"9; T713, 992. 
26rbid., pp. 616, 1070. 
27rbid., pp. 1823, 1592 . 
• )8rbid., pp. 667, 1232. 
29rbid., p. 520. 
Culpepper of Beards Store represented the lower tier of 
cotton counties.30 
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Although the tariff vote appeared to the public to be a 
totally united negative action on the part of the North Caro-
linians, internal economic antagonisms were noticeable; 
problems which would later lead to a further regional polit-
ical cleavage. John Bryan of New Bern, in a lengthy congres-
sional discussion concerning the proposed amendment on 
molasses, favored striking out the additional duties proposed 
due to the injury it would inflict upon his constituents. He 
stated: 
The only foreign trade of North Carolina is, 
and long has been, with the West India Islands, 
while the shallowness of our waters forbid our par-
ticipation in the European trade •... North Car-
olina produces . . . the materials . . . desired in 
those Islands. We can export •.. lumber of all 
kinds, staves, shingles, pork, bacon, corn, peas, 
beans, naval stores, fish and live stock ••.• 
This trade .•. with the French islands is essen-
tially a barter trade , . • molasses is therefore 
received of necessity as a return cargo. . . • If 
this vent for our products i~ closed, great and 
general distress must ensue. 1 
Bryan further stated that the Committee on Manufactures, 
in recommending the additional duty on molasses, was attempt-
ing to exclude that which was import.ed and distilled into 
spirits. He said it seemed they were trying to legislate a 
demand for whiskey made from home grown grain and then ex-
clude foreign spirits and molasses to compel its use. He 
30Ibid., p. 763. 
31Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 2110-
2111. . 
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contended that the Committee and the interests favoring such 
action would be aiding one interest at the same time they 
were annihilating the West India trade of North Carolina.32 
The Piedmont representative, Samuel Carson, quickly 
arose to counter Bryan's remarks. He said his colleague 
should have confined his remarks to the district he repre-
sented and permitted those representing other parts of the 
state to act in the interest of their own constituents. He 
stated he favored retaining the additional duty on molasses, 
although he gave his vote with the perfect understanding that 
upon the final question he would vote against the whole bill, 
it being immaterial in what shape it was presented.33 He 
clarified the situation of the west by saying: 
With the western end of North Carolina, it is 
very different. We have none of the advantages of 
commerce, and consequently, none of the benefits re-
sulting from this lumber and molasses trade; but we 
have . . • a fine climate and soil well adapted to 
the culture of hemp, and if other branches of indus-
try are to be protected, an adequate protection on 
hemp would cause some people to 34urn their attention 
to the growing of that article. 
Carson also objected to the east's determination to con-
tinue the molasses trade since that product was made into 
"Yankee rum" and since, if the molasses trade ceased, the de-
mand for domestic spirits (whiskey) would be increased. 
32Ibid., pp. 2110-2118. 
33Ibid., pp. 2118-2119, 
34Ibid., p. 2119, 
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These, he felt, were the only advantages to be calculated on 
by the farming community of ~orth Carolina.35 
The east-west confrontation did not evince any recon-
siderations in regard to the final decision on the bill. All 
actually agreed with Daniel Turner that the tariff was "inex-
pedient, oppressive, and a violation, if not of the letter, 
then of the spirit of the Constitution. 11 36 
In 1828 the tariff, although all the North Carolinians 
and many other southerners objected, became law, and soon 
thereafter, the new President, Andrew Jackson, took office. 
Jackson, born in the region near the North Carolina-South 
Carolina border, was presumed to be a friend of the people 
and in sympathy with the anti-tariff views of the South. He 
quickly gained the North Carolinians' favor by selecting 
John Branch of Enfield as his Secretary of Navy and by sup-
porting the doctrine of states' rights in various state con-
troversies. They especially noted his states' rights actions 
in regard to the various Indian controversies and the Mays-
ville Road veto. The westerners of North Carolina who had 
favored Jackson, thinking he supported internal improvements, 
were disheartened. Since the War of 1812 they had hoped the 
federal government would fund the projected national road 
which would run from Maine to Louisiana. The westerners 
knew that such a road would greatly benefit their region, 
but the slaveholding east, led by Nathaniel Macon, objected 
35Ibid., p. 2119. 
36Ibid~, p; 2437~ 
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to any such federal policies, saying they were but the first 
step toward the emancipation of slaves. 37 
Jackson, a strong-willed President, soon aroused per· 
sonal animosities between himself and other southern Demo-
crats over the Peggy Eaton affair when not only John C. 
Calhoun of South Carolina, his Vice President, but also John 
Branch of North Carolina and others incurred his displeasure. 
Many of the Cabinet members eventually resigned. Later, 
other southerners disagreed with him when it appeared that 
he was becoming more nationalistic in belief. The Jefferson 
Day Banquet toast between himself and Calhoun led the states' 
rights Democrats to see that Jackson would not be the pawn 
of the South as had been expected; and they in turn realized 
that the President would not help them effect a reduction of 
the hated tariff. Several South Carolinians were already 
propounding the virtues of nullification, the doctrine enun-
ciated by Robert Turnbull in 1827 and John c. Calhoun in 
1828. By 1832, when a new tariff bill was written, the sup-
port for or opposition to the measure was based not only on 
economic considerations, but personal antagonisms, alliances, 
and constitutional doctrine. 
The Tariff of 1832 was a highly protective measure, al-
though before the numerous amendments were added, it was 
intended as a lower tariff. A few provisions, but only· a few 
affecting the South, were lowered. Although the bill was 
37w. E. Dodd, The Life of Nathaniel Macon (Raleigh, 
1903)' pp. 317-326.- -- -
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still protective, the tariff outlook of the North Carolinians 
seemed to change in 1832 in comparison to their vote i.n 1828, 
(Map 13) The representatives' opinions, as seen in the vote 
of the congressional leaders, shows eight of the fifteen 
representatives favoring the act which was still highly pro-
tective in regard to cotton and woolen goods which the south-
erners needed. Six still opposed the tariff, while one 
abstained.38 This split vote, as compared to the fifteen 
votes in opposition to the 1828 bill, represent~ a noticeable 
change of thought. 
North Carolina's 1832 tariff vote was not quite as regu-
lar as the voting patterns of other states, but some of the 
regional attitudes are apparent. For example, William 
Shepard of Elizabeth City voted in favor of the bill. He 
represented the district which wanted internal improvements, 
the Albemarle Sound district, and contended that tariff 
revenues might be used to initiate road and canal projects. 
Also, as a National-Republican, he felt the Union was the 
primary consideration involved and that, although he did not 
care for Jackson as a democratic President, nevertheless, he 
supported his arguments for unity.39 
Most of the Roanoke tobacco region and the remainder of 
the Tidewater favored the Tariff of 1832. Thomas Hall of 
Tarboro, Micajah Hawkins of Warrenton, and John Branch 
38Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, 
pp. 1219' 3830-3"8'11. 
39Brio&raphical Directory of the American Congress, 
p . 15 91. ..,.._...,.. . . . 
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represented the strong tobacco interests, while Jesse Speight 
of Stantonsburg, Lauchlin Bethune of Fayetteville, and James 
McKay of Elizabethtown represented the mixed cotton and 
tobacco region which was also noted for its naval stores and 
small grain crops. The attitude of most of these men can be 
summed up by Hall's comments in Congress when he stated he 
had never in his life given a tariff vote and he never 
should, but in the present case he had voted "solely upon the 
principle of a reduction of taxes." He said he had never 
voted for laying on one cent, but he perceived the present 
case to be a direct reduction of some millions of dollars so 
he supported it.40 The possible reduction of taxes was not 
the only matter involved: as Democratic-Republicans, not 
National-Republicans, and thus as strict-constructionists, 
the North Carolinians a1so based their decision on the proper 
interpretation of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. 
Like the Virginians who favored secession but not nullifica-
tion if the need arose, the North Carolinians of the northern 
Tidewater, following the lead of their former senator from 
Warrenton, Nathaniel Macon, said the Principles of '98 con-
ceded the right of secession, but not of nullification.41 
The doctrine of nullification, if enacted, would allow a 
state to remain in the Union yet not obey its laws, and this~ 
40Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, p. 3831. 
41Macon was John Randolph's lifelong friend and was in-
fluenced by his think,ing. Noble E, Cunningham, 'l'he Je!fer-
sonian Republicans .!.!! Power (Chapel Hill, 1963) ,p. 73. ·· 
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to the northern Tidewater citizens, was an impossibility. 
They decided to vote for the 1832 act in accordance with the 
wishes of some of the Virginians and in order to show the 
South Carolinians they did not countenance the doctrine of 
nullification. 
Only two Tidewater congressmen opposed the Tariff of 
1832. John Branch of the northern district h~d developed a. 
distinctive antipathy toward Andrew Jackson so he opposed the 
~ 
measure which had the earmarks of a protective measure which 
was acceptable to the President. Branch had been Jackson's 
Secretary of Navy in 1828, but was forced to resign during 
the Peggy Eaton affair, and although he was John Eaton's 
friend and a Jacksonian Democrat, the episode caused him to 
turn to support of John C. Calhoun by 1832. 42 John McKay, 
the owner of three hundred slaves, voted against the bill due 
to his proximity to South Carolina and the influence of the 
nullifiers from that state. He resided at the fringe of the 
rice and cotton area, cultures which used slave labor, and 
he agreed that governmental interference iri tariff problems 
might lead to further encroachments into other state af-
fairs. 43 
The Piedmont had three separate centers of opinion in 
regard to the 1832 bill; the areas dominated by Willie 
Mangum, Lewis Williams, and Henry Connor. Willie Mangum of 
42nictionary of American Biography, II, pp. 596-597. 
43Ibid., XII, p. 75. 
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Orange County led a strong Whig element of politicians and 
farmers. He was at one time a Jacksonian Democrat, but, like 
several others, his views changed when Jackson appeared to be 
supporting eastern interests over those of the west, He op-
posed the protective tariff, but also opposed nullification 
even though he was friendly with many South Carolinians,44 
Many of the people of the central Piedmont, Pemocrats who 
were becoming Whigs, were not supporters of the general Whig 
platform which endorsed protective tariffs, internal improve-
ments by the federal government, and national banks. The 
North Carolina Whigs belonged to a different wing of the Whig 
party, the anti-tariff, pro-internal improvement wing.45 
Senator Bedford Brown, Samuel Carson, and Abraham Rencher, 
along with Willie Mangum, voted against the 1832 tariff, as-
serting that it was too high. 
Lewis Williams, a planter in the northern tier of to-
bacco counties, did not vote,, although as a Jacksonian D~mo-
crat he would have probably favored the bill. Augustine 
Shepperd supported the measure, but he too would later become 
a Whig in opposition to Jackson. The other Jacksonian Demo-
crat, Henry Connor, a planter who, along with Jackson, fought 
the Creek Indians in 1813-1814, supported the measure. 
Daniel Barringer of Raleigh, a town which often allied with 
the Tidewater tobacco-slaveholding interests, al~o supported 
the bill. 
44Ibid., XII, p. 233. 
45Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina, p. 329. 
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The 1832 tariff vote shows that the Jacksonian Democrats 
of the Tidewater and northern and southern Piedmont generally 
favored the bill, as did the National Republicans of Albe-
marle Sound; the first due to their support for the President 
and their beliefs in secession instead of nullification, and 
the latter due to the desire for federal money for internal 
improvements and their support of the Union. But the Pied-
mont was more divided, with the Jacksonian Democrat area of 
the north supporting the measure, the Whigs' central area 
opposing it, and the Democratic southern area favoring the 
bill. The Whigs, as mentioned, were opposed to protective 
tariffs, and al~o opposed to Jackson; the Democrats were sup-
porters of Jackson and his policies in that year. 
With the passage of the Tariff of 1832, the resultant 
Ordinance of Nullification by the South Carolinians, and the 
Nullification Proclamation and Force Bill by the President, 
the citizens and congressmen, both from the North and South, 
began looking for a method to ease the tensions of the peo'- '· 
ple. After concerted congressional actions, the Compromise 
Tariff of 1833, a bill which proposed lowering tariff duties 
over a period of nine years, emerged and was passed into law. 
In North Carolina the people as a whole were relieved at this 
easing of pressure. The Whigs, National Repuolicans, Jack-
sonian Democrats, and Jeffersonian Democrats all supported 
it. The vote consisting of fourteen yeas, no nays, and one 
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abstention, shows this to be true.46 (Map 14) Neither the 
Whigs nor Democrats wanted a high tariff, and the National-
Republicans did not want a partitioned Union, so all were 
satisfied. 
The vote on the Force Bill, a bill involved not so much 
with tariffs but with the doctrine of states' rights, showed 
the political cleavages of the state more clearly if one 
remembers that there was one National Republican area and a 
large Democrat area in the Tidewater, and that there was, 
from north to south, a Democrat, Whig, Democrat, area in the 
Piedmont. (Map 15) Except for one person, the Tidewater 
congressmen favored the Force Bill.47 This ~gain showed 
their opposition to the doctrine of nullification as opposed 
to secession, and their general antipathy toward disunion 
when they felt conditions did not merit it. They believed 
tariffs for revenue were constitutional though unjust. Hall, 
feeling Jackson was too strong in his attack on states' 
rights, would not accept the general stand of his section, 
while William Shepard, the National Republican of Elizabeth 
City, favored Jackson's stand for the Union. 
The Piedmont vote shows the Jacksonian Democrats such 
as Lewis Williams casting a vote for Jackson's bill, the 
Whigs such as Abraham Rencher opposing the act, the Senators 
not voting, and the Democrats of the lower Piedmont siding 
46Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., IX, pp. 1810-
1811, 808-809. ~ 
47Ibid., pp, 688, 1903. 
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with their neighbor,, South Carolina, in opposing the bill 
which attacked their states' rights, anti-tariff, pro-
nullification stand. The one man who resided in the central 
Whig area but who aligned himself with the nullifiers of 
South Carolina, Samuel Carson, stated in Congress that the 
bill was "more despotic in character t:han the Alien and 
Sedition laws. 11 48 His Whig constituents, in disagreement 
with his views, saw fit to renounce him at the polls during 
the next congressional elections.49 
When South Carolina asked that a southern convention be 
called to consider the situation, the North Carolina legis-
lature met to discuss the mat:ter and present their own views. 
The state, predominantly Jeffersonian Democrats of the seces-
sionist category, adopted the following Resolves: 
That the General Assembly of the State of North 
Carolina doth entertain . . . a warm attachment to 
the Constitution .•.. [and a] devoted attachment 
to the Federal Union ...• yet it is believed, a 
large majority of people think [tariff] acts uncon-
stitutional; and they are united in the sentiment, 
that the existing Tariff is impolitic, unjust and 
oppressive .••. That: the doctrine of Nullification 
as avowed by the State of South Carolina ..• is 
revolutionary in its character, subversive of the 
Constitution . . • and leads to a dissolution of 
the Union. 50 
The Resolves, which also asked that a peqceable adjust-
ment of the existing controversy be sought by all representa-
tives, were passed by a v9te of 47 to 7 in the Senate of 
48rbid., p. 1766. 
49Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 677. 
SOAmes, State Documents on Federal Relations, p. 51; 
Niles' Weekly Register, XLitr-;--pp. 351-352. · 
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North Carolina, and 98 to 22 in the House.51 Governor Mont-
fort Stokes concurred with the majority of the North Carolin-
ians. Thus, North Carolina was strongly opposed to South 
Carolina's nullification position in 1833. 
In conclusion, it appeared that North Carolina was op-
posed to tariffs except for the citizens of the Albemarle 
Sound area which at times broke from the conservative mood 
of the state and favored tariff revenues which could be used 
for local internal improvements, and that the generally fav-
orable attitude toward the protective tariff of 1832 was 
based upon both what they considered to be the true princi• 
ples of '98 and the desire to achieve whatever cuts were 
offered in this bill. It is also evident that the two-party 
system which was emerging was quite different from the situa-
tion in some other states, for the Whigs of the middle 
Piedmont and the extreme northeast were of the internal im-
provement and not the protective tariff wing of that party, 
but the North Carolina Whig party did not fully mature until 
1834 when President Jackson's bank policies alienated count-
less citizens. Finally, it appears that regional proximity 
and the cotton culture were major factors causing the lower 
Piedmont to lean more toward the South Carolina doctrine of 
nullification than any other section of the state, with 
some southern Tidewater citizens doing the same. Since North 
Carolinians were more indigent than people of other states it 
51Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations, p. 51. 
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would seem their opposition to tariffs would be quite strong, 
yet this was not the case for their poverty stricken economic 
system was one to which they had adjusted. They were not so 
suddenly shocked by the loss of prosperity as was South Caro-
lina, so they had no reason to suddenly fight the federal 
~overnment as the source of their economic problems or as the 
contemplated enemy of slavery since they had fewer planta-
tion slaves than did South Carolina.52 They, as noted in 
their Resolutions of 1833, felt themselves to be opponents 
of protective tariffs and defenders of states' rights. To a 
great degree, North Carolina was one of the consistent anti-
tariff states during the tariff interlude. 
Cl!APTER V 
TENNESSEE 
[President Jackson] is not one of those who 
change their opinions from day to day as some pol-
iticians do .•.• On great political questions he 
forms his opinion on reflection and abides by them 
until his judgment instructs him that he ought to 
change them. Upon the [tariff] his opinions were 
made public so earli as ..• 1824; and I defy any 
man to show that he has ever· wt"itten or uttered one 
word inconsistent with the se'ntiments [then] 
expressed. . . , 
Felix Grundy, 
February 15, 18321 
Felix Grundy, speaking in 1832 during the congressional 
debates concerning the writing of a new tariff, berated Henry 
Clay of Kentucky for having stated that the Chief Magistrate 
pursued an equivocal course in regard to the tariff ques tion.2 
Clay had inferred the President had manipulated things so 
that on the south side of the Mason and Dixon line he was · 
understood to be in opposition to the tariff, while on the 
north side, the opposite opinion was ascribed to him, 
Grundy's defense of the President is interesting because 
Grundy and Jackson, both from Tennessee, did not share the 
same views in regard to tariffs; Grundy favored low tariffs 
1Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIIl, p, 395. 
2rbid., pp. 393-412. 
1 ?7 
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while the Chief Executive at times favored higher ones. 
Jackson, as a presidential contender in 1824, had supported 
the tariff act of that year which placed protective duties 
at 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem on textiles, an action which 
was not in accord with the citizens of his own state,3 and as 
candidate for the presidency in 1828, his supporters had been 
responsible for writing the Tariff of Abominations although 
they did not want it to become law. Nevertheless, upon its 
passage and upon Jackson's election to the presidency in that 
same year, the people of the South and West noted that four 
laborious years passed before the Old General made any state-
ment favoring tariff adjustment, and that in those years his 
northern supporters had profited more than his southern 
allies. But if other southerners and westerners such as ~he 
South Carolinians or ttenry Clay noticed Jackson's seeming 
duplicity, the Tennesseeans seemed unaware. They, like Felix 
Grundy and James Polk, went about their own business of vot-
ing against protective tariffs when only economic issues 
dominated~ but in voting for them when President Jackson's 
reputation was at stake. The irony is that, although believ-
ing in low tariffs and state sovereignty, most of the Tennes-
see congressmen voted in favor of the Tariff of 1832 which 
was still strongly protective and for the Force Bill of 1833 
3Jackson, in a letter sent to Littleton Cpleman, stated 
he favored a "judicious tariff." James Parton, Life of 
Andrxw Jackson (Boston, 1860), III, pp. 35-36. - -
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which seemed to renounce the doctrine of states' rights_4 
Tennessee's unremitting support of the President was evident-
ly not based on economics or political doctrine, but on 
personal factors. In order to understand the rather strange 
•; 
reactions of the Tennesseans, it is best to note the condi-
tions existant within the state prior to the 1828-1833 tariff 
era. 
Tennessee, initiated into the Union in 1796, was by the 
Twenties aqd Thirties a fairly well developed agrarian state 
with corn as its major crop in total production,5 However, 
when compared to the other more fertile states of the South 
and Southeast, Tennessee seemed little more than a land of 
small farmers.6 The people, separated by physiographic con-
ditions into three distinct regions, produced two staple 
crops, cotton and tobacco, in ... the most fertile pockets of 
land, and grain crops such as wheat, corn, and oats through-
out the other areas. The agrarian activities of the people 
ranged all the way from the more aristocratic nature of the 
plantation ecqnomy, to a frontier style of life based on 
self-subsist¢nce. Altfoge,ther, the state became not one 
··~ ' 
entity, but "the Three States of Tennessee" as the varying 
4The eleven Tennessee congressmen cast a 10-1 vote 
against the Tariff of 1828, but supported the Tariff of 1832, 
the Tariff of 1833, and the Force Bill with 9-2, 10-1, and 
9-2 votes respectively. 
Sstanley J, Folmsbee, Robert E, Corlew, and Enoch L. ?iitchell, 
Tennessee: A Short Histo~y (Knoxville, 1969), p. 292. 
6caleb Perry Patterson, The Negro .!.!! Tennessee, 1790-
1865 (New York, 1968), p, 58. · -
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political and economic needs and interests of the people 
from one specific portion of the state made them at times 
feel quite separate from the citizens of otQer portions of 
the state. 
East Tennessee, one of the three regions and the first 
section to be settled, was of secondary agricultural impor-
tance when compared to Middle Tennessee due to the scarcity 
of fertile land but was, at first, the section with the 
strongest political power. (Map 16) This region, running 
from the border of North Carolina on the east, and stretching 
across the Unaka Mountains and the Great Valley to the mid-
dle of the Cumberland Plateau on the west, was predominantly 
a mountainous, hilly region. Except for the fertile farm 
lands of the Great Valley of the East Tennessee River and the 
other small river valleys, the East Tenne~seeans had severe 
natural handicaps which prohibited them from establishing a 
major plantation system or from developing a large staple 
crop system. But although there were limitations, the east-
erners planted a variety of ~rops and raised fruits and 
vegetables as well as raising hogs and cattle. Corn and 
wheat were their major crops, while cotton and tobacco were 
secondary pursuits, By 1850, they were producing only one 
bale of cotton and ten hogsheads of tobacco, but were produc-
ing 1,813,338 bushels of wheat and 10,998,654 bushels of 
corn.7 Their major income came from pork and foodstuffs 
7Report of the Comptroller !.£ the General Assembly, 
1850, Po 44. I 
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which were sent down the Tennessee River or herded across 
the southern part of the state to Alabama, a region which was 
more accessible to the east Tennes$eeans than was the western 
portion of their own state, 8 Due to their trade problem, 
they, although considering themselves to be Jeffersonian 
Democrats in Jackson's day, demanded internal improvements.9 
By the 1820's, however, the easterners' demands for roads and 
canals were often contradicted by the middle Tennesseeans, 
for although the East was fairly densely populated and the 
capitol was centered at Knoxville, the easterners had to 
fight to maintain control of state politics, Many of the 
leading eastern politicians eventually united into a closely 
knit political organization known as the Sevier machine, a 
group which wielded a lot of power in the Tennessee political 
arena during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. 
Middle Tennessee,:the second major division within the 
state, was a cotton, tobacco, and small farming region. It 
included the western half of the Cumberland Plateau, the 
Central Basin surrounding Nashville, the Highland Rim which 
surrounded the Nashville Basin, and the lands stretching 
westward to the Tennessee River. The Central Basin, an ex-
tremely fertile area, drew planters from Virginia and the 
Carolinas and other seaboa'rdi.··s'tates who hoped to make or 
Boliver Taylor, Historic Sullivan (Bristol, Tenn., 
1909), p. 230. 
9patterson, The Nearo in Tennessee Historl, p. 63; also 
numerous votes or-tlie Tennessee General Assemb y concerning 
internal improvements. 
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renew their fortunes as great plantation owners. Nashville 
quickly became the leading city of Middle Tennessee as the 
people flocked to the area, then as the best lands around 
Nashville were taken, the settlers scattered to the other 
portions of the region, which, although less fertile, pro ... 
vided a subsistence for small farmers ~nd, in some areas, a 
major income for cotton and tobacco farmers. Tobacco, cen-
tered in the north and no:t:"thwestern part of Middle Tennessee 
along the Cumberland River Valley, provided the planters in 
Robertson, Smith, Williamson, Montgomery, Sumner~ Dickson, 
and Stewart counties with fairly large incomes.lo By 1840 
Tennessee's tobacco yield was exceeded only by that of Vir-
ginia and Kentucky, Cotton planters found the counties of 
Davidson, Williamson, Maury, and Rutherford to be the best 
production areas of the middle portion of central Tennessee, 
while a second group of planters located themselves in 
Lincoln county and other central Tennessee counties along the 
Alabama border.11 The plantation economy which centered 
around these two staples used slave labor, and as the years 
progressed, t h.e institution affixed itself more deeply on the 
state. As the planters gained political power in central 
Tennessee they worked to gain even more cont~ol over the 
state as a whole, hoping to surpass the East Tennesseeans in 
the state legislature and to bring the capitol to Nashville, 
lOPatterson, The Negro in Tennessee, p. 61; Folmsbee, 
Corlew, and MitcheTI""';" Tennessee; 'p. 293, 
11Patterson, The Negro.!.!! Tennessee, p. 61. 
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but the legislators of central Tennessee, with the exception 
of those around Nashville, were not as interested in internal 
improvements since the Cumberland and Tennessee River systems 
provided them with good water transportation. The Nashville 
residents wanted internal improvements in order to bring in 
more raw materials from the hinterland so their city might 
develop to its full potential.12 
West Tennessee, the region stretching westward from the 
Tennessee River to the Mississippi River, was the last sec-
tion of the state to be settled, A portion of this land was 
in the Congressional Reserve and was used to settle claims 
held by North Carolina, which had once been the owner 
of all of Tennessee, before any land could be sold to Tennes-
seeans. After 1810 the Congressional Reserve was finally 
opened and several new settlers joined the frontiersmen and 
squatters who already resided there.13 The southwest portion 
of West Tennessee, the district around what would become the 
city of Memphis, was owned by the Chickasaw Indians until 
1818 when Andrew Jackson and Governor Isaac Shelby negotiated 
with the Indians and purchased it. Then, in 1819, Jackson, 
General James Winchester, and _John Overton established the 
town of Memphis on the banks of the Mississippi River, an 
area which became the center for West Tennessee cotton 
12Thomas P. Abernethy, "The Origin of the Whig Party in 
Tennessee," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XII (March, 
1926), p. 513. . . 
13.Ameri~an State Pa5ers, Public Lands (Washington, 
D. C., 1860), pp, 584-58 , 
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production.14 The two counties of Shelby and Fayette pro-
vided the most fertile cotton lands,15 and in turn, became 
the homes of the more aristocratic planters of the west, 
while the counties to the north, especially Lauderdale, 
Gibson, Weakley, Carroll, Benton, and Haywood became noted 
for small scale tobacco planting~ 16 The rest of West Tennes-
see was a land of small farmers and frontiersmen, with some 
of the poorest land being located in the central and south-
east portion of West Tennessee. The farmers produced corn, 
wheat and garden crops. West Tennessee, a latecomer in the 
field of settlement, was never as powerful in the political 
arena as it hoped to be in the first quarter of the 1800's 
because it was too sparsely settled; only one congressman 
represented the region.17 
Out of the tripartite regionali~m within the state, 
there emerged a struggle for political power which pitted 
the Sevier machine of East Tennessee against the political 
powers of Nashville, a group known as the Blount machine. 
John Sevier, famous for his early efforts in settling East 
Tennessee and for his victories in the Revolutionary War and 
14Gerald M. Capers, Jr., The Biogtagh~"of a River Town, 
Memphis: Its Heroic Age (Chap-er-Hill, 1 3 )°7""passim; J-:--M:" 
Keating, History of Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee 
(Syracuse, 1888 , passim. --
lSpatterson, The Negro in Tennessee, p. 62. 
16Ibid., p. 62. 
17Bio~raphical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-
1961 (Washington, n. c., 1961)-:-pp. 108, 112, 116. --.--
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against tqe Indians, was a hero to the eastern citizens,·,,: - ., 
,..so for years his group of politicians was able to control 
\ ~ . \ ., 
politics in the East with ease. 18 The Middle Tennessee resi-
dents also supported two noted citizens, William Blount and 
James Robertson, the "Father of Tennes!;lee," who had helped 
settle the Wautauga area. Andrew Jackson was one of the 
favorites of this second political circle~ 19 When Blount 
lost favor at the national capitol by sµpporting an expedi-
tion against Spanish Florida, the United States government 
expelled him from his seat in the Senate, then Andrew Jackson 
took his vacated seat and a half-brother, Willie Blount, took 
contr0l of the Blount machine in Tennessee. 20 It seemed 
Blount's actions had hurt the Middle Tennessee machine until 
John Sevier, who had completed three terms as governor, be-o --
came implicated in fraudulent land sales. The Blount fact~on 
seized upon this scandal, and used it to their benefit. 
Since Middle Tennessee opposed allowing land sales until sur-
veys were made and the settlers were allowed to pre-empt 
their holdings, most of the people there were upset with 
Sevier's maneuvers, but the poorer settlers and squatters 
were pleased with the views of the Blount machine, a group 
which they deemed more democratic than the faction in East 
18Thomas Perkins Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation 
in Tennessee: A Study in FronoieFDe'mocracy (Chapel Hill, 
1'9"32), pp. 164-IBl. --
l9rbid., p. 168. 
20rsabel Thompson, "The Blount Conspiracy," East Tennes-
see Historical Society's Publications, II, pp. 3-~ 
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Tennessee.21 Andrew Jackson, whose career was in the hands 
of the Blount group, was elected as Tennessee's first dele-
gate to the House of Representatives in 1796, but retired 
after one session due to financial reverses and lack of in-
terest. It was after this, in 1797, that he was selected to 
fill the Senate position left open by Blount, but he made no 
great impression upon that body and again resigned after 
serving a few months.22 In 1801, by the tie-breaking vote 
of Governor Roane, the first state executive from the Blount 
faction, Jackson was elected to the major-generalship of the 
militia, an office to which he had long aspired, so his zeal 
proved more long-lasting and rewarding in this position than 
as congressman. 23 Between 1812 and 1824 Jackson became one 
of the most famous Americans of his day as he fought the 
Creek Indians during the War of 1812 and won renown at the 
Battle of Horseshoe Bend, and especially when his troops 
defeated the British at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815. 
In 1818 Jackson's troops invaded East Florida and executed 
two Britishers who were supposedly engaged in inciting 
Indians and marauders to cross the border and fight the 
Americans, but although some people frowned upon this inci-
dent, many Americans felt he was justified. As Indian 
21Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, 
pp. 170-171. - - . -
22parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, I, pp. 212-219. ------ -
23Abernethy, From Frontier_!£ Plantation in Tennessee, 
pp • 170 .. i 71. 
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Commissioner in 1818 and 1819 he was successful in removing 
the Indians of southwest Tennessee from the state, as noted. 
His nickname, "Old Hickory," was known to all Americans by 
1820 and his exploits were told throughout the country; so 
by 1823, having in the meantime moved to the Hermitage, a 
plantation near Nashville, and having recouped his financial 
losses, he was again prepared to enter into politics, this 
time with a genuine interest.24 
Jackson's re-entry into the political arena was heralded 
not only by Middle Tennessee but by East and West Tennessee 
alike. For the first time most regional jealousies were ob-
scured due to the popularity of the Hero of New Orleans. 
Although his political views were not completely known, vary-
ing economic groups considered him to be a supporter of their 
personal interests: he was considered as a champion of the 
cause of the frontier, especially after Secretary of Treasury 
William Crawford of Georgia compensated the Cherokee Indians 
for conflicting claims on lands already obtained by the 
Jacksonian cession treaty;25 but he also appeared to support 
the aristocrats rather than the debtors when he opposed the 
creation of a state loan office or bank in Tennessee which 
Felix Grundy, a truly democratic-minded person, had attempted 
to establish, 26 and when he supported the wealthy contender 
24John William Wa7d, Andrew Jackson; ~Symbol for !!!! A&e 
(New York, 1953), passim. . ' 
25Abernethy, From Ftontier to Plantation in Tennessee, p. 239. 
-~ '' .-.-
26Nashvillei;Cl~rion, July 25, 1820; Joseph H, Parks, 
Felix Grundy: ·Champion of Democracy (Baton Rouge, 1949), 
pas~im. · .....,.. ' 
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as opposed to the poorer candidate in the 1821 g0vernor's 
race. But although Jackson was a fairly opulent planter 
with slaves and was a Middle Tennesseean of the Blount organ-
ization, the rich and poor alike from East, Middle, and West 
Tennessee nearly all supported the hero as he contended for 
the presidency in 1824 and 1828, 
The people of Tennessee, although eager for Jackson to 
be elected Chief Executive, had definite interests and needs 
which they expected him to support, They were basically 
Democratic-Republicans of the Jeffersonian creed and expected 
economy in government and protection of the states' rights 
doctrine. Many were cotton farmers and planters who hoped 
no major protective tariffs would be passed to hinder their 
economy, 27 but there was a division of sentiment on questions 
such as internal improvements: 28 East Tennessee supported 
federal internal improvements due to the isolated nature of 
their section; the Nashville merchants and planters of Mid-
dle Tennessee who wanted to insure easier transportation of 
their tobacco and cotton crops favored them; some of the 
West Tennesseeans who hoped to develop their regions sup-
ported internal improvements; but the small farmers of Middle 
27Tennessee's cotton production increased from 1 million 
pounds in 1801 to 3 million in 1811, 20 million in 1821, and 
45 million pounds in 1826. Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of 
the New West, 1819-1829 (New York, 1962), p. 52. ____,_.. ~ 
.......,_ .....-- --...... ,, ' 
28Andrew Jackson was one of the few who defended protec-
tion since he believed it was necessary to build up industry 
for ~,ilitary reasons, and for the creation of a home market 
for the West's surplus agricultural products. 
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Tennessee were opposed. 29 The bank issue also continued to 
be divisive, for the larger cities tended to favor them while 
several rural areas opposed them. 30 The Tennesseeans were 
lax in their Jeffersonian principles in these two respects, 
but on the tariff issue there was fairly united opposition. 
They looked to Jackson, should he win the election, to help 
them revise the tariffs. 
Andrew Jackson, having lost the presidential race of 
1824 to John Quincy Adams, determined to win the election of 
1828 by, strangely, allowing his supporters to initiate a new 
tariff bill. The bill, actually the work of a few politi-
cians such as Martin Van Buren and Silas Wright 0£ New York, 
was effectively contrived to get support from northerners who 
felt Jackson was for a protective measure and from southern-
ers who felt he opposed such acts31 since they realized Jack-
son could not win with southern votes alone. The southern 
Jacksonians expected the tariff would be killed since it was 
to be exhorbitantly protective and abominable to the New 
England manufacturers, and they hoped President Adams would 
be condemned for even pretending to support such a prohibi-
tory bill. 
29Btanley J. Folmsbee; Sectionalism ~nd· Internal Im-
provements J:.!2 Tennessee, 1796-1845 (Kno;xvil"le";" 1939), pasSim. 
30Abernethy, "The Origin of the Whig Party in Tennes-
see," p. 513. 
31Robert V. Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson 
(Philadelphia, 1963), pp.vl-180; Robert V. Remini, Martin 
Van Buren and the Making £.! the Democratic Party (New York, 
IBl), pp.173-:US. -
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During the congressional debates concerning this contro-
versial tariff measure the Tennesseeans, as well as many 
other southerners remained unusually silent since most of 
them understood the scheme and hoped to effectively perpe-
trate it. rhey did not especially want the New Englanders to 
realize the amount of intrigue involved for fear they might, 
out of anger, support the bill although it was too protective 
· even for them. Only three comments were made by the Tennes-
see congressmen during the weeks of debate, two by John Eaton 
and one by John Marable, but these remarks were simply state-
ments on an amendment.32 Most of the congressmen, with one 
exception which shall be noted, assumed Andrew Jackson was, 
like them, opposed to the obnoxious bill, 
The congressional vote on the Tariff of 1828 shows the 
degree of Tennessee's opposition to the bill. (Map 17) Ten 
out of eleven congressmen voted against it.33 In East Ten-
nessee the four congressmen, John Blair, a lawyer from Jones-
boro, Pryor Lea and Senator Hugh Lawson White of Knoxville, 
and James Mitchell of Athens all opposed it.34 Blair and 
Mitchell represented the small farmers and White and Lea 
represented the Valley citizens who had mixed forms of live-
lihood, from professional to business pursuits, most of whom 
32Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess,, IV, pp. 733, 
2322.. - . 782, 
33rbid,, pp. 2471-2472, 786. 
34Bio~raphical Directory of the American Congress, 
pp. 562, 1 02, 1804, 1340. - . 
Tennessee 
• J. Marablev . R. Oestja 
Yellow Creek •GJ:tll. f0a!!.D J.SiTI . . 
· Sen.J Eaton+ 
• D.Crockett 0 •Nashville 
·Trenton 
Key 









P.Leoo . • J.810-if 
• SenH.Whiteo- ~esboro 





























were agrarians and small businessmen. In West Tennessee the 
one representative, David Crockett of Trenton, also voted in 
opposition.35 }Jis constituents were frontiersmen, squatters, 
and small farmers since the good cotton lands were found more 
to the southwest. Again the agriculturalists objected to a 
bill from which they could not b~nefit. Middle Tennessee, 
with one exception, was also opposed to the measure. The 
northern tobacco interests, represented by John Marable of 
Yellow Creek and Robert Des.ha of Gallatin, would not be bene-
fitted by this bill. 36 Neither would the cotton interest~ 
which were represented by John Bell and John Eaton of Nash-
ville, James Polk of Columbia, and Jacob !sacks of Winchest-
er,37 !sacks resided in Winchester in an area less fertile 
than the other middle and southern Tennessee area, but gen-
eral farming and the cotton culture existed in that vicinity. 
Three of the four, all except John Eaton, abided by the 
interests of the people and voted against the bill; John 
Eaton's reasoning was not based on normal economics. 
John Eaton, married to the ward of Andrew Jackson, be .. 
came a close friend and sta\lnch·supporter of his wife's bene-
factor a few years before the 1828 campaign, and it was he 
who undertook to support his friend for the presidency. As 
a lawyer and a slaveholder, the views and interests of the 
35rbid., p. 755. 
36rbid., pp. 1262, 803. 
37rbid., pp. 539, 884, 1467, 1~08. 
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two were similar, so he and other leading ,Jackson proponents 
decided to form a political clique at Nashville, Eaton did 
everything he could to aid Jackson in maintaining national 
favor, and when the protective tariff of 1828 came up for a 
vote, Eaton voted yea. The vote cast in favor of the tariff 
by Eaton was politically motivated because, ever desirous of . 
aiding Jacl<.son, he realized a pro·tariff vote would cause the 
northerners to gain more confidence in the Old General. Once 
Jackson won the election he repaid Eaton for his efforts by 
granting him the position of Secretary of War although the 
position had been promised to Hugh Lawson White, the able 
politician of ~ast Tennessee.38 
The tariff passed both houses of ,~ongress and was signed 
into law by President Adams on May 19, 1828. Because the 
bill was enacted during the administration of this man, 
Jackson and his followers were not heavily blamed. To a 
degree they had succeeded in their purpose, although the 
abomin.able tariff was now law, Jackson tried to keep silent 
on the measure, although in 1824 he had supported what he 
termed a "judicious" tariff which had enacted average tariff 
rates of 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem.39 By the end of 1828 
the people were denouncing Adams and proclaiming Jac~son, and 
finally the coveted presidential seat was obtained by him in 
the fall of that year. Tennessee's popul~r vote favored 
38oictionarf of ,American Biograph;y, V, pp. 609 ... 670; 
Abernethy, Fromrontier to Plantation in Tennessee, p. 294. 
~ ,,, ~' ........... 
39Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, p. 395. 
. . .....,..... . 
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Jackson with.44,293 votes fo~ him compared to only 2,240 for 
John Quincy Adams.40 
Tennessee•s reactions to the T.ariff of 1828 were mild 
compared to other states in the South since the people felt 
Jackson would work to lower duties within a short time. The 
newspapers such as the Knoxville Register and Nashville 
Gazette noted a distaste for the measure, but it seemed the 
people felt Jackson could do no wrong, and did not realize 
he was at odds with theil:' :point of view as cotton and tobacco 
farmers. 
In 1830 the President vetoed the Maysville Road Bill, 
' thus stating his opposition to federal internal improvements. 
Tennessee, as an inland state, and especially last Tennessee, 
had been, to a great degree, an advocate of such measures, 
He also seemed opposed to the power and extension of the 
banking system; again something many citizens of his sta.te 
desired, Yet,. due to the strength of the stat;es' rights tra-
dition and to the strong prestige of Jackson, these actions 
were also quietly accepted. Several politicians of the state 
were alert to h;l.s actions and anxious to oppose him, bµt, in 
order to retain the support of their own constituents who 
we+e enthusiastic Jacksonians, they had to remain s:i,.lent. 
In 1832, afteX' four years u.nder the Tariff of Abomina-
tions and with the sound of "nullification" being heard 
throughout parts of the South, Jackson stated it might be 
40Remini, The Election of Andr~w Jackson, p. 187, 
............... . ' ""!"I""!" . . . . . . ' ' 
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wise to consider a new tariff measure. +he bill which 
emerged in the House of Representatives was less protective 
than the 1828 measure, but by the time it had been amended, 
the duties on iron and textiles retained the protective 
rates,41 Nevertheless, as a state which almost worshiped the 
Old Hero and which had more to gain from union than separa-
tion, all nine of the representatives voted in support of the 
act although they were not in favor of the retained woolen 
and cotton duties, 42 (Map 18) James Polk, a tJ;"ue J~cksonian­
Democrat and opposer of nullification who was as anxious as 
the rest that the du.ties be lowered even more, said that it 
appeared to him that although there had been no petition from 
the woolen ~anufacturers, the principle that was sanctioned 
went to incre~se not to reduce the protecting duty. He rec-
ommended that they not lose sight of the objective with which 
they had beg\ln .. -a fair compromise to all interests of the 
country. 43 
John Bell, often considered the founder of the Whig 
Party in Tennessee,44 was in 1832 on the verge of his break 
with the Jackson ad~inistration, but though he often dis-
agreed with Jackson's policies, he remained silent and 
avoided an open break because of the Chief Executive's 
41Register of Debates, 22 Cong., l sess., VIII,: ·passim. 
42Ibid., pp. 3830-3831, 1219. 
431bid,, pp. 3658-3659. 
44oictionar:y of American Biograph¥, II, p. 157. 
Tennessee 
• ..... Joht:ison "'T'W. Hal I~ . 
. . + Clarksville •Green Gard.en 
W. Fitzgerald J.Bell + 
..-oresden • Sen F. Grundy0 
· Nashville 
+ J. Po~ · + 
•Columbia J. Standifer 
Key -
Yea vote + 
Nay vote 0 
























N·ot voting 0 
1Tcongressmen 





popularity. He was sympathetic toward John C, Calhoun and 
the Carolinians in regard to the retained protection policies 
of this bill, but felt the Union should be preserved, He 
stated on the floor of the House that he was not for any sec-
tion or interest, but he was for Union.45 
David Crockett, w'h q during his congressional career 
made the mistake of opposing Jackson, was qot reelected by 
his constituents to the Twenty-Second Congress, 46 but instead 
William Fitzgerald, a Jacksonian, represented the West.47 
Fitzgerald supported the measure in order to assure the na~ 
tion of his support for Jackson rather than Calhoun. In 
Middle Tennessee two of the state's three leading Democratic 
Party leaders, James Polk and Cave Johnson of Clarksville, 
supported the measure as did the other Jacksonians, William 
Hall of Green Garden and JacQb !sacks of Winchester. Bell, 
as mentioned, cast a vote for the bill, not because of his 
staunch support of Jackson, but due to the desire to save the 
Union. The only vote against the bill was by Feli~ Grundy, 
the third leading Democrat of the state. Grundy was sympa-
thetic to the states' rights stand of the Carolinians who 
claimed the bill was unconstitutional. The senators, more 
so than the representatives, considered the bill objection-
able as it reached the voting stage since its protective 
45Reg1ster of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, 
pp. 3348, 3388, - .... 
46Dictionary of American Biography, IV, pp. 555-556. 
4 7Biographieal Directory o.·· f the Ameri,c~n C,onsress, 
p.89Z •... ··· 
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qualities remained too strong. Grundy voted against this 
1832 bill, but later realigned with Jackson and favored fur-
ther administration and party policies. He said he had been 
willing to vote for the bill as it came from the House, but 
in its present shape he could pot vote for it. 48 This was 
also the sentiment of Senator Hugh White from East Tennessee. 
White, a very reputable man who had been slighted by Jackson 
on different· occasions, and who would be come a W hi g 
leader in the future, cast a vote not t.~nged by politics or 
personal bias, but against the obje~tional feature of the 
senate bill.49 The re't of the congressmen in his section 
voted for the measure, again as a vindication of the Presi-
dent's actions to date. 
The Tariff of 1833, coming after weeks of agitation and 
concern, was a compromise act intended to allay the nullifi-
cation actions of South Carolina. The Carblinians' Ordinance 
of Nullification, which was countered by Jackson's Nullifi-
cation Proclamation and Force Bill, stated the tariffs of 
1828 and 1832 were unconstitutional and that they, as a 
sovereign state, had J;"eseryed powers not granted to the fed-
eral government so could decla:i;;e unconstitutional actions 
such as this tariff null and void. President Jackson's 
Proclamation asserted the states had given up their sover-
eignty to form the Union and that he intended to maintain the 
48Refister of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, 
pp. 1206 f. . .__,. . ,. 
49nictiona:t;";Y of American Bie>,graphy, VIIl;, pp. 32-33. 
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Union by fo~ce if necessary. The Tennesseean~, as Democrats, 
had always maintained the doctrine of states' r:l.$hts, o!itnd 
Jackson hilllself had uphel.d it in rega;rd to the Indian affairs 
of Georgia in 1832, but now he appeared to be reversing him-
self. But when the question revolved around separation as 
espoused by South Carolina, or Union, as proclai~ed by Jac~­
son, most Tennesseeans favored the latter, The Tennessee 
General Assembly adopted resolutions in 1832 decla~ing that 
they rega~ded.the resolutions adopted by the State.of Virgin-
ia in 1798, and the commentaries of Mr. Madison thereon, as 
the true exposition of the Constitution, and that although 
South Carolina claimed to adhere to the same doctrines, the 
General Assembly of Tennessee denounced nul.l:l.fication as 
heresy.SO The Tariff of 1833, a bill which lowered the pro-
tective duties, appeared to be the solution, not only to enc;l..; 
ing the nullification pontroversy, but to achieving the 
desired agrarian goal of lower duties. 
The Tennessee congressional tariff vote of 1833 shows 
that ten of the eleven congressmen favored the bill. 51 ... · (Map 
19) William Fitzgerald, again the Jacksonian representative 
in the west, supported it as did all the congressmen from 
Middle Tennessee. The cotton and tobacco planters were 
especially pleased since this measure supported a gradual 
50Resolutions of the Tennessee General Assembly, in 
Charles Sellers, ed., Andrew Jack.eon, Nullification, and the 
State~Rights Tradition' (Chicago, 19163), p~ 50. · - -
SlRegister of Debates, 22 Cong,, II sess., IX, pp. 1810-
1811, sos:so9. --
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return to f~ee trade. In East Tennessee all favored the bill 
except Thomas Arnold of Campbell Station. Arnold's actions 
were both politically and personally motivated because he 
was, by this time, disenchanted with Jackson, and was becom-
ing a Whig in politics. The Whig movement, an anti-Jackson 
movement, was just gaining converts and was not yet solidly 
organized. Arnold, a teacher then a lawyer in Kno~ville, 
despised Jackson's µnderhanded tactics in an 1823 election 
when Jackson, then ho?ing to become a presidential contender 
in 1824, had learned that John Williams, a man who disliked 
him, was running for the Senate. Since it would not do to 
have an opponent elected.~n his own state so close to the 
election date, Jackson himself ran against and defeated this 
man who was a friend of Arnold.52 Arnold never forgave 
Jackson, and he was only one of a growing number who had per-
sonal reasons for disliking the rash actions of the Old Gen-
eral. Others in the East, with the exception of this man, 
accepted the act because their Union tendencies overrode 
their growing anti-Jackson tendencies, 
The ultimate test of Jackson's strength in Tennessee 
lay in the reaction to the Force Bill, (Map 20) The con-· 
gressional vote of that state shows Jackson still retained 
his mesmerizing hold over the general populace and that the 
political leaders, with one exception~-again Thomas Arnold--
felt they must support him because their constituents 
5 2Abernethy~ From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, 
p. 293. . -
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demanded it.53 That this hero-worship is evident is noted 
in the vote of the western section, an a:i::ea that was the most 
democratic of the three. Here William Fitzgerald voted for 
the bill which was anathema to true Democrats. It is also 
evident in East Tennessee where all but the one vote was cast 
for the bill because this was becoming the Stl;'onghold of the 
Whig party. Arnold's objections were the same as those im-
pelling him to vote against the 1833 act since he didn't 
favor a bill which would get Jackson out of his dilennna, 
Middle Tenn~ssee, more staunchly in favor of Jackson as a 
party leader than any other section., voted for the bill also. 
In summary, the Tennesseeans' reactions to the tariffs, 
more so than reactions by otheil' southerners, were motivated 
by party politics, economics, pe:rf;onal attitudes, and psycho-. 
logical factors instead of by logic or by stl;'ong economic 
desires alone. The divisive for~es between the three major 
regions of Tennessee were present in the 1828-1833 era, but 
were obscured by the prevailing counterfQrce of the Old Hero, 
the man who was so universally acclaimed. When the Tennes-
seeans opposed the 1828 tariff, they did so for economic rea-
sons because their agrarian way of life necessitated a degree 
of free trade, but when, in 1832, they favored the protective 
measure, they did so because the vote was a test pf Jackson's 
power over Calhoun's threats of nullification. They did this 
even though they still considered the bill objectionable, 
53Register of Debates, 22 Cong,, II sess., IX, pp. 1903, 
688. . ~ . ' 
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They accepted the 1833 Compromise Tariff as more in line 
with their needs and desires and cast a normal, logical vote 
for it, but that same year they again went against their 
principles and favored the seemingly ultra-federal Force 
Bill. They listened to Feli~ Grundy, a leading Tennessee 
Democrat, who defended the administration as he made the fol-
lowing statements: 
(Concerning] the Proclamation lately issued by 
the President • • • a great injustice has been done 
in this debate ••• ~ South Carolina had no right 
to annul the revenue laws . . • no State has a con-
stitutional right to secede from the Union. . • . I 
should make this remark, that if that instrument 
Cthe Nullification Proclamation] be construed as in 
all fairness it should be . , • none of these ultra 
federal doctrines would be found in it of which 
gentlemen eomplain.54 
Grundy, Polk, and other Democrats were able to hold the 
state in the Jackson ranks during the tariff and nullifica-
tion interlude, but Jackson himself alienated many people in 
personal encounters, and ultimately, in 1834, an opposition 
party emerged in East Tennessee and in some of the larger, 
wealthier cities. nut the South Carolinians were right in 
1832 when some of them said that of all the southern states 
Tennessee could be least counted on to aid them in supporting 
nullification and ,,t'tt,~opposing the federal ·government's 
tariff m~asures.55 
54rbid,, p, 667. 
55william W. Freehling, Prelude to Cl.vil War (New York, 
1965), p. 239. 
CHAPTER VI 
GEORGIA 
The Government of either State is to be consid-
ered an independent moral agent. • • . Georgia 
claims • . . there is such a radical difference of 
opinion between the authorities of Georgia and those 
of the United States, that the harmony and tranquil-
lity of the two governments . • • can never be main-
tained uninterruptedly until the Indians shall have 
been removed. 
George M. Troup, 
November 7, 18261 
States' rights, the central theme of Georgia history for 
a number of years, was centered around the state's desire to 
remove the Cherokee and Creek Indians from within her bound-
aries. 2 This doctrine which maintained that certain rights, 
such as Indian affairs, were reserved to the states was not 
in opposition to the attitudes of federal officials, even 
President John Quincy Adams, although he revoked one of the 
cession treaties; Adams simply felt the 1825 Treaty of Indian 
Springs was not valid since the proper Indian authorities ha~ 
not supported it. 3 Upon the revocation of the treaty, George 
M, Troup, the Governor of Georgia, began a seething series of 
c.' 
lAmerican State Pa,ers, ··Indian Affairs (Washington, D. 
1832-1834), II, p. 28, 
2Ibid,, I, II, passim. 




letters to federal authorities denouncing their actions. Not 
all of his letters were sent directly to Washington officials 
though. Some, such as the one quoted, were sent to "Fellow-
Citizens ," for 1826 was an election year and George Troup, 
the incumbent governor seeking re-election and heading one 
of the two major political factions within the state, needed 
an issue which would gain the support of the constituents.4 
Troup's letters evidenced a willingness to fight or even 
separate from the Union to maintain states' rights in such 
cases of governmental usurpation, and many Georgians appeared 
willing to support him. His fight obtained results within a 
few months when a new, legal removal treaty was written ced-
ing Creek lands in Georgia to the state,5 
The successful recalcitrance of the Georgians was espe-
cially noted by the South Carolinians in the decade of the 
Twenties. The South Carolina nullifiers, who also espoused 
the states' rights doctrine, had called for a southern con-
vention to consider complete nullification and to test the 
constitutional validity of the extremely protective 1828 and 
1832 tariffs. They felt certain that this sister state, as 
well as Virginia, could be counted on to ally with them in 
their fight against the federal government's protective tar-
iff policy. They logically based their assumption on two 
major considerations; first; the fact that the Georgians had 
4Ibid., p. 728. 
Srbid., pp. 612-613, 747. 
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proved their readiness to fight for states' rights in regard 
to federal infringements on state Indian policies, and sec-
ond, the fact that Georgia was beset with economic ills simi-
lar to those afflicting South Carolina. However, early in 
1833 the South Carolinians were rudely awakened to the incor-
rectness of their logic when the Georgians, although exhibit-
ing a strong distaste for protective tariffs and leaning more 
toward South Carolina's viewpoint than did any other state, 
renounced the doctrine of nullification. Instead, they sup-
ported the President in his determination to maintain federal 
laws. To understand Georgia's reactions, it is best to note 
the economic, social, and political elements existing within 
the state in the first three decades of the nineteenth 
century. 
Much of the history of Georgia centers around two men, 
George M. Troup and John Clark, the leaders of the two polit-
ical factions within the state in the 1820's. 6 These fac-· 
tions developed, not because of personal antagonisms between 
the two men, but due to pre-existing conditions which caused 
two divergent types of livelihood and outlook to arise. 
These two interest groups, the aristocrats and the small 
farmers, simply waited for the proper personalities to come 
along to weld them together and to speak for their interests. 
The dominant faction within the state in the 1820's was 
the aristocratic element whi~h consisted of planters, 
6ulrich B. Phillips, Georgia and State Rights (Washing-
ton, 1922), pp. 93-103. 
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merchants, lawyers, and other men of wealth. 7 These people 
were located in two main regions, the Tidewater lands of 
southeastern Georgia and the eastern Piedmont.a (Map 21) 
The coastal planters, like those in South Carolina, raised 
long staple cotton and rice and had large holdings of slaves, 
while further inland the planters raised short staple cotton, 
as did their upland counterparts.9 Numerous slaves were also 
found in this portion of the uplands,lO 
The economic nature of these two areas was not the only 
element binding the people together; the other tie was based 
on lineage since the settlers of the two regions came basic-
ally from the state of Virginia.11 These people, proud of 
their family heritage, developed a supercilious attitude 
toward the people of other backgrounds, especially North 
Carolinians, and believed political leadership should be in 
the hands of the educated elite, or in other words, men of 
their own class and conviction.12 
7George Smith, The Stor~ of Geor~ia and the Georgia 
People, 1732-1860 (Macon, 190~)-;-pp. 2 2-2"li4; J'Olin Edgar 
Dawson Shipp, Giant Dayi, or the Life and Times of William 
H, Crawford (Americus, 90"9), pp.~3~ ..,..._ -
8Phillips, Georgia a~d State Rights, PP• 106-108. 
~ . ,.. . . 
9Robert Preston Brooks, History of Georgia (Boston, 
1913), p. 209, ~ 
lOPhillips, Georgia~ State Rights, pp. 106-108. 
llshipp, Giant Days, pp. 34-35, 
12knanda Johnson, Georgia ~ Colony and State (Atlanta, 
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These planter-aristocrats were opposed by the second 
class of Georgians, the frontier-farmer group.13 These peo-
ple, small cotton farmers or self-subsistent frontiersmen, 
lived in the northern, central, and southwestern parts of 
Georgia between the planters' lands just mentioned, and the 
Indian lands, while at times some of them lived within the 
Indian domain.14 One of the farmers' major desires was to 
wrest these lands from the Creek and Cherokee nations. Since 
many of these farmers were North Carolinians, they did not 
become too friendly with the haughty Virginians. 15 
The leadership element arose rather naturally for the 
farmers when Elijah Clarke, the old Revolutionary War hero 
and Indian fighter, made a name for himself fighting the 
Creek chieftain, Alexander McGillivray, and his Indian ma-
rauders from Florida. He was soon pushed into the position 
of spokesman for the poorer Georgians and was supported by 
the hardy men of his type. His son, John Clark, who pre-
ferred to shorten the spelling of his name, soon assumed the 
reigns of authority handed him by his father.1 6 
The aristocratic group found a leader in the person of 
James Jackson, a lawyer in the Yazoo land fraud cases at the 
turn of the century. Jackson fought the Yazoo land claimants 
l~il;'hillips, Geor~ia and State Ri$hts, p. 89. 
14smith, Story of Georgia, pp, 241, 304-305, 
15Johnson, Georgia as Colony and State, p. 193. 
16Phillips, Georgia and State R:i.ghts, pp. 95, 97. 
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and other land grabbers in general, but the Clarke supporters 
charged his actions were designed more to build a political 
organization than to prevent frauds. 17 Whatever his intent, 
he succeeded in gaining a political following which included 
two lawyers who hoped to enhance their own political careers, 
William H. Crawford and George Michael Troup. 18 In 1800 
James Jackson's followers supported the Jeffersonian politi-
cal doctrines and declared themselves to be the Jeffersonian 
party of Georgia; this left only the Federalist position open 
for their opponents, the Clarke faction. 19 The result was 
indeed ironic for the aristocratic element supported the 
democratic Jeffersonian party while the democratic farmers 
were forced into the aristocratic Federalist party. The 
frontiersmen, being unsuited to the Federalist doctrines of 
the day, also finally joined the Jeffersonian party, but the 
intrastate factionalism within this party remained as strong 
as ever. Upon James Jackson's death in 1806, control of the 
aristocratic party passed to William Crawford in the uplands 
and George Troup in the lowlands, and control of the Clarke 
faction passed from Elijah to his son, John Clark. 
By 1820 the intrastate factionalism was as strong as 
ever *as both parties sought to elect men of their choice to 
17rbid., pp. 95-96. 
18shipp, Giant Days, pp. 36, 38, 45-46; Phillips, Geor-
~ and State Rights, p. 97; Biographical Director§ of "'Eli'e'""" 
AIDerTCan Cbn~ress, 1774-.J,961 (WaShington, D. C., 1 6T) ,--
pp. 752, 172 . . 
l9Johnson, Geol;,"gia ~Colony and State, p. 194. 
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the state legislature, though on a national scale Georgia 
appeared to be united. The citizens as a whole seemed to 
favor low tariffs, Indian removal, and states' rights. This 
unity expressed itself in the state's strong electoral sup-
port of William Crawford, Georgia's candidate for the presi-
dency in 1824, in an election which had political 
repercussions in the South. 
William Crawford, a Democratic-Republican, was consid-
ered to be the natural heir to the presidency since he had 
served the party faithfully for a number of years and had 
acted as Secretary of Treasury under President Monroe for the 
past eight years,20 The party leaders nominated him in a 
congressional caucus to be the presidential contender against 
John Quincy Adams, the National-Republican nominee, but 
although Crawford was a Democrc:i.t, several groups from the 
South and West opposed him because they felt;: he represented 
the old "Virginia Dynasty. 1121 Two states' legislatures, 
Tennessee and Kentucky, placed their own favorite sons, 
Andrew Jackson and ijenry Clay, in contention for the posi-
tion, and as a result split the vote of the party, but Craw-
ford's chances were weakened anyway when he became seriously 
ill before the election. The:'Cla:rk party supported Jackson, 
but the electors from Georgia were aristocrats so all votes 
were given Crawford. John Quincy Adams won the coveted 
office. 
20Biographical Directory; of the American Congress, p. 752. 
2lshipp, Giant Days, pp. 175-176. 
1.64 
The importance of the 1824 election is two-fold. First, 
the newly elected President's policies seemingly did not co-
incide with the Crawford-Troup faction's views on states' 
rights, causing the ensuing state versus federal confronta-
tions as previously mentioned. Second, another incident 
which was to have consequence in the tariff issue occurred--
an issue involving John C. Calhoun. Calhoun, of the neigh-
boring state of South Carolina, also had presidential ambi-
tions, but due to the number of contenders in the 1824 race 
he became a candidate for vice· president. Animosity arose 
between Crawford and Calhoun as each worked to oust the other 
from favor, for both kn~w only .one person from the South 
could hope to win enough votes for national office. 22 Al-
though Crawford's political fortunes declined after his ill-
ness, his dislike of Calhoun continued. With Crawford no 
longer a strong contender, the Troup faction switched to 
support of Andrew Jackson, the Clark party's favorite, rather 
than to Calhoun, but by the time the tariff controversies 
shook the country, there were both elements of agreement and 
disagreement between the factions. The tariff controversy 
caused these conditions to emerge into view, 
The Tariff of 1828 with its average ad valorem rates of 
50 per cent was firmly opposed by the Georgians. Georgia was 
a state which depended on cotton as its primary staple,, having 
increased its production from 10 milJ.ion po~nds in 1801 to 
22southern Recorder, Oct. 15, Nov. 19, Nov. 27, 1827. 
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20 million in 1811, and 45 million pounds in 1821. It was 
second only to South Ca~olina in total production.23 Their 
cotton prices, like South Carolina's, were depressed dbrtng 
the Twenties, and they blamed the Tariff of 1824 for hurting 
them even more. Even before the Tariff of 1828 was written, 
the Governor and General Assembly had stressed they would 
resist efforts to grant protection by all constitutional 
means and the Southern Recorder and other Georgia newspapers 
denounced the proposed tariff as unjust. 24 Georgians became 
more silent as the tariff bill of 1828 emerged from committee 
in Congress, for they, like other southerners, hoped the 
portions of the bill which hurt the New England manufacturers 
would cause them to join the South in opposing it. Although 
the Tariff of 1828 passed Congress and was signed into law, 
all seven votes from Georgia were cast against it.25 (Map 
22). the senators, Thomas Cobb of Greensboro and John Ber-
rien of Savannah, made no statements in Congress but balloted 
against the bill. 26 Three respresentatives also made no com-
ments during the congressional debate: John Floyd of Jeffer-
son, Charles Haynes of Sparta, and Wilson Lumpkin of Madison, 
but the other four representatives saw fit to make a few 
23Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819-
1829 (New York, 1962), p, 52. - - - ---- -. - --
24Niles' Weekla Register, XXXIII, pp, 33, 221-222; see 
also Southern Re.cor~er, January-March, 1828. 
25Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess,, IV, pp. 2471-
2472, 786 .... -
26Ib'd ' i .. , passim. 
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statements.27 Richard Wilde of Augusta was the only cori- .·, . ., 
{ ., 
gressman to make a lengthy speech opposing protection and 
castigating the pill which, he said, would benefit the North 
at the expense of the South.28 Tomlinson Fort of Milledge-
ville supported a duty on ~ndigo, and George Gilmer of Lex-
ington and Wiley Thompson of Elberton simply and briefly 
stated their opposition. 29 This silence was short-lived, for 
with the passage of the bill many Georgians were ange~ed and 
expressed their opposition vigorously. They supported Andrew 
Jackson for president in 1828, hoping he would seek relief 
for the South, but by 1830 the only reductions which had ap-
peared were on tea, coffee, molasses, and salt.30 The system 
of protection and the 50 per cent ad valorem duties of the 
1828 tariff continued to exist. 
The Tariff of 1832 was onty; ·1slightly better than the 
Tariff of 1828, so once again the Georgians evidenced their 
displeasure by vote and action. 31 (Map 23) Both of Geof~:: · 
gia's senators, Troup of Dublin and John Forsyth of Augusta, 
opposed the bill. Troup did not voice his opinions in Con-
gress, but Forsyth, who was weakening in his alliance with 
Troup, at one time stated he intended to vote for the bill 
27Ibid., passim. 
28Ibid., pp. 2698-2699. 
29Ibid., pp. 2322, 2299, 2327, 2708, 2445. 
30Georgia Courier, May 31, 1830. 
31Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, 
PP. 1219, 383o-3m-1. · 
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because unless it was enacted, the country would be left 
with the existing protective bill without any reduction. 32 
He voted against the bill when the question was called, but 
not before he had alienated many of his aristocratic friends. 
Six of the seven representatives also voted against the bill, 
with Augustin s. Clayton being most outspoken in Congress. 
He felt Georgia and the South "paid all and got nothing."33 
As he continued the congretsmen listened intently as he laid 
before them the spect:.r~ -of nullification. 
We are awake to the sufferings you have in-
flicted on us under the talisman of Union ... we 
will serve the Lord of Liberty .•.. If you do not 
withdraw your exactions, if you will not live with 
us upon the terms of eq~gl rights, we shall certain-
ly part from you. • • . 
Of the other Georgia congressmen, only four made 
speeches against the bill. Henry Lamar of Macon and Daniel 
Newnan did not voice their opinions, leaving that up to 
Thomas Foste~, Wiley Thompson, and Richard Wilde. These men 
made some remarks against the bill, but none were as incen-
diary as those made by Clayton. 35 
Only one Georgia congressman, James Wayne of Savannah, 
favored the Tariff of 1832. Wayne made four short speeches 
in Congress, stating his opposition to keeping duties high 
32Paul Murray, The W~i~ Party in Georgia, 1825-1853 
(Chapel Hill, 1948),pp . .,. 0, 15; ReBister of Debates, 22 
Cong., I sess., VIII, pp, 624-626, 65 -651, 12"04, 1290. 
33rbid,, pp, 3530-3567. 
34Ibid., p. 3567. 
35Ibid., pp. 3705, 3780, 3798, 7474, 3722, 3723. 
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and mentioning that some concessions should be given to South 
Carolina. 36 Wayne, a lawyer in Savannah, and a representa-
tive for the merchants, hoped to obtain a bill which would 
keep commerce strong as well as counter the nullification 
argument.37 Thus only one Georgia congressman favored the 
bill by vote, although another spoke in favor of it. 
The post-tariff reaction was quite strong in Georgia 
once the tariff bill became law, and finally the state polit-
ical leaders called for a convention to consider the merits 
of nullification, a policy which had gained attention in 
their state after a year of strong agitation and propaganda 
from their neighboring state of South Carolina. 38 The ensu-
ing events within the convention showed the populace that all 
were not in agreement as to the proper procedure which Geor-
gia should follow. These varying outlooks merit some 
consideration. 
The differences of opinion which occurred in 1832 were 
caused by the reemergence of the partially dormant Clark~ 
Troup factionalism, as well as some personal factors which 
affected a few individuals. By the time these elements had 
completely emerged there were three groups in existence, each 
with its own set of views on the tariff and nullification. 
The Clark faction, the first of the three groups, opposed 
36rbid., pp. 3683, 3713, 3723, 3774. 
37Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 
p. 1785. . --
38southern Recorder, Nov. 22, 1832. 
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nullification although they also opposed extremely high tar-
iffs. Like the unionists of South Carolina, these people 
awakened to the fact that they must not let the nullifiers 
take over and disrupt the state. The main force which domi-
nated their decision was thetr admiration of Andrew Jackson, 
for he, along with Elijah Clarke, had fought against the 
Indians and in 1814,Jackson had won the Battle of Horseshoe 
Bend as well as helping stop the Indian menace arising from 
the Florida marauders. Such men as Tomlinson Fort of 
Milledgeville, Wilson Lumpkin of Madison, and Charles Haynes 
of Sparta, all congressmen in the previous sessions, now 
openly worked against nullification, as did James Wayne and 
John Forsyth of the Twenty-Second Congress. 39 These Clark-
Unionists established newspapers to combat any nullification 
literature which might ensue. The Federal Union, Tomlinson 
Fort's paper at Milledgeville, became the leading Union 
chronicle, with The Democrat of Columbus and The Telegraph 
at Macon running a close second. 40 The Clark•Union following 
increased in size as they not only denounced nullification 
but used it to politically castigate the Troup faction, They 
would not renounce the "hero of the common man," for they 
themselves were corrnnoners. As stated by William Lumpkin: 
Upon several occasions we have been compelled 
to throw ourselves upon our reserved rights, and re-
sist Federal encroachments; but we have never veiled 
39Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia, pp. 23, 30. ' - . 
40rbid., p. 22. 
ourselves in the flimsy4e;arment of peaceable consti-
tutional nullification. I· · 
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The Troup faction, although berated as nullifiers by the 
Clark-Union group, were basically opposed to nullification. 
One wing of this group went all the way to supporting inter-
position as a remedy, but this was not true of the Troup 
faction as a whole.42 Thus the Troup element can be termed 
the state's right wing while the nullifiers should be noted 
separately. George Troup, a senator in 1832, made no 
speeches in the halls of Congress, but within the state he 
stressed his opposition to nullification. Troup and his fol-
lowers, as well as the Clark faction, were involved with t~y­
ing to gain jurisdiction over the Cherokee lands in the 
northern part of the state, but when the Cherokees, an ex-
tremely civilized nation, met the Georgians in federal court 
in the case of Worcester v. Georgia in 1832, Chief Justice 
I- I 
John Marshall, on March 3, declared the federal government 
had exclusive authority over tribal Indians and their lands 
within a state and that state regulatory laws were not en· 
forceable in the domain of the Indians,43 The Georgians 
w0uld have been extremely unhappy had. Andrew ;Jackson, the 
President, not chosen to ignore the court's decision. 44 
41Fed~ral Union, Nov. 8, 1832. 
·42Murr~y, 1The Whi~ :P~rty iin. Georgia, pp, 23~ 30. 
43Feder al Union, ·March 29 ', 1'832 ~ 
44Mary Yo'lljrlg, "Indian Removal·. and Land Allotment," 
American Historical Review, LXIV (October, 1958), pp. 31-45; 
Mal;."y Young, 11The Creek, F:r;.auds ,,.A.St~dy in Consc,ien.~e and Cor-
ruption," :Missis'sipp:i Valle~ Hi$ to·rical, Review, XLII 
- ·:(December, 1955) , pp. :4°11..-4. 7. · · . · 
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Thus, in regard to this statewide problem, the Troup faction 
and others felt their friendship with Jackson mu$t be main-
tained. They disclaimed any accusations made by Clark-
Unionists that they supported the doctrine of nullification, 
but they did oppose the tariff and did favor states' rights .45 
The third group was a minority faction led by Augl,lstin 
Clayton and John M. Berrien, Clayton of Athens, was a cot~ 
ton planter and the owner of one of t~e few cotton textile 
factories in the vicinity~ He stat~d;in Congress that al-
though he was a manufacturer he opposed the bill for he saw 
how good his profits were even with his small endeavor, ln 
making one pound of cotton into cloth his expenses ran 16 
cents while his selling price was 31\ cents, so his profit 
was 15% cents per every pound.46 Clayton was strongly de-
. voted to the cause of states' rights and opposed the tariffs 
.and the Supreme Court as curtailing those rights, His ally, 
John Berrien of Savannah, had a deeper reason for being a 
radical nullifier, Berrien, a member of Jackson's Cabinet 
from 1829 to 1831, had become disenchanted with the President 
over the Eaton affair. Also, a distinct lack of trust ex-
isted between the two. 47 Berrien felt the tariff was 
45Federal Union, April 26, 1832~ Murray~ The Whig Party 
in Georgia, p. 30. 
46Re~ister of Debates, 22 Cong,, I sess., VIII, 
PP• 3727- 728, -- . 
47Thomas P. Govan, "John M. Berrien and the Administra-
tion of Andrew Jackson,'' Journal of Southern History, V 
(November, 1939), pp. 447-467, ..,,_. 
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unconstitutional, as noted in his 1829 congressional speech, 
and his growing alliance with John C. Calhoun of South Caro-
lina, a man who also heartily disliked Jackson, abetted his 
nullifi~ation tendencies.48 The nullifiers of Georgia, led 
by these radicals, were never to become as numerous as those 
in South Carolina. 
These were the three elements presented in the conven-
tion which met in Milledgeville on November 12, 1832, 49 It 
see~ed to the Clark men that the States' Rights faction was 
in control, so John Forsyth and other conservatives walked 
out~SO Forsyth hoped this would delay any radical plans the 
convention might have, but ;aerrien and Clayton hoped the com-
mittee which had been formed cquld formulate a good radical 
plan of action which would be acceptable to a majority of 
Georgians. They were soon disappointed for the resolutions 
presented were not too radical. They stated Georgia's belief 
in free trade, and her opposition to the unconstitutional 
tariff which ~hey vowed to resist by all means within their 
power. First, however, they would wait for a congressional 
effort to lower the e~isting measure.51 The states' rights 
48Augusta Chronicle, Aug. 25, 1832; Richard H. Shryock, 
Georgia and !.fu;. Union in 1..§.iQ (Durham, 1926), p, 95, 
49southern Recorder, Nov. 22, 1832; Federal Union, Nov, 
22, 1832. . . 
50Niles' Weeklt Resister, XLIII? pp, 220-222; Phillips, 
Georgia, ana State R ghts; p. 130~ · -· 
, : _........., , .i. . . , . .. .. : ·.) T • . , ·• .• 
51Niles' Weekly Register, XLII!, pp. 220-222, 229; 
Stephens F. Mille't·,_.TheqBench and ·Bar o:f,Georgia: Memoirs 
and Sketches, I (PhiTiC!elphia,-rB'S"ST; pp. 60- 2. - .. 
175 
element, instead of the nullifiers or the unionists, domi-
nated the convention. 
Once the resolutions by the bonvention were heard by 
the people of the state, many stated their opposition to even 
these attitudes. The General Assembly, saying it, not the 
convention, truly represented the people, met to allay the 
fears of the populace in late November, 1832. They repudi-
ated the convention resolutions and stated that the true 
representatives of the state favored calling a convention of 
southern states to study the tariff question. But to them, 
nullification was completely wrong.52 
All concerned waited for the new Compromise Tariff of 
1833 to emerge from Congress, a bill which was much better 
than either the 1828 or 1832 measures. When the balloting 
on the compromise act occurred, the vote of the Georgia Con-
gressmen was quite different from the vote on the 1832 bill 
which most disliked. In 1832 eight congressional votes were 
cast against the bill with one in favor, but in 1833 seven 
votes were cast for the measure with two not voting. 53 (Map 
24) Troup and Wilde did not vote, but the votes of the 
others are quite understandable for whether one belonged to 
the Clark, Troup, or Clayton element, he would favor a low 
tariff and would want to avoid conflict. Of the seven con-
gressmen who voted for the bill in 1833, only James Wayne 
52Niles' Weekly Register, pp. 279-280. 
53aegister of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., IX, pp. 1810-
1811, 808-809. -
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cast a vote similar to the 1832 vote, for this Clark man was 
voting not only for low tariffs but for Jackson and the 
Union, This appeared in all of his congressional votes.S4 
The Force Bill or Bloody Bill did not find the same fol~ 
lowing among the Georgians in Congress.SS (Map 25) To peo-
ple who favored states' rights, this measure was despicable. 
Naturally Augustin Clayton voted against it, although Berrien 
was not in Congress to show his opposition. Others who op-
posed the act included the Tro~p men; Thomas Foster, Henry 
Lamar, Daniel Newnan, Wiley Thompson, and Richard Wilde. 
Again the Clark men can be discerned in the voting pattern 
for John Forsyth and James Wayne voted for this bill which 
enraged most men of a states' right creed. Wayne stated the 
Bloody Bill was not meant to dissolve the Union, but instead 
helped the Union, while Thomas Foster denounced Wayne for 
supporting the act. He stated he was against the employment 
of military force, and although he did not approve of South 
Carolina's measuJ;"es, he supported her effort to prohibit the 
Union from changing its character.S6 
With the passage of the new and lower tariff in 1833, 
the South Carolinians calmed themselves slightly, and the 
issue of nullification appeared to disappear from view on the 
part of the Georgians. The period of calm was short-lived, 
54rbid,, pp, 1697-1698, 1768, 1812. 
S5Ibid, , pp. 688, 1903. 
S6rbid., pp. 1768, 1865-1876. 
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for the submerged anti-Jackson sentiment on the part of the 
aristocratic pl~nters and states' rights leaders soon erupted 
as Jackson did more things to gain disfavor in the eyes of 
the Georgians. The result was the emergence of the Whig 
party of Georgia,57 
The question of why Georgia did not heartily support 
nullification even though so similar to South Carolina in 
many ways can be answered, Georgia was suffering from the 
depression, especially in the Piedmont, and there were nu-
merous slaves, both in the Piedmont and the Tidewater, but 
these conditions were not as bad as they were in South Caro-
lina for if new Indian lands were opened the farmers and 
planters would have fresh soils in which to plant new crops. 
There were no major slave insurrections in Georgia like in 
South Carolina so they were not as worried about the slave 
situation. The main reasons, though, concern the situations 
within Georgia itself~ The state was not as united as was 
South Carolina because regional and personal factionalism 
existed, as has been noted. Also, the bonds of collllllunication 
between the regions were not as strong as in the Palmetto 
State. The major difference, though, was Indian removal, a 
problem wh~ch existed in Georgia throughout the tariff inter-
lude. In President Jackson they found a man who would sup-
port any of their anti-Indian actions~ They returned this 
~7Arthur Charles Cole, The Whig Party in.the South 
(Wash~ngton, 1913), pp. 49-6T;Murray, The Whig Party 2:!! 
Georgia, p. 1. · 
I 
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favor and maintained his friendship at the cost of suffering 
through some protective tariff measures. They in turn gained 
the disfavor of some South Carolinians, but this was to be 
expected because the old Crawford~T~oup faction heartily dis~ 
liked John C. Calhoun and other Carolinians anyway, Although 
they too might suffer the consequences, tariff interests were 
secondary to the Georgians. And finally, there were no able 
young orators of the caliber, skill, and zeal of George 
McDuffie, Robert Hayne, and James Hamilton, Jr., of South 
Carolina. rhus Georgia, the state most likely to align with 
South Carolina in suppo~t of the nullification program, 
turned away from her sister state to support South Carolina's 
enemy, Andrew Jackson, the Indian fighter. 
CHAPTER VII 
ALABAMA 
But the strife and dissension which have been 
produced by the persevering efforts of the advocates 
of this doctrine [nullification] to gain for it the 
favorable opinion of the people, have been carried 
to such excesse,_that it is already growing into an 
evil not less to be deprecated than the tariff 
itself ...• 
Governor John Gayll' 
November 5, 1832 
It seemed that opposition to South Carolina's doctrine 
of nullifica~ion was inversely proportional to a state's 
distance from her, for G~orgia had a fairly strong element of 
nulli£iers, but Alabama had fewer. In fact, Alabama was vig-
orous in her support for the Union and President Jackson dur-
ing the tariff and nullification crisis, This degree of 
Union sentim~nt seems strange when compared to other southern 
states such as South Carolina and Georgia since there were 
strong economic similarities among them; all were dependent 
upon cotton for their major source of income. In turn, it 
was natural, seemingly, for an agrarian. state like Alabama to 
Qppose the tariffs which benefited the ~anufacturing inter-
ests of the North and Northwes~ and the hemp and sugar 
1Alabama Senate Journal, called session (November, 
1832), pp.·6-14; Niles' Weekly Register, XLIII, P~ 220. 
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producers of Kentucky and Louisiana instead of themselves. 
But the Alabamians did more than condemn the protective tar-
iffs of 1828 and 1832, they denounced the most effective 
remedy the South had for ending the protective legislation 
--the doctrine of nullification. To the present day student 
of history, several questions remain: Why were these people 
so strongly opposed to nullification--a doctrine which, if 
extensively supported, might cause the North to reconsider 
the tariff duties and, in turn, to lower them? Why did 
Governor Gayle consider nullification an evil worse than the 
tariff? And, were most Alabamians in agreement with Governor 
Gayle's position? An understanding of Alabama's tariff and 
nullification reactions is best arrived at by looking at the 
conditions within the state which laid the foundation for 
opposition to the tariffs and also to nullificationl. 
When Alabama entered the Union in 1819, the populace, 
although separated by distance, had common problems which 
tended to unite them. Primarily, they were all newcomers to 
a young, western state, and to'gether they faced the problems 
of claiming the land and establishing themselve~ as farmers 
and planters. It was natural for citizens of a newly estab-
lished connnonwealth to look to the federal government for 
protection and aid during its early years. Also, citizens 
"" 
of a y~~ng state usually had problems of an individual and 
local nature which caused them to be too concerned w~th their 
labors to be strongly involved in politics, although most 
people from Alabama as well as the other southern states 
claimed to be followers of the Democrat party. 2 
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The Alabamians had, other than the above degree of unity 
among themselves, a ~pecial bond of unity with the federal 
government--the desire for a national policy of Indian remov-
al. Alabama had once been the home of several Indian nations 
with the Choctaws living in the southwest and west, the 
Chickasaws in the northwest, the Cherokees in the north and 
northeast, and the Creeks, the dominant group, in the cen-
tral, southern, and eastern areas,3 but the United States 
government had gained much of this land in various cession 
treaties until, when Alabama gained statehood in 1819 the 
Choctaw Indians retained only one small area along the west-
ern boundary while the Chickasaw retained an even smaller 
area along the northwestern border, but the Cherokee and 
Upper Creek held title to the largest area, a strip of ter~ 
ritory on the eastern side of the state. All told, the 
Indians retained about 12,000 square miles of land or one-
fourth of the area of the state. 4 They remained in these 
lands; ·creating few problems, until the settlers filled the 
best portions of the ceded lands and looked for even more. 
The variety of settlers who poured into Alabama inad-
vertently formed the basis for the social, economic, and 
2Theodor·e.H. Jack, Sectionalism and §i.9)Y Politics in 
Alabama, 1819-1842 (Menasha, Wisconsiii';-1 , p. 23. -
3Bureal,.1 of American Ethnology, Eighteenth Annual Report, 
Plate 1. · 
4Nile.s' Weekly Register, }QtXVII, pp. 12-13. 
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political sectionalism which emerged in later years. These 
people, basically from Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Georgia, worked their way into the four 
major areas opened for settlement. (Map 26) They could set-
tle in the north along the Tennessee River and the fertile 
lands to the not:"th and south of it; in the n.orth central part 
of the state which was less fertile; in the Black Belt which 
ran across the lower central part of the state in a seventy-
five to one hundred mile strip; or in the south-central and 
southwestern part of Alabama. The best area was the fertile 
Black Belt, but a small area in the western Tennessee Valley 
and around the Huntsville area and the lands near the rivers 
of the southwest were also quite productive. The early set-
tlers did not fully realize w~ich regions would be most prof-
itable, so they tended to settle in areas either near the 
borders of their old home state or else in areas which were 
already populated by people from their native state. Many 
Tennesseeans settled the Tennessee River Valley and the lands 
to the north and south of it. They were joined by some Vir-
ginians and a few Georgians, but the latter group was found 
mainly in Madison County in the Huntsville area. 5 Since only 
a few counties in this region were extremely fertile, the 
majority of these people became cotton farmers with few 
slaves, The richer western counties as well as Madison 
County could maintain large scale culture better, so planters 
5Thomas P. Abernethy, The Formative Period in Alabama, 
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with numerous slaves were found there, 6 In general, it 
should be noted that the north was basically a small farm 
region, 
The settlers from South Carolina, North Carolina, and 
Virginia worked their way across the state into the river 
lands of the west and southwest, The soils were fairly fer-
tile, especially along the rivers, and numerous plantations 
arose. The major plantations appeared in the Black Belt 
which touched "the lower west-central part of the state and 
stretched eastward into and across the lands owned by the 
Upper Creeks. The eastern part of the Black Belt was set-
tled mainly by Georgians who simply worked their way westward 
into Alabama, and some of them settled inside the Indian do-
main. These people of the south, the Georgians, Carolinians, 
and Virginians, became the dominant planters and slaveholders 
of the day.7 
The year of statehood, 1819, was a year of depression 
fer the nation, but the young state qf Alabama had fewer 
problems than the old, settled. states to the east whose citi-
zens had a backlog of debts and whose soils were becoming ex-
hausted, The newly opened lands of Alabama poured 20 million 
pounds of cotton into the market by 1820, and hurt the east-
erners even ~ore since the market was already oversupplied.8 
6Ibid., p. 39. 
7rbid., p. 41, 
8Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819-
1829 (New York, 1962), p. 52. ..,----..... _,.... ...,..._.. __,_ .....---.-
~
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As a result of this and other economic factors, the price of 
cotton began a downward trend throughout the South. Alabamas 
cotton producers also suffe~ed as the price of short staple 
cotton fell from 17 cents to 6 cents in the 1819-1823 peri-
od. 9 However, the Alabamians could actually be considered 
prosperous in comparison to the other southeastern states 
since their fresh soils produced ~''more~'bouptift,11/c·rap with 
less labor, but they too felt the sting of the depression. 
They were especially worried about the consequences of highly 
protective tariffs, realizing that it w~s improbable that 
northern manufacturers could use all the cotton produ~ed in 
the south. If prohibitory tariffs caused Europe to retaliate 
by refusing to buy American cotton, they knew their economy 
wot;tld be ruined; thus, their major concern with federal poli-
tics was centered a~ound tariff needs. 
As early as 1822 the Alabam~ana felt that the answer to 
the country's problems, especially the ones rel~ted to the 
tariff, lay in the person of Andrew Jackson. As a southwest-
erner and a Democrat, he evidently would, if elected presi.-
dent, feel a concern for the South, especially in regard to 
free trade,10 The low tariff question became of pressing 
concern to the Alabamians and others in the early Twenties 
for it was rumored a bill would be introduced into Congress 
by certain northern manufacturers who were also feeling the 
9Abernethy, The Formative Period in Alabama, p. 8~. _.....,_. ,, .,. ' ~
lONiles' Weekly Register, XXV, pp. 323-324. 
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strain of depression, Their fears were re~lized in 1824 
when not one but two setbacks befell the South: the protec-
tive tariff of 1824 was passed, placing textiles on the enu-
merated lists with duties of 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem;l1 
and John Quincy Adams, the National-Republican, defeated 
Andrew Jackson for Presiden~, Adams' vie tory seemed to the 
South a defeat for the Jeffersonian doctrine of states' 
rights, economy in government, and strict construction of the 
Constitution. The defeat, which pitted Adams and Henry Clay 
against Andrew Jackson who actuqlly had the plurality of pop-
ular votes, and against the Georgia candidate who was in line 
for the position, William Crawford, caused the southerners to 
unite more strongly around Jackson for the campaign of 1828. 
The 1824 election in Alabama saw some divided sentiment, 
with a few people being opposed to Jackson. Since William 
Crawford of Georgia was also a candidate for the presidential 
office, the Georgia settlers around Montgomery and Huntsville 
gave him their support, while some slight support for Adams 
came from the southwest and west where a number of planters 
from Virginia and the Carolinas who were growing more unsure 
of the outcome of the "democracy" which was developing, 
lived, Their changing attitudes developed because they were 
growing wealthier and, in turn, more conservative. Jackson 
won the majority of the state outside these three regions, 
11 . 
Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., I sess. , passim. 
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his strongest support coming from the north and north-central 
region where the small fa:rm~rs of a democ~atic nature 
resided.12 
Thus it can be seen there was beginning to Qe an element 
of dtsagreement between north and south Alabama as early as 
1824. This division was based ~pon the economic divergence 
between north and south, a difference which was no longer one 
simply between Tennesseeans, Carolinians, Virginians, and 
Georgians, but one between small farmers and large farmers, 
slavehoiders and non-slaveholders, democrats and conserva-
tives. This dif;ference was not striking at first, but it 
was noticeable in the newspapers of the day as the articles 
J;"eferred to the people of "the north," or "the south," but 
even th9ugh there were mixtures of these elements in each 
region. the dominant group .of an area tended to maintain 
control .13 
Two problems added to the incompatibility of the people 
in north and south Alabama. First, co~unications were poor 
because the Indians still held the eastern region so the 
north-south routes were along the western rivers aqd past the 
Tuscaloosa area. 14 The second problem concerned the banking 
situation since some of the people from south Alabama, both 
merchants from Mobile and planters in the Black Belt and 
12Huntsville Demo~rat, November 22, 1824. 
r · 1 ' · 
13southern Advocate, May 13, 1825, March 17, April 28, 
1826, ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
14 Abe:t;'n,ethy, 'the Formative Period in Alal:>ama, p. 102. 
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southwest, wanted to establish a branch of the Bank of the 
United States.in Alaba\1\a in 1626, thinking the presence of 
banks would help maintain a stable credit system for the 
pl~ntation owners and others, However, the northerners grew 
to believe such a bank would benefit the planters of the 
soQth more than the farmers of the north so they fought 
against it. 15 
In spite of the growin,g economic and regional schism, 
Alabama as a whole tended to favor Andrew Jackson for the 
presidency in 1828, With this in mind, they elected Jackson-
ian Democrats to the Twentieth Congress of 1627~1828: sena-
tors William R. King and John McKinley, and representatives 
John McKee, Gabriel Moore, and George W. Owen. McKinley and 
Moore were from Huntsville ip north Alabama, the strongly 
Jacksonian area, while McKee was from Tuscaloosa ip. the west 
central part of the state, an area which also $Upported 
Jackson, but Owen was from Claiborne, a southwestern town 
which leaned toward the planter interests, 16 The most nota:-
ble congressman of this group was William King from Selma, a 
staunch Jacksonian-Democratic leader who catered to the 
wishes of the northern element although he lived in the 
planting district of the south,17 This was not too uncommon, 
lSNiles' Weekly Register, XXXII, p. 124; Southern Advo-
~, June 16, 1826, 
16Bio$raphical Directol!.'!t of the Ame;rican C?n&ress, 1774.,. 
1961 (Washington, D. C., 196 )~p-:-106. 
17rbid., p. 1168. 
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though, since the spokesmen of the Jacksonian interests 
could be found throughout the state. Southern Alabama Jack-
sonians were not so unusual as the fact that no southern 
anti~Jacksonians were vocal in politics at this time. Time 
and events would, of course, alter that. In 1828 most were 
seemingly Jacksonians, strict constructionists, free-trade 
agrarians. These were the conditions existant within the 
state of Alabama at the beginning of the most heated tariff 
debates in Ameri~an histo~y·-conditions which were not evi-
dent to those outside Alabama and which were not outstanding 
when the tariff issue revolved around the question of free 
trade alone. But when other factors were present the Ala-
bamians often based their reactions on other personal con-
siderations. The question of a protective tariff in 1828 
encompassed only economic factors, so more unity than really 
existed appeared to be present in Alabama. 
As southern free traders and supporters of Andrew Jack-
son for the presidency in 1828, the Alab.;unians joined in the 
plot to effect a tariff which would be so high that the New 
England ~~nufacturers themselves would help the South vote it 
down. The Tariff of 1828, an act with average ad v.alorem 
duties of 50 per cent, was t:he fesul t of ·their -.collabora- ·' 
tions •18. 
When. the Tariff of 1828 reached the floor of Congress 
for debate, the Alabamians, although conce~ned with the 
18Robert V. Remini, M~rtin Van Buren and the Making of 
the Democratic Party (New York, "!9"51), pp.!'73-:r75. · -
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protective duties on textiles included in the bill, were 
rather confident that the bill would not pass so only one of 
the five congressmen made any remarks. 19 (Map 27) Gabriel 
Moore of the Huntsville planting area condemned the duties 
on hemp and cotton bag'ging in the bill, He said most of the 
cotton bagging used in Alabama was made in Kentucky and it 
had been shown by the Tariff of 1824 that the South suffered 
from such duties, and maintained that before 1824 bagging 
was purchased from K~ntucky at 33 or 33 1/3 cents due to 
transportation costs, but after 1824 the cost was between 40 
and 45 cents. This proved to Moore the unjust nature of the 
act which forced them to buy this northern product at a high 
rate because of transportation and tariff costs when they 
could buy it more cheaply from a foreign source. He felt 
duties on this and other items would cause the British ~o 
place retaliatory duties on their cotton and thus they would 
be hurt in more than one respect. 20 The other Alabama con-
gressman joined Moore in placing a unanimous vote against 
the bill but to the dismay of many southerners, the measure 
passed.21 
Although Moore was the only one to condemn the tariff 
openly in Congress, the act was strongly berated throughout 
the state, especially after its passage. The Mobile Register 
19Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, passim. 
20Ibid., pp. 2207-2208. 
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and the Huntsville Democrat were strongest in their anti-
tariff pro~ouncements, suggesting a boycott of northern goods 
to show northern manufacturers what it was like to suffer ... ~ 
from the tariff injustices. These and other papers contended 
home manufactures in the South might be the solution.22 One 
paper, the So.uthern Advocate of Huntsvill', a former Adams 
newspaper but now a half ... hearted Jackson paper,- suggested 
that it might be best to give the tariff a try. 23 This point 
of view reflected the sentiments of the editor, a man from 
the NQrth, who felt less hostile to the tariffs. The Gener~l 
Assembly of Alabama sent a resolution of protest to Congress, 
numerous anti-tariff meetings were held, and Governor Murphy, 
in his message to the General Assembly, denounced the Tariff 
of 1828 which would, he said, hurt the <;:otton trade by caus .. 
ing a virtual prohibition of these exports to foreign 
c,::ountries. 24 
Only two areas of Alabama, other than some from Hunts-
ville who favored trying the tariff, e~pressed no opposition 
to the act; the Black aelt and the western Tennessee Valley 
cotton counties. The larger planters in these regions urged 
a trial of the tariff; then, if it worked a hardship, stated 
it could be adjusted. 25 
22Niles' Weekly Register, XXXV, pp, 83, 259-260. 
23Ipid. , p. 69. 
24ror a description of the anti-tariff reaction in Ala-
bama, see the Southerp Advocate and other newspapers for 
Janua~y-March, 1828; ~iles' Weekly Register, XXXV, p. 69. 
25J~ck, 1 Sectionalis~ and PartV P~litf9s i11 Alli!bama, 
p, ZS; Niles Week!x.Jlegi~t.~r, XXX, p. 69. 
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It thus appeared that a new division was beginning to 
emerge in Alabama over the tariff issue. The state, which 
at first seemed completely opposed to the protective tariff, 
now had a group opposed and a second group, which though not 
strongly for the protective act, were not radically against 
it. These two groups all had one thing upon which they were 
in complete agreement; they did not;: believe in nullification, 
the doctrine being pronounced by the South Carolinians since 
1828, and a doctrine which seemed to be gaining strength in 
South Carolina with each passing year. 26 
By 1832, and with the passage of the tariff of that 
year, a third faction appeared in Alabama, a faction that 
disagreed with the other two by saying nullification was a 
sound remedy, though in turn, it agreed with the first group 
in saying tariffs were destructive to the South.27 This 
third group was led by two men: James Calhoun and.Dixon H. 
Lewis. Calhoun was a nephew of John C. Calhoun, the nulli-
fication theoretician of South Carolina. He and other South 
Carolinians including a group which had gone to college at 
Columbia, South Carolina, had been exposed to the strong 
states' rights doctrines of the Carolinians. 28 Of the two, 
Dixon Lewis gained the most acclaim in Alabama. Lewis, of 
26Ibid,, pp. 69, 149, 275-277. 
27Jack, Sectionalism and Party Politics in Alabama, p. 29. 
28william Garrett, Reminiscence~ .. of Public Men in Ala-
bama fot:tThirty Years (Atlanta, 1872)tpp. 288 .. 2'"S'9; Willis 
Brewer;-Atabama, Her Histor~, Resources, War Record, and 
Public Men (Montgomery, 187 ), p. 218. ----- ------....--
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Montgomery County in the heart of the Black Belt, was a 
Virginian by birth, a Georgian in upbringing, a student in 
Columbia, South Carolina, and an Alabama cotton plante+ and 
lawyer. ijis uncle was Bolling Hall, a Georgian congressman 
and a personal friend of William Crawford, Nathaniel ~aeon, 
and John Taylor who were all lead:lng states·' rights advo~ 
cates. Lewis supported Andrew Jackson in the 1822-1828 pe-
riod and even pt'oposed resolutions to the s~ate legislature 
in 1827 supporting Jackson's name for the presidency. His 
zealous protection of states· rights was known: he had de-
nounced President Adams' actions in regard to the Indian 
problems in Georgia; he opposed banks as Hall and Crawford 
had done; and he presented a resolution to t;he General As-
sembly deprecating the increase of federal power,29 but 
Lewis, in 1828, was in the minority in espousing states' 
rights to the point of nullification. The people did not 
fully understand his position which, as Abernethy says, was 
a "purely negative suppol;'t of Jackson and a very positive 
support o;f state rights. 11 30 
By 1832 the nullification doctrine was spreading, and 
it was rWiiored that South Carolina would follow this remedy . . 
sbc;nild the 1832 tariff be higher than the f ·5 , .. ,.p e r . C. e ri t: . 
rates they proposed. The Jacksonians, the dominant group in 
29Biogrc;J.phical Directory of the Amel?'ican-Con~ress, p. 
12).5; Garrett, Reminiscences, pp f "471::..475; Virgin·ia P: Brown 
and Helen M. · Akeris, 'Alab'a.nla Heritage (Huntsville, 1967), 
p. 132. . 
JOAbernethy, The Formative Period in Alabama, p. 151. 
~ ,., . ,,...,,...,.., .. , 
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Alabama, continued their pronouncements against nullifica-
tion, an action which would split the Union, and Senator 
William King, one of the earliest speakers against this doc-
trine, told the people of Selma in 1828 that he opposed nul-
lification although some individuals were trying to make the 
gove+nment feel that the South and Southwest were the advo-
cates and supporters of a most distinguished and meritorious 
citizen and were planning to dissolve the Union. 31 The 
.~obile Regi~ter wrote: ''We will frank~y declare, it was not 
from the State of South Carolina that we ever expected a 
proposition, the bare contemplation of which must cause the 
heart of a patriot to sink within him. 1132 The Southern Advo-___. 
\ 
cate recited some of the to.asts which were made in opposition -
to South Carolina's actions: 
The Union of the States: Palsied be the arm 
that shall be raised to sever it. 
The Tariff: Unconstitutional in principle, 
unjust and unequal in its operation. We will not 
?ppose it with violence a~~ passion, but by rely-
~ng on our own resources. 
The Tariff of 1832, an attempt to lower the level of 
tariff dut~es, was presented to Congress for debate in the 
spring of that year, and Alabamians, like other southerners, 
were quite interested in the particulars of this bill. Wil-
liam King and Garbiel Moore, the two strong Jacksonian Demo-
crats, had been in Congress in 1828 when the earlier bill was 
31Huntsville Democrat, Nove~ber 7, 1828.· 
, • 32Mobile "Regi:ter, J~~Y 12, 1828 ~- . 
33southern Advocate, November 7, 1828. 
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passed but the three new members, Clement Clay of Huntsville, 
Samuel Mardis of Montevallo, and Dixon Lewis of Montgomery, 
had not.34 Clay and Mardis were Jacksonians, but, as has 
been noted, Dixon Lewis was breaking from Jackson due to his 
strong states' rights sympathies and his nullification 
tendencies. 
During the congressional debates of 1832, King and Moore 
concerned themselves with attempting to get amendments added 
to help the South.35 King berated the bill as still too pro-
tee ti ve and "unjust upon our section," and stated he was "for 
constitutional resistance of this oppressive system." He 
more truly expressed his fears by saying: 
••• if the majority will persist in this spe-
cies of injustice and oppressioq • • • consequences 
will result which I shudder to think of. Sir, this 
is no idle thrept, •.. I stand here as one of the 
most moderate of those who are opposed to the mis-
called Ameri§an System, advocating conciliation, 
union. ~ . , 6 
King spoke correctly, for his moderation was well known 
when compared to that of others in Congress, especially 
Dixon Lewis. Lewis made the most prolonged speech of any 
Alabama congressman, a speech which lasted most of two days. 
After mentioning the agrarian nature of his section of the 
country, he injected his feelings in regard to South Caro-
lina, without directly speaking the word nullification. 
p. 11~~13io&raphical Directory of the American Congress, 
35Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, passim. 
36Ibid,, p. 661. 
Sir, the prosperity of Alabama has frequently 
been alluded to in this debate; and for what other 
purpose than to detach her from the great and suf-
fering anti-tariff interest of the South, I am at 
a loss to imagine •.•• The withering blasts of 
federal legislation have not yet produced in Alabama 
that desolation which has swept over the more e:lt!. 
haus~ed states .. ·.• A~'bama is prosperous . , • 
despite . • , taxation. 
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Lewis' speech is important in showing not only his senti-
ments against the protective tariff and his concern for South 
Carolina, but also in showing the reason most Alabamians did 
not go all the way to nullification; they were fairly wealth~ 
despite taxation. 38 They hated the duties, but could afford 
to suffer from them more than break with the Union when pros-
perity existed. 
When the vote was taken, King, Moore, and Lewis voted 
against the bill. 39 (Map 28) All three opposed the contin-
ued degree of protection on cotton and woolen goods. King 
and Moore, the moderates, felt that if this act were rejected, 
a lower bill might be presented and the trend to nullifica-
tion on ~tbe part of some southerners could be averted. Lewis 
voted in outright opposition to a protective act, no matter 
what the outcome might be, while two votes in favor of the 
37Ibid., pp. 3567-3586. 
38Alabama, like upcountry Georgia.and much of Missis-
sippi and Louisiana, was enjoying the second great period of 
expansion of frontier cotton planting in the Twenties, and 
her cotton production had increased from 20 million pounds in 
1820 to 45 million pounds in 1830. William W. Freehling, 
Prelude to Civil War, The Nullification Controversy in South 
Carolina-,-1816-'18"'!0(New York, 1965), p, 204; Turner-,-Rise of 
the New West, p. 52. - -
39Re~ister of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, 
pp. 3830- 831, 1"'219. 
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SCon~re•smen 
Map 28, Ale\lbama's Congressional Tariff .Vote, 1832 
2·n11L .\ll~t-;·' 
tariff of 1832 were cast by Clement Clay of Huntsville and 
Samuel Mardis of Montevallo, men who also opposed the tariff 
but felt the reduction in the 1828 duties was a step in the 
right direction. They were Jacksonian Democrats who believed 
the tariff could be lived with, then adjusted.40 
The passage of the Tariff of 1832 and the resultant 
Ordinance of Nullification passed by the special nullifica-
tion convention in South Carolina caused mu.ch reaction 
throughout the country. In Alabama the citizens continued 
to hold free trade meetings to condemn the protective tar-
iffs and to consider South Carolina's call for a southern 
convention, The Assembly concurred in such a meeting but on 
the same date passed resolutions asking Congress to speedily 
enact tariff reductions and South Carolina to suspend her 
Ordinance of Nullification. 41 The state which had once 
seemed rather united was starting to break under the weight 
of the tariff and nullification disputes, and the people who 
had once been basically Jacksonian~Democrats, were starting 
to split. The majority remained Democrats ot Jacksonians, 
supporting the President in this controversy and expounding 
the .merits of Union while berating nullification. l'he splin-
ter ;~group that broke from this party became the States' 
Rights Democrats, a group led by Dixon Lewis and James 
40Ibid., pp. 703, 1272. 
41Herman V. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations, 
The States and the United States (Philaaelphia, 1906), 
pp. 48 ... 50'; "State Papers on Nl..lllificationj pp. 224 ... 225, 219-
223. . -
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Calhoun!., . These people opposed the tariff, favore(;i nullifi-
cation, and were hostile to Jackson.42 A third group or 
party also gained strength--the National-Republicans or, as 
it came to be known, the Whig party. This group disliked 
Jackson and were in other ways rather different from the 
other elements within the state. These men were planters in 
a portion of the Black Belt, the southwest, and in a small 
part of the northern Valley, who with time and age and wealth, 
were becoming more conservative. With the frontier nature 
of their state disappearing, they began to consider the mer-
its of the .::fed,eral government, a body which might finance 
111~ ' 
internal improvements which would help them get their crops 
to market and banks which could provide them with credit.43 
Henry Clay's Americ&,n System seemed to have merit to them, 
although they were not as enthusiastic about the third part 
of his plan--that concerning the tariff. Clay supported 
protective tariffs, as did the National-Republicans of the 
North, but the National-Republicans of Alabama simply felt a 
tariff was not an item which would hurt them; they never s~p­
ported protection to the degree of their northern counter-
parts. 44 
Division within the state of Alabama increased as the 
Comprdmise Tariff of 1833 and Jackson's Force Bill were 
42Garrett, Reminiscences_,:PP· 288-289, 471-475; Brewer, 
Alabama, pp. 218, 330-331. , 
43southern Advocate, April 13, 1827. 
44Arthur Charles Cole, The Whig Party _!E: the South 
(Washington, 1913), pp. 25-2~ 
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introduced into the United States Congress. A compromise 
tariff, the Vet"planck bill~ was already on the floo:r of .the 
House when aenry Clay introduced a second compromise measure 
into the Senate. Since all revenue bills were to ol;'iginate 
in the House, his actions seemed unconstitutional, but with 
affairs as they were, King, the moderate Jacksonian~Democrat, 
suggested that Clay's bill be allc;>wed to enter the Senate,!JS 
King hoped the bill would produce the desired effect of curb-
ing tariff rates and ending the cry for nullification. 
Clay's bill, which was ultimately accepted and substituted for 
the Verplanck bill, provided for the lowering of duties over 
a nine-year period of time, but it was an apequate change as 
far as the Alabamians we:re concerned, When the vote was 
taken all five Alabama congressmen, including Lewis who ac ... 
cepte4 it as a Calhoun~sponsored bill, (Map 29) voted for the 
Compromise Tariff of 1833. 46 They had reason to, for if this 
more moderate bill were not passed and the Force aill did 
pass, there would almost ass\lredly be a war between South 
Carolina and perhaps other states and the federal government. 
The Alabamians, although mostly Jacksonian-Democrats, 
did not countenance the Force Bill, a bill which seemed to 
oppose the doctrine of $tates' rights. Even Moore, who next 
to King, had been a long-time Jacksonian, .~astigated this 
action: 
',,45Register of Debates, 22 Cong,, II sess,, IX, p. 480. 
46rbid., pp, 1810-1811, sos~ao9. 
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I rise with no hypocritical pretense of extra-
ordinaJ:"y attachment to the Union. This bill pro-
poses to clothe the President of the United States 
with dictatorial and discretionary powers •••• It 
makes the President of the United States a national 
dictator. [The Alabamians] gave him their confi-
dence when he was a plain and unpretending planter 
like themselves. But they voted for Andrew Jackson 
to be the P:t'esident of a free people, S\lbject to all 
the restraints of the Constitution. • , • Little did 
they expect he would march at the head of a standing 
army ••• Cto collect] odious, unjust, unequal, and 
unconstitutional taxes.47 
With States' Rights Democrats opposing the actions of 
Jackson, and the Whigs disliking him but desiring to remain 
attached to the Union, the majority pa:t"ty of Democrats were 
rethinking their attachment for President Jackson. The one 
solution, as noted, was to pass both bills--the tariff and . 
Force Bill--at the same time, so one would cancel the odious-
nes~ of the other. It ~eemed evident the Force Bill would 
pass due to the North's predominant support of it. Samuel 
Mardis warned that the. two bills' must be passed together, 
stating that i~ the congressmen thought passage of the Force 
Bill alone would have no serious consequences, they deceived 
themselves. He said the Force Bill had the wrong title. It 
should be called "a bill to dissolve the Union. 11 48 
The Alabama congressmen showed their opposition to the 
Force Bill in two wa:y19; the s,enators refused to honor it with 
a vote, knowing it would pass anyway, and the representatives 
47Ibid., pp. 488-492. 
481bid., pp. 1770-1771. 
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all cast opposition votes.49 (Map 30) So the bill passed, 
but at least the nullification furor was ended. 
In analyzing Alabama's role in the tariff and nullifica-
tion controversies, one can note three things: Alabama was 
predominantly a Jacksonian state, a factor which was ~.nhanced 
by the prosperity of the state and by the desire for further 
Indian removal; second, the tariff and nullification dilemma 
caused two anti-Jackson elements to emerge, neither of which 
was very strong in the 1828-1831 period; and third, it should 
be noted that regionalism and social and economic factors 
played a part in the tariff controversies aJl.c:i., caused regional 
political units to develop. The people were actually divided 
into four parties which might be termed the Jacksonian Demo-
crats (Union), the Northern Whig\(Union), the States' Rights 
Democrats (Nullification), and the Southern Whigs (States' 
r.ights). The first two groups, located in the north and 
north .. central part of the state and sometimes scattered else-
where, were unionist in their outlook because the communica-
tiqns problem and regional jealousies caused them t~ feel 
separa~ed from the rest of their state and to have needs and 
interests of their own, In the South, the States' Rights 
Delltocrats and States' Rights Whi,gs were mainly the planter 
element. During the late Twenties the two southern groups 
would merge into the Southern Democrats, again due to prox-
imity and similarity of interests. These people belonged to 
49 . Ibid., pp. 1903, .688. 
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the Georgian,· Ca~olinian, and Virginian groups, while the 
northern element had been mainly from Tennessee, with some 
from Virginia and Georgia. 
Altogether, Alabama's support for the Carolinian doc-
trine of nullification was limited. Except for one small 
group, many Alabamians felt more affinity for Georgia and 
Virginia and the leaders of those states--the first of which 
supported Jackson over Calhoun, and the second which main-
tained the "Principles of 1798" d;Ld not condone nullific;a-
~ion. The Alabamians, though, had two very personal reasons 
of their own for being less radical in their reactions to the 
tariffs than the other state~--they we~e emerging from the 
depressioq and were becoming prosperous, and they still 
needed fedet1al sµppo:Pt to rid themselves of the remainder of 
the Indians which held some very fertile lands. It was 
neces~ary that Alab~a maintain the bonds of Union. 
CHAPTER VIII 
MISSISSI:PPI 
Resolved, That the doctrine of Nullification 
is cont;r;a:t:'y to the letter and spirit of the Consti .. 
tution, and in direct conflict with the welfare, 
safety and independence of every State in the Union; 
and to no one of ~hem would its consequences be more 
disast~o\ls, more l;'uinous, than to the State of Mis .. 
sissippi •.•.•• Resolved, That we will, with heart · 
and hand, sustain the President of the United 
States. • • , 
Resolutions of the ~ississippi Legislature, 
January, 18331. 
The position of Mississippi in the controversy over pro-
tective tariffs and nu,llification is.int;:eresting because in 
the period between 1828 and 1833 only two strong voices were 
heard advocating nullification, ye~ in later years M~ssissip­
pi became one of the strong states' rights advocates of the 
South and carried the doctrine of state sovereignty to the 
ultUn.ate conclusion of secession, second only to South Caro-
lina. The basis for this disunionist sentiment, though ob-
scured by the popularity of Andrew Jackson, was nevertheless 
present in the late Twenties and early Thirties. It was 
noticeable in the sectionalism of the state which pitted the 
older, more wealthy and conservative planters and merchants 
1Report and Resolves of Mis~issippi, in State Paper,s £!! 
Nullifieation (Boston, 1834), pp. 231-233. 
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· of the west against the· newly a:r;rived smaller :J;aqners of the 
east, iri. the small but growing anti-Jackson sentiment, in the 
~J;'eas which favored flenry Clay and the American System, and 
in the disappointed attitudes of the Jacksonians of Missis-
sippi who were chagrined at the President's attack on state 
sovereignty as embedded in the Force Bill. 
In 1828, at the time of the pa$sage of the ta;riff of 
Abominations, Mississippi was a young frontier state with a 
strong degree of national sentiment since, like most frontier 
states, it needed the protecting hand of the federal govern-
ment until its problems could be solved and its institutions 
established. Its major attachment to the Union centered 
around the Indian problem, since the Indians owned more land 
th~n the whites did and since the settlers were always anx-
ious to increase their holdings. The Indians retained 
16,885,760 acres and the United States government retained 
11,514,517 acres of Mississippi land, leaving only 2,663,957 
acre~ out of the 31,074,234 total acres for the settlers.2 
Th.elands owned by the Mississippians were in the southern 
portion of the state, with the e~ception of one small parcel 
in the northea~t. Even these lands had been opened gradually 
ai;; Indian cessions and an acquisition from Spain ·occurred. 
Of the two early Indian cessions, the first, the Treaty of 
Fort Adams in 1801, ceded the old Natchez district to the 
United States governI!lent and th~ second, the Treaty of Mount 
2American Almanac (Boston, 1832), p. 149~ 
211 
Dexter in 1805, ceded the southeastern Choctaw area to the 
Americana.3 Finally, in 1812, t;he remainder of the south-
eastern lands which had been taken from Spain in 1810 were 
·added to the territory, 4 Thus in 1817, the year $tatehood 
was granted to Mississippi, the lands were available for 
legal settlement only in the extreme southern region below 
the parallel of Natchez, but in 1820, three years after 
statehood, it was reali~ed that the region near the Tombigbee 
River in the northeast part of the state which had been ceded 
I 
by the Chickasaws to Alabama was actually in Mississippi ter-
ritory. 5 This. strip of land soon became Monroe and Lowndes 
counties, but the region was so small in cpmparison to the 
Mississippi lands of the south and so distant from them that 
it was several years before it became politically important. 
The voters of Mississippi h~d a high regard for Andrew 
Jackson because of his victories against the Creek Indians in 
181) and against the British in 1815, but their admiration 
grew in 1820 when he and Thomas H;i.nds, a Mississippian who 
had aided Jackson in some of his campaigns, were successful 
in getting the Choctaws to sign the Treaty of Doak's Stand, a 
treaty which gave much of the west-central p~rt of the state 
3John K. Bettersworth, Mississippi: A Historx (Austin, 
1959), pp. 129, 168, 176, 
4rbid,, p. 176. 
5Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississi~pi 
(Chapel Hill, 1960), p. 20; John K. Bettersworth, Mis'sissip-
.l?!, pp. 129-130. 
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to the government.6 Still, about fifty per cent of the land 
... -the northern half of the state.- ... remainecl in the hands of 
the Choctaws and Chickasaws, and it was this need for further 
Indian cessions which induced the Mississippians to consider 
Andrew Jackson, a man known to believe in removal policies, 
for the presidency. 
In the southern portion of the state, the land now set-
tled by the whites, there was not complete unity for even in 
this rather small region, sectionalism eJ(isted, There were 
three areas which because of age, position, or way of life, 
felt themselves to be separate entities. 7 (Map 31) The 
first region, the Natchez district, was th~ oldest, most set-
tled po:.::-tion of the state since it had been the first land 
area given up by the Indians and because it contained the 
rich delta soils of the Mississippi River. The fertile brown 
loam of the river lowlands proved favorable to the cotton 
culture and to the commerce which developed out of the trade 
in cotton,8 As Americans from the eastern states moved into 
this region they established the plantation system and worked 
their lands with the slaves they brought with them. The 
6Ibid., p. 176; Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in 
Mississippi, p. 19. 
7Dunbar R@wland, Historx of Mississip~i, The Hea:rt of 
the South, I (Chicago, 1925), p, 554; theiviSIVe spirft"""is 
aDiy·presented in Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Missis~~ppi. 
8charles S. Sydnor, A Gentleman of the Old Natchez 
Re~ion: Benjamin L. c. Wailes (Dl.irham, TI"3'8~pp. t .. 3o; 
Dunbar Rowland, eO., Encyclopedia of Mississippi History, II 
(Madison, 1906), pp. 302-318, ' :--
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Natchez District, by 1830, held 34 per cent of the state's 
white population and 65 per cent of the state's slave popu-
lation.9 The wealth gained by these planters gave them an 
added prestige in the state, and the age of their district, 
when compared to the newer districts to the north and east, 
gave them a degree of political power not wielded by the 
other districts, at least in the early years of statehood, 
The second important region was often termed the "Piney 
Woods" area, a portion o{ land which lay directly to the east 
of the Natchez District, and stretched across the lower por-
tion of the state to the Alabama border, The soil there was 
less rich so large pl.;intation farming was seldom noted. The 
people were mainly small farmers engaged in planting small 
cotton and grain crops and in herding and lumbering.lo This 
land area contained 28 per cent of the white and 4 per cent 
of the slave population of the state in 1830,ll Most of the 
Piney Woods district lay in the lands ceded by the Choctaws 
in 1805, just four years after the Natchez cession, yet late 
enough to place them second in the political as well as the 
social arena. 
9The Statistics of the Po8u1ation in the United 
States ':'--;- • Compiled Trom tlleriginal TetUFns of· the Ninth 
Census. , , (Washington, 1"'8"72'), pp. 41-43. ~ ~ · 
lOJohn Francis Hamtramck Claiborne, "A Trip Through the 
P~ney Woods," Publications of the Mississippi Historical So.-
ciety, lX (Oxfor.d, 1906), pp. 48'7 ... 538. 
llThe Statistics of the ?opulation 
pp. 41-4'T." ...,...... -. 
. . . Ninth Censqs, 
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The third region was the ''New Purchase" o:r the 1820 
Doak's Stand purcha$e from the Choctaw Indians, This region 
lay to the north and east of the Natchez district in a strip 
that touched the Mississippi River on the west, and stretched 
from the west central portion of that river to the middle of 
the state then veered southward to the Natchez and Piney 
Wood$ districts. rhis area had a more varied economic and 
I 
political makeup because the western delta land was quite 
rich and coµld support a plantation economy, although the 
eastern stretches were more adaptable to a small~fa:rm econ-
omy .12 lt took some time for plantation agriculture to 
establish itself, so, in the meantime, the region felt a 
closer kinship with the Piney Woods, a region which was also 
new and which was scorned by some Natchez politicians and 
planters. One county, Washingtoi;i, developed more quickly 
than the rest and became a slave-owning county with a plan-
tation economy, feeling a closer affinity to the Natchez 
district than to its own region.13 As a whole, the area in 
1830 contained 30 per cent of the whites and 18 per cent of 
the slaves of the state,14 
The psychological differences between these regions--
the idea of being the primary or secondary region--and the 
12John ~. Bette:rsworth, Mississippi, pp. 8, 16-17. 
p. 20~3Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi, 
14The Statistics of the Population .•• Ninth Census, 
pp. 41 ... ~ -- -
, . 
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economic differences which ex~sted in the early years between 
the wealthier people of the west and the farmers of the east, 
were not the only factors causing disagreement. Political 
issues and policy proposals were also involved, especially 
in regiird to internal improvements, banks, the s~ave trade, 
further Indian removal, and, at times, the tariff. Many peo-
ple of the ~atchez district were opposed to internal improve-
ments by the federal government, did not expecially press for 
further Indian removal, and were rather opposed to allowing 
further slave sales in the state, but they favored the estab-
lishment of a branch of the Bank of the United States in 
their area. 15 The easterners held the opposing view in each 
instance. 
In looking at the reasoning of the Natchez element, the 
explanation for these attitudes is clear. If internal im-
provements were granted, they would benefit the Piney Woods 
and eastern areas more than the planters of the Natchez dis-
trict. They already had ~he mighty Mississippi as a trans-
portation route, but should the easterners be granted money 
for canals they might establish a waterway to the south which 
would divert their goods to the Gulf rather than through the. 
merchants at Natchez.16 If Indian removal occurred and the 
remaining northern lands were opened, more farmers would in 
15Natchez Gazette, December 21, 1832. 
16Refiister of Debates, 19 Cong., 2 sess., p. 12; Natchez 
Gazette; Decei:nber21, 1831; Monticello Pearl River Advocate, 
May 7 ,· 1830. 
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all proba~ility enter the state and attach themselves polit-
ically to the New Purchase and Piney Woods element, thus 
caQsing Natchez to lose its political power.17 And if slave 
sales continued as the Virginians and North Carolinians and 
other states to the east sold their surplus slaves, the 
Natchez district would make less money on the slaves they 
wanted to sell into the upper portions of their own state. 18 
Thus, these were three things the Natchez element did not 
want, but it did want the branch Bank of the United States 
since the merchants as well as the planters were always anx-
ious for a stable and plentiful supply of money and credit. 19 
So many sectional differences emerged that the editor of the 
)?e.;1rl River Advocate finally wrote, "Why do members of the 
legislature from the west, so uniformly oppose, either di• 
rectly or indirectly, every measure which is broµght forward, 
calculated to benefit us?"20 
Even with this degree of sectionalism, there was major 
agreement on some things in the Twenties--especially on the 
necessity of electing Andrew Jackson to the presidency. The 
people from the Doak's Stand purchase and from the Piney 
Woods as well as the two northern Tombigbee counties were 
strongly ip favor of elevating Jackson to this position, and 
17Natchez Natchez, April 3, 1830. 
l8Niles' Weekl'3 Register, XXXI'II, p, 211; Natchez 
Natchez, November 1 , t·3o. 
19Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy£!! Mississippi, 
p. 21. 
20Natchez Natchez, May 22, 1830. 
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the planters of the Natchez area were generally in a~cord. 
However, it should be noted that i~ any section or group op-
posed him, it was this are.;i and the planters of rivel;' coum-
ties to the north of Natchez. The old rive; towns with the 
planters and me?;"chants often had a m,llilber of National-
Republicans in them.21 This was especially true of Natchez, 
but as a whole, even this area found much in comm.on with the 
democratiq spirit of th~ day and the democratic goals of the 
South, ln most situations these Federalist-leaning people 
cast their lot with the Pemocratic-Republicans, probably be-
cause they knew only the Democr~tic party could sµcceed in a 
young, southern, frontier state. Altogether, the Oemocratic, 
states' ;rights, Jeffersonian party was the party of the 
state, and when Jackson lost the presidency to John Qu.incy 
Adam~, the National-Republican, in 1624, it was not due to 
lack of support in Mississippi for he won a majority in every 
county although.Adams got a good deg~ee of support in the 
Natchez district.22 
The second thing the Mississippians seemed to agree up~ 
on was the necessity for a low tariff, Those who disagreed 
had little to say, either in the papers or in the halls of 
Congress as a tariff bill which was highly protective emerged 
Sentiment was strongly against it because Mississippi was a 
cotton state e~periencing a recession which had caused cotton 
21John K, Bettersworth, Mississippi, pp, 170-171. 
I • 
22rbid., pp. 171-172. 
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prices to drop to around the 10 cent per pound level in 
1828. 23 The southern planters were upset by their reduced 
profits, b~t the northern manufacturers of textiles were also 
feeling the pinch of reduced incomes and were suggesting as 
a remedy a protective tariff. The reaction of Mississippi 
was viblent as they berated such a proposal and the Presi~ '~ 
dent, John Quincy Adams, who, they felt, condoned this por-
tion of the American system. The reaction was much the same 
in the other southern states, but the Jacksonians of the 
South and West ultimately endeavored to block the passage of 
a protective bill by creating a measure which would be ob-
jectionable, even to the easterners who had asked for 
protection. 
The power of the anti~ta;iff Mississippians was rather 
weak in Congress for they had only one representative along 
with the two allo·tt;eO. senators, all of whom were Democrats. 
·, . 
(Map 32) The Natchez district was represented by Senator 
Thomas H. Williams of Washington and Representative William 
Haile of Woodville,24 For the first time, the east was able 
to send a man from their district to Washington, Senator 
Powhatan Ellis of Winchester, who termed himself a descend-
ant of Pocahontas,25 These men were all hearty supporters of 
23Ibid., pp, 189-190. 
24:aio~:aphical Director* of the American Congress, 1774-
1961, (Was 1ngton, D. C., 19 1)7 p. 107, 
~
25Ibid,, p. 857• Edwin A, Miles, Jacksonian Democracy 





































Map 32. Mississippi's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1828 
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2.21 
Andrew Jackson. Haile; knowing the Jacksonian sentiment, 
had simply campaigned by placing notices in the papers saying 
"Haile will be i;upported by the friends of General Jackson. ,,26 
Since the tariff was fought by the rather secretive 
machinazations of the leading Jacksonians, few people felt 
the need to $peak their piece in Congress. Only Haile, a 
noted inebriate, saw fit to make himself heard.27 Since 
Congressmen from the North were evidently trying to obtain a 
protective bill for their own interests, he suggested the 
propriety of a p~otective duty for indigo and castor oil, 
two products which would benefit the South because, within a 
few yea+s, the South could supply the American demand. He 
stated that action of this nature ''would be a most healthful 
duty . . • would gratify the South and the West and remove 
some qf the constipations which have been manifested in this 
debate. 1128 He felt the indigo or "blue ruin" duty, if intro-
duced into the bill side by sid~ with the minimums on woolens, 
"would ~ave a happy influence of giving a beautiful blue 
tinge to the neighboring woolens. 1129 He continued that this 
suggestion was simply a test on the sincerity of the 
26rbid. , p. 12. 
IV, 
27Ibid., p. 14; Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., 
pp. 2318-2322, 2329. ~ 
28Ibid., p. 2319. 
29rbid. 
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advocates of protection, because P.e had heard "there was 
honor even among thieves. 1130 Haile's suggested amendments 
were defeated. 
In the midst of the argument over the Tariff of 1828, 
one area of the $tate, Natchez, suggestec;l there might be 
merit to this act. The businessmen there argued that cotton 
was hard on the soil and that already evidence of this could 
be seen. They suggested the possibility of some other pur-
suit in the state such as manufacturing, and said possibly 
the tariff was not so abominable after all. 31 The Natchez 
Ariel was especially strong in its support of the tariff, 32 
but the pro-tariff voice of this area was easily argued down 
by the other Mississippians who were not ready to abandon the 
cotton culture. 
The Mississippians, other than the Natchez element, 
determined to express their Q.isapproval of the tariff as pro-
posed in 1828. A few ant~-tariff meetings were held,33 aad 
the l~gislature of Mississippi, acting in accordance with 
majority sentiment, passed resolutions declaring '' .•• the 
Tariff of 1828 is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution 
of the United States; impolitic and oppressive in its opera .. 
tion in the Southern States, and ought to be resisted by all 
30 ,, . 
Ibid,, p. 2329. 
3lJohn K. Bettersworth, Mississippi, p. 190. 
32Ibid., p. 190; Natchez Natchez, August 14, 1830. 
33For a survey of the antitariff meetings held in Mis-
sissippi, see the Natchez Gazette, the Woodville Mississippi 
Democrat, and other noted papers of the day. 
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constitutional means."34 However, their rei;;istance was to 
no avail, for although all three of M:i.ssissippi's votes were 
cast against the measure, it passed into law. 
South Carolina, after the passage of the tariff of abom-
inations, sugg(!sted the possibility of nullification as a 
remedy for such unwarranted actions by the Worth, but did not 
seem ready to carry out such a measure l>y herself. Most of 
the southern states, in~luding South Carolina and Mississip-. 
pi, felt Jackson's elevation to the presidency would provide 
the remedy they needed since he~ in all probability, would 
lower the tariff, When, in la28, he did win, most of the 
southerners were relieved, thinking t;here would be no neces .. 
sity for nullification. Only a small minority of Mississip-
pians actually supported the extremists of Soµth Carolina who 
espoused nullification. 
Within the state of Mississippi the nullification ele-
ment con~isted of two types of people; those who truly be-
lieved this was the only solution open, and ~hose who were 
hostile to Andrew Jackson. At times the question of the tar-
iff and the attitude of hostility toward this man became con-
fused in the minds of the people. ~here were not too many 
avowed nullifiers in Mississippi, but two of the leaders of 
this minority who dared oppose Jackson were George Poindexter 
and John Quitman. 
34Herman V. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations: 
The States and the United States (Phi!aaelphia, 1906), .. 
p •. 156. . -- - . 
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George Poindexter, appointed to Congress to fill the 
unexpired term of Robert Adams in Oecember of 1830, was an 
enigmatic senator in many respects. Poindexter, a Virginia 
born lawyer, came to the territory of Mississippi in 1802 and 
was soon involved in public life in Natchez and Wilkinson, 
Mississippi. He was the most well-known figure in the state, 
having served as the at~orney-general of the Territory, in 
the general assembly of the Territory in 1805, as a terri-
torial delegate to the United States Congress from 1807 until 
1813, and as the United States district judge for the Terri-
tory. Upon the admis~ion of Mississippi as a state, Poin-
dexter served in th~ Fifteenth Congress in 1817 ... 1819,, .as the 
governor of Mississippi 1819-1821, and finally, as United 
States sen~tor.35 Not only was he well known for serving in 
political positions, but his outspoken actions also gained 
him notoriety since he often stated his beliefs openly even 
though they were contrary to the views of a majority of his 
~onstituents. One view which set him apart from other Mis-
sissippians was his dislike of Andrew Jackson. 
Poindexter's rei:isons fot this antipathy are not coni-
pletely known, but there were evidently two causes; one was 
simply a personality clash. Poindexter, though $0 ill he 
could hardly walk had been appointed to fill out an unex-
pired congressional term, and upon arriving in Washington, 
had a meeting with the President. At their first meeting the 
35Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 
p. 1466. 
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personality clash was evident for Jackson later noted that 
Poindexter had a "sinister look. 1136 The real break qccurred 
over Jackson's system of patronage when the President ap-
pointed a Tennesseean, one of his former wife's relatives, to 
the job of surveyor of the public lands of Mississippi. 
Poindexter protested violently until Jackson reversed him-
self and appointed one of Poindexter's friends to the post, 
but when Poindexter's friend died, leaving the position open 
again, Jackson appointed another Tennesseean, Samuel Gwin. 
Poindexter again protested, and finally induced Congress to 
reject Gwin for the position.37 
The other man who was opposed both to Jackson and the 
tariff was John Quitman. He wrote to one friend in 1831 that 
he hoped Calhoun or some anti-tariff man would run for the 
presidency in 1832, but that he was strongly opposed to 
Martin Van Buren if he prov~d to be a proponent of tariffs 
and internal improvements. 38 Quitman, not only concerned 
with the dilemma of the South but interested in effecting a 
change, declared himself for Calhoun and organized the State 
Rights Association in Adams County. 39 His doctrines soon 
gained more followers and similar ·.associations were 
3 6EdwinA.~ Miles, Jackson;i.a~·Democracy;,,inMississippi, p~ .47. 
37rbid., pp. 48-49. 
38John Francis Hamtramck Claiborne, Life and Correspond-
ence of John A. Quitman, Major General, u-:s:A.-;-ana Governor 
of the State' of Mississippi, I (New York, 1860), passim. 
39cieo Hearon, "Nullification ;in Mississippi," :)?ublica-
tions of t:he Mississippi Historical Society, XII (1912); 
pp. 31-71. . 
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established in Wilkinson, Hinds, and Amite counties--all in 
west Missi~sippi.40 
Poindexter and Quitman failed to gather a large follow-
ing in support of Calhoun and in opposition to Jackson and 
the protective tariff policies because of the Indian problem. 
The main factor influencing the Mississippians was their en-
thusiasm for the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek which was 
initiated by Andrew Jackson and John Eaton in 1830. This 
treaty gave Mississippi an area of Choctaw land which 
stretched from border to border in the north central part of 
the state, leaving only the far northern area in Indian con-
trol. Altogether it added about 75 per cent more land to 
the state.41 Although Poindexter considered his hatred of 
Jackson more important than the Indian cessions, most of his 
constituents were of a different opinion--especially when 
John Calhoun penned his "Fort Hill" letter in 1831 which 
clearly stated his nullification views.42 
In 1832 the question of protective tariffs again emerged 
in congress as a new tariff was presented. This bill, initi-
ated as a less-protective act, became, in its final form, 
quite protective. The Mississippi congressmen, still three 
in nuniber, were Poindexter, Ellis, and a new man, Franklin 
40ibid. 
41ounbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, p. 555. 
42John C. Calhoun, "Fort Hill Address," in Richard K. 
Cralle, ed., Works of John c. Calhoun, VI (New York, 1883), 
pp. 58-94. - --- -
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Plummer of Westville. 43 Plummer, in congress since 1830, 
won his election by leading east Mississippi in its fight 
against the ~atchez district. He stressed the power the east 
could have if settlers of the Doak's Purchase and Piney Woods 
area would work together politica1ly.44 In the early Thir-
ties, the east was finally becoming a political power in its 
own. right. 
When the 1832 tariff bill reached the floor in congress, 
only Poindexter made any public statements. (Map 33) He 
castigated the bill, saying it established the principle of 
protection and, due to the inequality of its operation, he 
considered it worse than the bill of abominations of 1828 
and could never give it his vote.45 His sentiments were 
naturally stronger than those of the other Mississippi con-
gressmen because he had a double purpose: fighting protec-
tion and disavowing any tariff that President Jackson 
supported. Powhattan Ellis concurred with Poindexter in op-
posing the 1832 measure because it seemed too prot~ctive, but 
he did not renounce his support for Jackson. 46 The vote of 
Franklin Plummer, contrary to those by his fellow statesmen, 
was cast for the tariff. Plummer felt this compromise bill 
4. 3Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 
p, 115. . . . . . -. - -
44Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi, 
p. 31. . . . - .. .. 
625, 
45Register of Debates, 22 Cong., 
1154, 1186,-r200, 1284, 1290. 
46Ibid,, p. 1219. 






+ F. Plummer 
•Westville 
Sen G. Poindexter0 
•w; lki.nson 
I 
Yea vote 0 
Nay vote 2 
Not voting 0 
Yea vote I 
Nay vote 0 
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was slightly better than the 1828 measure, and since he op-
posed Poindexter, was also prone to vote for a bill which 
Poindexter disliked. 47 
After the passage of the Tariff of 1832, a convention 
in South Carolina declared the acts of 1828 and 1832 null and 
void, and, in turn, the President issued his Nullification 
Proclamation which seemed to deny the doctrine of state sov-
ereignty and the rights of nullification and secession, 
So~th Carolina reacted by issuing a call for a southern con-
vention to consider the question of state powers, but only 
Georgia and Alabama replied favorably to this call. The 
legislature of Mi~sissippi did not hesitate in rejecting 
South Carolina's actions, and assigned a committee the duty 
of w:riting a resolution on the subject. The resolutions 
which emerged were three in number: first, that the doctrine 
of secession was to be condemned; second, that the doctrine 
of nullification was contrary to the Constitution; and third, 
that they would sustain the actions of the President of the 
United States in the full exercise of his legitimate powers~8 
The 30~3 passage of these resolutions in the House was indic-
ative of the majority sentiment of the legislature of 
Mississippi.49 
47rbid., pp, 3830-3831. 
48Herm~n V. Ames, State Documents, pp, 183-185. 
49cleo Hearon, "Nullification. in Mississippi," p. 51. 
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Again the sentiment of the Mississippians was influenced 
by the Indian removal actions of the President, for in 1832 
the final Indian territory in the state was ceded to the 
government. This Chickasaw cession, the Treaty of Pontotoc, 
left the settlers in control of the complete state although 
the Chickasaws reserved the right to decide wh~n they would 
leave for Oklahoma,50 The faith which the Jacksonian~Demo­
crats of Mississippi had in the President had been upheld. 
The nqllification and t?,F~ff controversy was not yet 
resolved, for in January of 1833 the President introduced 
his "Force Bill'' into Congress which, if passed, wov.ld give 
him the right to collect the tariffs in the recalcitrant 
state of South Carolina. He tempered this action by suggest~ 
ing the feasibility of a new, lower tariff, 
As far as the people of Mississippi were concerned, a 
lower tariff would be beneficial, not only in averting mili-
ta+y action, but also in aiding the agrarian interests of 
the Sov.th. Again $enator Poinde~ter was the only Mississip-
pi co~gressman to fully state his position. He was opposed 
to any bill Jackson might introduce, but favored the bill 
Henry Clay introduced into the Senate, the Compromise of 
1833.51 He especially liked the Clay bill since Jackson 
hated Clay and since Calhoun and Clay had agreed to this bill 
together. When other senators argued the impropriety of 
. . SOstatu~1es at ts3~; of the u.nited Statei;; £! America • , VfI (Boston, , pp-:-!81-387. 
51Re5ister of Debates, 22 Cong., 2 sess,, IX, p. 474. 
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introducing the compromise bill into that house, Poindexter 
helped convince them that it should be accepted, urg~ng them 
that the acceptance of this bill would be a compromise be~ 
tween both parties. 52 When the vote was taken, he and the 
other Mississippi congressmen cast a unanimous vote for it, 53 
and the bill ultimately passed congress, thus initiating a 
trend toward lower tariffs, (Map 34) 
The attitude towat"d the Force bill was different, for 
even the Jacksonians of Mis,issippi felt the president went 
a step too far advancing the cause of federal powers over 
states' rights. Probably most of the people would not go as 
far as Senator Poinqexter did in berating the President, 
when in a speech before Congress he said: 
. . • • If the title of this bill corresponded 
with its provisions, it might be called "A Bill to 
Repeal the Constitution of the United States and to 
Invest in the President Despotic Powers." No bill 
has ever been presented into the consideration of 
Congress .• ·s~o virtually destructive of public 
liberty. • . , 
Realizing that the Force Bill would pass Congress, the 
Mississippi senators, Poindexter and a new man, John Black 
of Monroe, refused to vote. 55 (Map 35) Black, a Jackson 
Democrat, had taken Ellis' seat, replacing him as the sena-
tor from the east.56 The third vote, that of representative 
558; 
52rbid,, p. 101. 
53rbid., pp. 18l0-1811, 808-809. 
54rbid~, pp. 179-182. 
55rbid., pp. 688, 1903. 
56Biographical Director:y of the American Congress, p. 
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Plummer was ¢ast in opposition to the bill.57 So for the 
first time, the Mississippi~ns were opposed to an action by 
President Jackson, but when this bill and the compromise tar-
iff both passed, it seemed t ~'.e issue of states' rights and 
the hyper-emotionalism of most southerners would be quelled. 
i 
This did occur in some states, b\lt the South Carolinians 
raged on, as did Quitman and Poindexter and their new States' 
Rights Party of Mississippi;58 in fact, by 1834 the Staces' 
Rights Party was gaining converts. The issue was still very 
much alive, and under the direction of Quitman, was building 
a states' rights, anti~government attitude into the minds of 
the people. 59 
Mississippi states' rights ·history can thl,ls be divided 
into two separate phases: first, the 1828-183Z era when 
Indian Removal was important and when President Jackson, be-
cause of his leadership in this matter, was held in high 
esteem; and second, the 1833-1861 era when Mississippi grew 
increasingly opposed to northern power, In the first period 
although the tariff controversy reared its head, the people 
overlooked the objectionable bills and continued to favor the 
57Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess,, IX, pp. 1903, 
688. ' ''' - ' 
58The State Rights Party was organized in Jackson, Mis-
sissippi, in June of 1834 on the motion of John Quitman; 
Dunbar Rowland, ed., Encxclopedia of Mississipti History, II, 
p. 151; Jackson State Rights Barmer, June 24, 834. 
59James E. Winston, "The Mississippi Whigs and the Tar-
iff, 1834~1844," ~Mississippi Vallex Historical Review, 
XXII (June, 1934), p. SOS~ 
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government under Jackson. The few voices that were willing 
to denounce the tariff openly tended to be opposed to the 
President personally, and in their minds, considered both the 
man and the act doubly odious. These States' Rights Party 
men--a splinter group of the Jacksonian Democrats--also had 
to contend with a growing prospepity after the initial de-
pression in the late Twenties, so fewer followers were will-
ing to join them, The third party in the state, the Whigs 
or as they were known at the time, National-Republicans, re~ 
mained fairly quiet except to at times mention a tariff did 
not seem too abominable, and that perhaps Mississippi should 
try to become a manµfacturing state. Both these parties 
were centered in the Natchez and river counties. 
In 1832 the situation began to change due to three 
things: Jackson's Force Bill; the completion of Indian re-
moval; and the continued actions of the agitators, especial .. 
ly Quitman, With the maturing of the state with age and the 
resuitant growth of the Whig party, the States' Right Group 
and the Whigs coalesed, especially when Van Buren took over 
and Jackson was no longer a uniting force~ But that merger 
and the growth of nullification and secession sentiment was 
the second chapter in Mississippi histo~y and need not be 
recited here. Missis~ippi, in comparison to South Carolina 
and Georgia, remained fairly quiet in the tariff interlude. 
CHAPTER IX 
LOUISIANA 
Little did I expect that in the first six 
months of my public life, I should have heard ••. 
in this Hall •• ·~ the cry of disaffection, seces-
sion, disunion. Little did I expect to hear the 
boltl menace, that unless you abandon your protec-
tive policy the Union itself would be severed. Let 
me tell you, sir, Louisiana is determined to adhere 
to the union. • • . 
Loufa;·iana, along with her sister states, emerged from 
the War of 1812 into a world of optimism and expansion. The 
United States had just won the ''Second Wa:i:- for Independence" 
against Great Britain and her destiny now lay in her own 
hands, to mold and to shape as she pleased. For the people 
of Louisiana, the future looked especially bright because the 
young state which had entered the Union in 1812 with a mixed 
population of Creoles, French, $panish, and Americans had a 
new found unity and pride in their country after achieving a 
heroic victory at the Battle of New Orleans, and they lived 
in a region which promised to be a farmer's and planter's 
lReg.ister ~ Debates, 22 Cong., :r sess., VIII, p. 3588, 
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paradise. 2 Not only did they have new, fresh lands which 
beckoned the cotton farmers from the older states of the 
East, but also a climate and water transportation system 
which enabled them to raise a crop unique in the American 
agrarian com,munity--sugar cane. 
Sugar cane culture was not new in Louisiana, having been 
recommended as a possible staple for the area as early as 
1700. 3 The Jesuits introduced the valuable plant into the 
parish of St. Mary in 1725,4 and as the years progressed, the 
culture spread to the surrounding areas. Sugar was first 
produced on a profitable scale in 1795 by the Creole, Jean 
Etienne de Bore~ when his crop realized a profit of $12,000.5 
Yet though his efforts laid the foundation for the sugar in-
dustry in Louisiana, its progress was at first extremely 
slow. In 1802 the sugar exported from Louisiana amounted to 
1,576,933 pounds, the product of around seventy-five planta~ 
tions,6 but in 1803 Louisiana became a Territory of the 
United States, thereby placing the sugar domains within the 
bounds of a rapidly growing nation which could provide an 
2For a description of the various peoples of Louisiana, 
see Clement Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization, 1790-
1860 (New York, 196~·,pp. 125-=!35; Joseph Tregle, Jr., -
"Early New Orleans Society: a Reappraisal," Journal of -. · 
Southern History, XVIII (February, 1952), pp. 20-36,-
3J. D, B. DeBow, The Industrial Resources, Statistics, 
etc., of the United States (New y()rk, 1854), III, p. 275. - .,...._ __..,..... ,' 
4rbid. ::' 
SJ. Carly.le Sitterson, Sugar Country; the Cane Industry 
in the South, 1753-1950 (Lexington, 1950 , p:-s~ 
6Joseph George Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana and the Tariff, 
1816-1846," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXV (January, 
1942)' p. 26. 
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extensive home market for its produce. By 1812 sugar cane 
seemed indispensible to the future prosperity of the newly 
added eighteenth state of the Union.7 
Although the sugar culture expanded, t:he tropical nature 
of the :p·!Lant dictated the type of climate it must have; an 
early frost could ruin the crop. Consequently, the Sugar 
Bowl extended northward only a distance of a hundred miles 
from New Orleans, forming a crude triangle from the Red River 
on the north to the marshes bordering the Gulf of Mexico on 
the south, and from the Bayou Vermilion on the west to the 
Mississippi River on the east. 8 (Map 36) Moreover, the 
enormous expense of constructing the necessary buildings, 
purchasing the needed slaves, and acquiring other important 
tools for production, made a large capital outlay a necessary 
prerequisite for entry into the sugar industry. The sugar 
plantation was a farm where cane was grown and also a factory 
where sugar was produced; every plantation had to have its 
own master's dwelling, barn, stables, gristmill, laundry, 
daily, icehouse, tannery, smithy, hospital, slave quarters, 
and sugar house.9 In 1861, acco:t:".d.ing to one historian, the 
average value of 1,000 sugarhouses was $50,000, while many 
7The statistics from 1803 to 1817 on the sugar crops are 
deficient, so it is difficult to accurately as.sass the pro-
gressive annual increase of the culture during the above 
period. 
8charles P. Roland, Louisiana ~)gar Plantations During 
the American Civil War (Leiden, 195 , p. 1. - ' •' -.-
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cost over $100,000. 10 Still, when all conditions proved 
favorable, the planters realized good profits. William J. 
Minor, the absentee owner of a plantation in southern 
Louisiana, realized an average profit of about $4,176.25 a· 
year from his enterprise in the late Thirties and Forties, 
not the best years in the South's economy by any means. 11 
_,. 
The prohibitive capital outlays needed to establish a 
sugar plantation and the natural restrictions which confined 
the culture to the southern part of Louisiana caused most 
Americans who entered the new state to engage in a second 
great agrarian pursuit--the cotton culture. The newcomers, 
most of whom were familiar with the crop from their experi-
ences in the states to the east, settled in the northern part 
of the state in the Mississippi River delta, the Red River 
valley, and the hill country lying between the two. The cot-
ton lands stretc~ed southward, through a transitional di-
versified farming region to the sugar region of the south, 
while the Florida parishes; occupying the upper southeast 
portion of Louisiana al~o~~oduced cotton. 12 In 1816, just 
after the termination of the War of 1812, the Louisiana ..... 4 • 
10walter Prichard, "The Effects .. o.J the Civil War on the 
Louisiana Sugar Industry," Journal of Southern History, V 
(August, 1939) , p. "..~"J-7. _..., · · 
11.;r. Carlyle Sitterson, "The William J, Minor Planta ... 
tion~: A Study in Ante-Bellum Absentee Ownership," Journal of 
Southern History, IX, no. l (February, 1943), p. 73. · --
12Perry H, Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 
1812-1952 (Baton Rouge, 1957), pp. 11'-12, Thema.)or cotton 
plantation areas were Concordia, Catahoula, Tensas, Franklin, 
Madison, Richland, E;ast Carroll, Morehouse, and Red River. 
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cotton planters, aided by fresh soils, the increased demand 
for cotton, and the soaring prices for the short staple va-
riety which reached 27.2 cents per pound in that year, 13 
challenged the sugar planters for supremacy even in lower 
Louisiana. Together, the two staples forecast a great future 
for the citizens of the state14--a future they were deter-
mined to protect through favorable tariff legislation. 
When Louisiana entered the Union in 1812, the American 
tariff then in force levied a duty of 2~ cents a pound on 
brown sugar and 5 cents a gallon on molasses, 15 but with the 
advent of war, all impost duties were doubled, Sugar duties 
jumped to 5 cents a pound, and molasses duties increased to 
10 cents a gallon. However, Congress stipulated that all war 
duties should ct=ase one year after the termination of hos-
tilities, and that the ~ariff rates would revert to their 
prewar levels. The sugar producers realized they might soon 
be faced with an influx of sugar from the West Indies, and 
that some of the young plantations might be ruined. In des-
peration, the sugar planters of Louisiana--a southern agrar-
ian state--asked Congress to maintain the wartime protective 
duties on sugar. Although that body did not completely 
13william W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nul-
lification Controvers~ in South Carolina, 1816':TS"36 (New---.-
York, 1965), pp. 351- 5"'2':" 
14The people of Louisiana also raised non-staple prod~ 
ucts such as corn, strawberries, tobacco, rice, and other 
mixed farming crops. 
15Joseph Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana and the Tariff," p. 27. 
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follow their recommendation, it did report a new tariff bill 
which set the duty on brown sugar at 4 cents a pound, allow-
ing a l~ cent increase over the prewar rate.16 
Most southern agrarians supported free trade in 1816, 
being more lenient in that regard than they would be in the 
decade of the Twenties, so it appeared that the sugar plant-
ers of Louisiana were betraying the cause of the South when 
they sought protection for their product. However, the elo-
quent pleas by the state's congressmen allayed some of the 
fears of their southern neighbors as they presented arguments 
which would be reiterated many times in the years to come. 
They stated Louisiana' a sugar producers could not possibly 
compete with the influx of sugar from the West Indies unless 
a restrictive \t;ariff curtailed the imports from that source; 
maintained that Louisiana, within a few years, could supply 
the needs of the entire United States; and stated that trade 
with Louisiana would arrest the flqw of American dollars to 
the Islands. 17 Further, they contended that the extensive 
capital invested in their endeavors made protection a neces-
sity, and that the United Stiates, having taken it upon them-
selves to admit Louisiana as a state, owed her protection, 
especially since the other portions of the measure fined the 
citizens of Louisiana for the support of the other states of 
16Tariff Acts Passed El: the Congress of the United 
States from 1789 .!Q_ 1897 (Washington, 1899J;" PP:- 39, 46, 
17Annals of Congress, 14 Cong., I sess., pp. 1656-1657. 
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the Union. such as Kentucky wh:b:h fi1vored hemp duties and 
the New England· states which· .would receive protection for in~· 
I - '· 
dustry. 1 ~ Thomas Robertson, :representative from Louisiana, 
realized that the animus of the northern manufacturers was 
directed at agrarians in general, and th~~ they, in attacking 
the southern free trade system, were also indisposed to allow 
protection for any southern article although they themselves 
wanted h,igh tariff duties. He stated in Congress, "Gentle ... 
men, call it an agricultural product; is that sufficient to 
render it an object of prejudice? 11 19 
Evidently, the agrarian nature of the product was quite 
sufficient to render it objectionable to northerners, for 
they not only opposed the proposed 4 cent rate, but success-
fully reduced the figure in the House of Representatives to 
2~ cents.20 Robertson ultimately voted against the Tariff of 
1816 since it did not benefit the sugar industry, 21 but the 
Senate raised the duty to 3 cents, and after both houses con-
curred in this amendment22 the President signed the new tar-
iff into law, 
In 1824 the Committee on Manufactures reported a second 
major tariff bill which proposed average ad valorem tariff 
18Ibid., p. 1260. 
19Ibid., p. 1259. 
20Ibid., pp. 1326-1327. 
21rbid., p. 1352. 
22There was no call for a recorded vote in the Senate, 
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rates of 33 1/3 per cent on cottons and woolens, a 6 cent per 
square yard duty on cotton bagging, and a retention of the 
1816 sugar rates of 3 cents per pound. 23 The people again 
objected. Although sugar was important to them, Louisiana, 
in 1824, was primarily a cotton state. Louisiana'a cotton 
production increased troq 2 million pounds in 1811 to 10 mil-
lion pounds in 1821, and was, in 1824, again in a stage of 
rapid acceferation.which would result in a ·total output of 
38 million pounds two years later. 24 The young southwestern 
state, as well as the cotton states to the east, refused to 
countenance the measure which they claimed might cause Great 
Britain to retaliate against the American tariff policy· by 
refusing to buy the southern product. Congressmen William 
Brent, Henry Gurley, ~dward Livingston, and Josiah Johnston 
denounced every protective portion of the measure except the 
duty on sugar. They attacked the duty on cotton bagging 
which, they contended, was solely for the benefit of Kentucky 
to the detriment of Louisiana and other cotton states which 
needed this product. 25 _When the Kentucky delegation accused 
the Louisiana congressmen of opposing the principle of pro-
tection on northern items, but supporting it for themselves, 
the southerners countered with their major argument, saying 
23Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., I sess., pp. 960-965, 
24Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819-
1829 (New York, 1962), p. 52. -- - -- - -
25Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., I sess., pp. 1515, 
1545-1546, 166"')-;"1667' 
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the duties they sought were not protective but were of a 
nature which was clearly separate from the protective system. 
This was the reasoning they had to use to gain support from 
their southern allies, and a line of attack they would revive 
in 1828 when a new tariff proposal appeared in Congress. 
In 1828 the southern Democrats, some of whom were 
Louisianians, determined to use counterattack methods to 
dispose of the New England woolens manufacturers' demands for 
a new protective tariff. The southerners and westerners who 
favored Andrew Jackson for the presidency in the next elec-
tion placed men on the Committee of Manufacturers who sup-
ported free trade, and who, in turn, drafted a tariff measure 
which, if effected, woul~ harm the woolens manufacturers and 
other New England interests which sought help. 26 They pro-
posec;I doubling the duty on molasses from 5 cents to 10 cents 
a gallon while disallowing any drawbacks on rum; establishing 
specific 50 cent, $1.00, $2.50, and $4.00 valuation levels on 
woolens and 's.tip,µ~ati'ii~. ·that all goods in any specified 
bracket should be assessed .;:ts if. they cost the highest amount 
in that category; and increasing.the duties on raw wool to a 
mil~ed specific and ad valorem' r.ate which amounted to a 50 
.• ~"!-< 
.. ,,.,.. 
per cent duty, All of these recommendations were~detrimental 
to the industrialists who made rum from molasses and who used 
foreign wool in their textile factories. They especially 
attacked the $1.00 minimum which would allow many cheap or 
26Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Suren and the Making of 
the Democratic Party (New York, T9"51), pp.~3-:r75. --
' 
coarse articles of foreign material to enter the United 
States, and contended the bill was not beneficial to New 
England.27 
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The southerners found nothing in the bill which would 
merit their support, but realized that was inherent in the 
nature of the tariff measure. It appeared that most of the 
material benefits, should the measure pass, would be realized 
by the westerners who would be aided by the duty on wool, and. 
increased imposts on hemp, pig iron, hammered bar iron, 
rolled bar iron, and even molasses since exclusion of that 
item in New England might allow them to rna~.e more corn liquor 
in the West. 28 But although the Jacksonians of ~he west 
might vote for the final passage of tl:)e\·'$Ct, the southerners 
~; ;_-., ·:-:ry;1~ 
expected the measure to fail because 'bo'th the New England 
people and the southerners would oppose it. They did not 
criticize the westerners since they knew they were also in-
volved in the scheme to kill the tariff. 
The Louisiana congressmen deftly denied that the Tariff 
of 1828 was a plot against the New Englanders, and argued 
against the proposed measure with arguments similar to those 
they had used in 1824. The representatives, Henry Gurley, 
William Brent, and Edward Livingston, opposed the act. Gur-
ley, a Baton Rouge planter, again attacked the duty on cotoor 
ton bagging, as he had in 1824. He said the tariff proposed 
.· ·.· 27Frank W. Taussig, ~ Tarifff,._Hist~ry of ~ United 
States (New York, 1967), pp. 88-10 . · 
28rbid. 
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a duty upon an article used exclusively by cotton growers 
like himself, and, unlike other duties in the bill, it bore 
upon a particular section of the country which could least 
afford it. Gurley directed his remarks at the Kentuckians, 
who, he said, would derive the benefits f;-om the increased 
duties on hemp.29 Brent, a National~Republican from St, 
~artinsville, was not outspoken during the 1828 de~'tes, 
although he too had opposed duties on cotton bagging in the 
earlier sessions~ 30 Livingston, probably the most noted 
Louisiana congressman,31 was a Jacksonian Democrat from ~ew 
Orleans, and it was he who stated that there was a third 
sect~on of the country which was interested in the duty on 
molasses, and that was Louisiana. He announced he supported 
the protection proposed for that item since Louisiana's sugar 
growers who owned one million acres of sugar land which could 
produce 60 gallons per acre could supply the whole United 
States. He still maintained, though, that he generally op-
posed the principle of protection, but if the bill did pass, 
he wanted some of his constituents to share in the benefits}2 
1961 
29Biographical Director~ of the American Congress, 1774-
(Washington, 1961), p. 8T." - · · 
30Ibid., p. 594, 
31Livingston served as United States District Attorney, 
representative .a n.d senator from Louisiana fol;' a number of 
years before obtaining a positiQn on future President Jack-
son's cabinet~ Biographical Directory of the American Con-
~ress, p. 1226; .Ira Flory_~ Jr., "Edwarcf"Livingston's Place 
in Louisiana Law'" Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XIX, 
no. 2 (April, 1936), p,., 328, · · 
32Register ..£.!Debates, 20 Cong., I sess,, IV, p. 2346. 
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Although the bill ultimately passed the House of Representa-
tives, all three of Louisiana's representatives voted against 
"t 33 l. • (Map 37) 
The senators from Louisiana were less united in their 
opposition to the measure than were the representatives. One 
vote cast for the Tariff of 1828 came from Dominique Bouligny 
of New Orleans. Bouligny, a Creole? represented the sugar 
interests and, as a National-Republican, supported Henry 
Clay's American System which called for protective tariffs. 
However, he appeared uncertain as to what course to follow, 
ultimately voting for the third reading, for an indefinite 
postponement, and finally, for final passage of the meas-
ure. 34 His partner in the Senate, Josiah Johnston, a Demo-
crat from Alexandria, firmly opposed the bill since it was 
alien to the best interests of the cotton planters.35 
Altogether,, the Louisiana delegation showed their 
state's continued opposition to protective tariffs, but their 
efforts were unavailing as the measure passed Congress. The 
other cotton states of the South turned their attention to 
the presidential election of 1828, hoping to elect a man who 
would aid them in reducing the tariff. The most likely 
candidate was Andrew Jackson, a supporter of '~udicious 
33rbid., pp. 2471-2472, 786. 
34rbid., p. 786; Charles Cayarre, History of Louisiana, 
The American Domination (New Orleans, 19"03), IV-,-pp. 68, 346; 
BIOgraphical Directory of the American Congress, p. 576 • 
. ·35Register . ££Debates, 20 Cong.~ I sess., IV, p. }86; 
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tariffs" as opposed to John Quincy Adams who was known to 
favor protection. 
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The people of Louisiana were not as united as were many 
of the eastern states in their choice of candidates for the 
election of 1828. For the first time a strong political 
cleavage b~tween National-Republicans and Democrats arose, 
although there had been earlier differences of opinion based 
on nativity, or Creole as opposed to American heritage.36 
Most of the National-Republicans, including William Brent, 
Henry Gurley, Dominique Bouligny, and Edward White supported 
John Quincy Adams. Brent stated he saw no reason why the 
administration should be changed,37 and White, a future 
representative from Donaldsonville who disliked Andrew Jack-
son and Edward Livingston, was of the same opinion.38 The 
Whigs were usually sugar producers, and they wanted to retain 
in office a man who would give continued support to their 
unique culture. 
The Democrats, although not all united in their choice 
for the presidency, generally favored Andrew Jackson. Most 
of them were producers of cotton, having come late to the 
lands of Louisiana, and having brought the characteristics 
of frontier democracy with them. Some of them, such as 
36Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 35, 
37Niles' Weekly Register (Baltimore, 1827), XXXII, 
p. 309. 
38Diedrich Ramke, "Edward Douglas White, Sr.," Louisiana 
Historical ~uarterly (April, 1936), XIX, no. 2., pp, 283-
284; New Or ea'ns Be'e, June 18, 1828. 
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Edward Livingston, supported the Old Hero because they had 
fought with him in the Battle of New Orleans, 39 while others 
blamed the Tariff of 1828 on Adams and argued that Jackson, 
a southern man, would be more likely to redress their griev-
ances. The cotton lands in the northern portion of Louisiana 
were strongholds of Democrat support. 40 The Democrats of the 
South and Southwest were victorious in the contest, and sent 
Andrew Jackson to the White House. 
Although the Democrats of Louisiana won the political 
battle of 1828, they were not overly jubilant because the 
cotton economy was undergoing a depression. Cotton prices 
sank to below 10 cents a pound as the American economy dipped 
lower and lower. 41 The millions of pounds of new southwest-
ern cotton which were added to the market, along with other 
economic factors, caused the dilemma, but few southerners 
actually realized that overproduction was a major problem; 
instead they blamed the tariffs. 
At the same time that the cotton planters of Louisiana 
were suffering a decline in income, the sugar planters grew 
wealthy. Sugar production gradually inc~eased in Louisiana 
f~om, 30,000 hogsheads in 1823, to 71,000 hogsheads in 1827, 
3gBiographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 
1226. . . . . . - -
40Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 
p. 35; the terms Whig and National-Republican.:. ar,e .-.used"' 
synonymously. · 
4lwilliam W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, pp. 351-
352; Lewis Cecil Gray, History of AgrICultu:(e ii;i the South-
ern United States to 1860 (Wash!iigton, 1933), TI ,p. 1027. 
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and 87,965 hogsheads in 1828. 42 Each hogshead averaged 
1,000 pounds net, and yielded from forty-five to fifty gal-
lons of molasses.43 The 1828 figures represented the work 
of 308 sugar estates which utilized 21,000 slaves, 82 steam 
engines, and 226 horses.44 It was apparent to the cotton 
planters that in eight years' time, cotton had been chal-
lenged for leadership by sugar. The statistics gave strong 
proof of this: Louisiana's income from both cotton and sugar 
respectively had been $6,960,000 to $2,100,000 in 1820, 
$3,040,000 to $4,899,000 in 1828, and $2,044,620 to 
$6,069,585 in 1828. 45 This showed that the position of the 
two crops was almost reversed, in a three to one ratio, 
within the eight year period of time. 
The low prices for cotton, the blight upon a portion of 
their crop, and the evident profitability of sugar cane con-
vinced many cotton planters of lower Louisiana that they , 
must, if at all possible, convert their lands to the produc-
tion of sugar, and between 1828 and 1830 the whole complexion 
of the Louisiana economy changed. The sugar industry became 
the dominant endeavor of the agrarians, and spread' not only 
throughout the remainder of the lower zones which were 




45Niles' Weekly Register, XXII, p. 120; Joseph l'regle, 
Jr., "Louisiana and the Tai;-iff," pp. 53, .5'5-56. 
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conducive to the culture, but moved further northward into 
the drier areas. This movement was stimulated by ~he intro-
duction of a new, hardy variety of sugar cane, the ribbon 
species, which was brought into the state by a Mr. Coirn 
and John McQueen of Georgia,46 
With the advent of the new role for sugar in Louisiana, 
the planters' attitudes toward the tariffs changed. The 
changeover to the production of this expensive crop neces-
sitated protection. Thi~ was especially true in 1830 when 
a recession temporarily struck the state, forcing many of 
the planters to rely on foreign capital until the hard times 
ended.47 Many of the people in the cotton states to the east 
were shocked at the appearance of a set of resolutions re-
corded by the state legislature of Louisiana on March 15, 
1830: 
Resolved by the senat;.e and house of represent-
atives of the State of Louisiana • • • that the 
general assembly of their state do not ·concur in the 
views and sentiments expressed by • • • Mississippi, 
relative to the Tariff of 1828; that the legislature 
of this state does not perceive the unconstitution-
ality or im:policy of adopting such measures, ·,.nor has 
the state suffered any injury therefrom. 
Resolved, That we concur in the resolutions of 
• • • Vermont, by which they have declared the law 
of 1828 .•. to be const:Ututional, expedient, and 
harmless to the southern slates. 
Resolved, That our senators in Congress be in-
structed and our representatives be requested, to 
46 J. D. B. DeBow, The Industrial Resources; Statistics, 
p. 275. . --- . . . ... 
47Joseph 'l'regle, Jr., "Louisiana and the Tariff," p. 56. 
accede to and support such measures as thos~8con­
templa ted by the law of 1828 on the Tariff. 
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The Louisian~ans' decision to renounce the principles of 
free trade that they had advocated during the earlier tariff 
debates stemmed from their realization that they had no al-
lies. Many southerners, basically producers of cotton, dis-
liked the sugar planters who were pres\,lmably wealthier and 
who were covertly supporting protection while openly voicing 
opinions which seemed to support the cotton interests. These 
easterners had never strongly sided with the Louisianians, 
although the people of that state naturally supported the 
agrarian cause as long as cotton dominated their economy. 
Now, in 1830, the sugar producers realized they would have 
to gain support from one of the two sections in order to re-
tain the protective support needed by their industry. The 
decision being made, the planters wasted no time; they not 
only announced their new position by means of the Resolutions 
of 1830, but also returned a solid slate of National-Republi-
cans to the House of Representatives.49 
In 1830 and 1831 the positions of the protectionists 
and the free traders polarized even more. Memorials from 
the numerous cotton regions poured into Congress asking that 
the tariff duties be lowered. In 1830 Daniel Barringer of 
48Herman V. Ames, ed., State Documents on Federal Rela-
tions, The States and the United States (Philcidelphia, 1906), 
pp. l61-=It>2. - -
49BioZraphical Directory of the American Congress, 
pp, 983, l 16, 1802. __,.,.. ~ I 
255 
North Carolina tried to get the House of Representatives to 
reduce the duty on brown sugar hy 1 ~ent per pound, but the 
Louisiana congressman from Donaldsonville, Edward White, suc-
cessfully convinced the legislators to retain the 3 cent 
duty.so 
The tensions over tariff policy did not lessen in 1832, 
but increased tq the point that civil war seemed eminent. 
The radicals of South Carolina convinced many of the citizens 
of the Palmetto State that if the newly proposed Tariff of 
1832 did not lower the impost duties to around the 15 per 
cent ad valorem level they had the historical and constitu-
tional right to declare the tariff null and void in their 
state, and possibly, they might go a step further to seces-
sion. They further justified their demands by saying the 
growing surplus in the treasury warranted tariff reductions. 
Conversely, the National-Republican sugar planters of Louisi-
ana desirec;l·.to keep the tariff rates high so the treasury 
would remain fu11.51 Since the sugar domains had expanded, 
they needed more internal improvements to connect the farm-
ing regions to the waterways, and even the Democratic cotton 
farmers in the region were coming to the same conclusion. 
Some of the latter group even renounced the party of Jackson 
and turned to the opposition party; it seemed that increased 
SORegister of Debates, 21 Cong., II sess., pp. 358-359, 
455. 
5lnora J. Bonquois, "The Career of Henry Adams Bullard," 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly (October, 1940), XXIII, no. 
4, PP· 1012-1013; 
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wealth and maturity caused people to become more coqservative 
rather than democratic. 
The debate over the proposed Tariff of 1832 was heated 
as the cotton farmers of the Southeast criticized the insuf-
ficient lowering of duties and asked that the rates be cut 
further. Although impost levels on cotton bagging w~re ·re-
duced from 5 cents to 312 cents per pound, iron duties were 
lowered from $1.12 to 90 cents per 112 pounds, and sugar 
duties were dropped froqi 3 cents to 2~ cents per pound, the 
Carolinians were dissatisfied. They wanted the items de-
creased further, and especially desired a reduction in W!Jol ... 
ens and cottons duties which remained at an average ad 
valorem level of around 50 per cent.52 
Louisiana's congressmen, especially Henry Bullard, out~ 
spokenly berated South Carolina's position while trying to 
get the House to revise the sugar duty upward. Bullard, a 
cotton planter, weakened the South Carolinians' arguments by 
stating that he and other cotton planters of his state 
favored the tariff. He said that although they sometimes 
differed on it and other questions, they did not think of 
quarreling about it nor of complaining that they were op-
pressed. He said, " ••• on the contrary, that section of 
the country is prosperous, highly prosperous, and cocr-
tented,1153 He pointed out that the older seaboard states' 
52aouse Report, No. 481, 22 Cong., I sess.~ pp. 29-36. 
. . ; 
53Re3ister of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., p. 3588. 
2S7 
proplems lay, not with the tariff, but with their eroded and 
exhausted soils, and stated that he was for protection ~nd 
for the Union.S4 Philemon Thomas, the aging general who had 
fought in the Revolutionary War, supported Bullard's argu-
ments, and Edward White, though saying little in congress, 
opposed the tariff, After continued debate. the measure .. . . ~ ., 
' 
passed the House of Representatives, with Bullard and White 
voting against it because they did not want the sugar duty 
lowered by a half cent, and Thomas supporting it because he 
favored moderation.SS (Map 38) 
The Senate also passed the measure, after at first re-
storing the 3 cent rates on sugar, then again lowering them 
to 2~ cents, Louisiana's senators made no comments, but 
cast their votes in favor of the bill~S6 Altogether, the 
state appeared to favor moderation, with a total of three 
men supporting the act and two rejecting it. 
Strangely, the passage of the 1ariff of 1832 evinced no 
loud denunciations from the citizens of Louisiana even though 
the sugar duty had been lowered slightly. On the contrary, 
the New Orleans Bee criticized White and .Bullard for opposing 
the act. The newspaper contended they should have backed the 
tariff since the duties would cause only temporary embarrass-
ment and because the 2~ cent duties would allay discontent 
54Ibid., p. 3589. 
55rbid., pp. 3830-3831. 
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Map 38. Louisiana's Cong~essional Tariff Vote, 1832 
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and make protection more permanent.5 7 Both the cotton and 
the ~ugar planters of Louisiana seemed satisfieq. 
The same degree of contentment was not noticeable in 
the state of South Carolina; they called for nullification. 
A convention quickly assembled and set forth the Ordin,ance 
of Nullification, a document which declared the tc;triffs of 
1828 and 1832 null and void within their state. Such actions 
in the Palmetto State frightened the people of Louisiana be-
cause they knew disunion would harm their flourishing econ~ 
omy. Instead of holding nullification meetings, like many 
South Carolinians were doing, the people of Louisiana held 
union meetings.SS Each state throughout the South and North 
anxiously awaited the outcome of the dilemma as President 
Jackson proclaimed he would use force if necessary to collect 
the revenues and asked Congress to pass a Force Bill to that 
effect. 
The House of Representatives, alarmed at the situation, 
began work on a bill "to reduce and otherwise alter the 
duties on imports" on January 8, 1833, and shortly there-· 
after, Henry C!ay introduced a second compromise proposal 
into the Senate. Clay's measure quickly took precedence and 
worked its way through Congress as the Compromise of 1833. 
The new bill provided for a gr~dual reduction of duties until 
.5 7nora J, Bonquois, ."The Career of Henry Adams Bullard," 
p. 1019; New Orleaps Bee., July 14, 1832; Diedrich Ramke, 
"Edward Douglas White-:-Sr. ," p. 285. 
58Baton Rouge Gazette, December 29, 1832, January 5, 
1833, 
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1842, at which time the tariff should be on a revenue basis 
only with average ad valorem duties of around 20 per cent. 
All of Louisiana's delegation voted for the measure. S9 (Map 
39) To them Union was the most important factor to consider, 
and aft~r all, the duties would remain high for a while, then 
drop g+~dually. They had not deserted the protective 
'principle. 
•' 
On March 1, 1833, the second measure which was working 
its way through Congress, the Force Bill, emerged for a vote. 
This bill which was designed to combat South Carolina's 
Ordinance of Nullification seemed patrioti,c to the five con-
gressmen from Louisiana, and the entire delegation voted for 
it.60 (Map 40) Without the Union, their economy would 
suffer, 
Louisiana's changing economy had thus propelled ~er 
into the ranks of the protectionists--a position which seemed 
incongruous since the cotton culture made up a. large portion 
of the state's economy. However, cotton was s~cond in total 
value of production when compared to sugar cane, and even 
the producers of the secondary crop were fairly affluent. 
Although once democratic upon their entry into the state, 
the cotton planters often became Whigs as they grew wealthy 
and conservative, and even those who remained Democrats of 
the Jacksonian persuasion sought benefits in the protective 
59Register of' Debates, ··22 Qo~g., II.sess.; p. ,818. 
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tariffs so roads could be built and so that Texas cotton 
could be excluded f:J:om the American market. If any state's 
reactions to the tai;-iffs could be listed in contradistinction 
to those of South Carolina, that ~tate would be Louisiana, 
Cl{APTER \i{ . 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION · 
An astute observer of American history once noted that 
the elements of diversity within the South--the physiographic 
differences, the varied modes of livelihood, and even the 
divergent climatic conditions--prevented the attainment of 
any natural unity, and he further concluded that there was 
not one South, but many. To a great degree, his contention 
is valid, especially in regard to the tariff controversies of 
1828 th:i:;ough 1833. Yet many Americans of that era, as well 
as those of a later period refused to recognize the diversi~ 
ties inherent within the region. They looked instead at the 
elements of cohesiveness--the agrarian economy, the wann cli-
mate, the institution of slavery, and the ide•l of the coun-
ti;y gentleman--and assumed .that all the people in that 
section of the country, with the possible exceptiqn of the 
sugar p~anters of Louisiana, would act as a single unit in 
supporting the doctrine of free trade. Such preconceived 
notions, however, belie the truth of the situation, for a 
~eassessment of the South's reactions to the various tariffs 
and to the Force E~ll shows that factions emerged in nearly 
every state to counter the protagonists of free trade, and 
especially to curtail any extremists' reaotions which might 
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lead to disunion. Even South Carolina, the most rebellious 
state of all, was not without its unionists and pr9tection-
ista. Evidently, some obscure internal problems were dis-
rupting the tranquility and harmony of the South, but in 
order to understand the logic behind each action, the author 
had to revert back to the assumption that there were truly 
many Souths, and, in turn, to survey the peculiar economic, 
social, and political conditions inherent within each area. 
The economic factors are most vivid~ for the South was 
a land of mountains, plains, deltas, plateaus, and coastal 
lowlands, each with its own distinctive local economy that 
had special needs and interests of its own although it might 
be a part of a larger southern culture. While the southern~ 
ers were predominantly agrarians, their modes of livelihood 
varied from that of the small self subsistent farmer, to the 
medium scale agriculturalist who raised sheep~ cattle, or 
grains, to the large scale planters who depended upon a 
staple crop economy. Of the staples, the cotton culture pre-
dominated, having spread throughout the South from lower 
Virginia to Louisiana. However, other money crops such as 
rice, tobacco, and sugar cane also played a major role in 
the agricultural community. 
In general, these separate economic elements caused 
some regions to disagree with their neighboring area, but 
strangely, many southerners within a distinctive region or 
within a well defined staple crop area, often quarrelled 
among themselves or with people engaged in the same pursuit 
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who lived just across the state boundary. This, in turn, 
~hows that economic factors were not the sole cause for the 
various southern reactions, but that other indepeadent vari-
ables were involved. For example, an internal political feud 
in South Carolina which caused one group to support and one 
group to oppose John C. Calhoun and his free trade policies,, 
led some agrarians to vote for protective tariffs when they, 
in reality, disliked them. A se~ator from Tennessee sup-
ported the highly protective Tariff of 1828 to further the 
political objectives of one of his friends even though many 
of his constituents disagreed with his position, Some people 
in northeastern Virginia, coastal Virginia, western Virginia, 
and eastern Tennessee favored protection so they could obtain 
federally financed internal improvements. Other citizens in 
portions of Tennessee, Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi 
supported protection whenever a qµestion of allegiance to 
Andrew Jackson arose since they preferred to support the Old 
Hero rathe:i: than his enemy, John C. Calhoun. Moreover, other 
people from Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi who wanted the 
Indians removed from their domains_ alsu,· supported some pro-
te~ tive tariffs and unionist measures in order to retain the 
support of Andrew Jackson, a noted advocate of removal poli-
cies. Finally, some of the populace in Virginia and North 
Carolina backed moderate tariffs in order ta stigmatize the 
South Carolinians' contention that nullification was an his-
toric and constitutional doctrine~ 
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All these adverse reactions, and more, took place at 
various times during the tariff interlude, but this does not 
deny the fact that a majority of the southerners were free 
traders when only economic interests were at stake. In gen-
eral, the cotton, tobacco, corn, and rice producers of the 
South opposed the tariffs which they felt were for the bene-
fit of the textile manufacturers of the North. Conversely, 
the sugar cane producers, the self sufficient farming inter-
ests, the sheep raisers, the salt, iron, and coal miners, 
and the merchants favored protection. Some of these elements 
reacted favorably to the impost measures because they wanted 
to exclude foreign imports similar to those produced by their 
own labor, while others did so because they did not have such 
a large personal stake in the workings of the tariff and did 
not consider the issue of great importance. This disinterest 
was especially true of the merchants who were often former 
northerners or Europeans with only a moderate interest in the 
South, and the subsistence level farmers who would not di-
rectly feel the effects of such legislation. Nevertheless, 
both those who opposed and those who supported free trade, 
did so with purely economic interests in mind during the 
first portion of the tariff era--a condition which was des-
tined to be of short duration, 
In 1828, when th~ tariff of that year emerged, the ele-
ments of economic motivation were singularly apparent, as 
was the fact that the South was predominantly a free trade 
regi,on. Since 1824 many agrarians had berated the tariffs, 
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contending that they placed a tax upon one portion of the 
Union for the benefit of another, but that measure was noth~ 
ing when compared to the measure being debated in Congress. 
The new act proposed average duties of 50 per cent ad valorem 
.·' 
instead of the old 33 1/3 per cent rate, and.·incp~ased the 
I ' 
duties on cotton bagging, cottons, and woolens, all of which 
were needed by the ~outhern agrarians. Although the discus-
sions in the Senate and House of Representatives became muted 
because of the political overtones involved, the congress-
men 1 s final vote on the measure distinctively placed most of 
the South in the free trade bracket. (Map 41) Seventy-four 
of the eighty-three southern senators and representatives 
cast their votes against tpe act, five supported it, and four 
did not vote. In scrutinizing the position of the congres-
sional votes on the map, one notes that the rice•and long 
staple cotton planters of the coast, the tobacco planters of 
eastern Virginia, North Carolina, and portions of Tennessee, 
and the short staple cotton producers and other fanning in-
terests from lower Virginia to Louisiana opposed the tariff. 
Their reasons for so doing were based on the factors previ-
ously noted. But other clearly defined regions also appear--
areas which supported the Tariff of Abominations. 
In 1828 -two ma j o.·r regional groups favored protection, 
the sheep raisers, salt, iron, and coal miners, and other 
farmers, all of western Virginia, and the sugar producers of 
southern Louisiana. The Virginians had two things in mind. 
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items which they could supply, and they hoped to get federal 
support for internal improvements since their fellow states-
men in the east would not aid them. They could only obtain 
the funds if the national treasury received money from the 
tariffs. In Lo\,lisiana, the second major protectionist re,..> 
sian, the sugar planters there, though few in number when 
compa:t;"ed to the cotton planters within the stC!.te, wanted 
protection against the West Indies sugar cane which was not 
only more abundant, but of better quality. Only one vote, 
that of John Eaton of Tennessee, su"PPorted the new level of 
duties because of personal rather than economic motives. 
Eaton wanted to help Andrew Jackson, his long time friend, 
win the coveted position of President of the United States, 
and he believed this could be done only i,£ the. northerners 
thought Jack.son and hls friends favored protection. 
Other than the one vote, the reactions to the Tariff e>f 
1828 were clearly ecoQ.omic and whol.ly uncomplicated, but by 
1832 when the next tariff appeared, the former positions were 
often abandoned. Too many variables had entered the pi~ture. 
Many South Caroli~ians were radicals and were threatening to 
nullify any further protective legislation; Andrew Jackson, 
the Presiqent who presumably favored low tariffs at one time, 
now seemed to support high imposts, and he despised the noted 
southern leader, John C. Calhoun. The American economic de~ 
pression as well as the soil depletion of the Tidewater and 
Piedmop.t in the older seaboard states added t;b their'r·t:rou-. ~ 
• !I'.,. ... •·~,..,..., 
bles. Other problems were also apparent; the Indians still 
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held lands in the Southwef$t; intrastate feuds and animosities 
increased; and political factionalism grew more distinct, 
Altogether, these factors caused a more localized reaction 
to the Tariff of 1832. 
The most notable reaction occur~~q1 in South Carolina 
when a large group of sho~t staple cotton planters from the 
Piedmont, and several rice and short and long staple cotton 
planters fro~ the Tidewater, became ext~emists in their de~ 
nunciations of the tariff. They held free trade meetings, 
rallied around John C. Calhoun and other more radical ora-
tors, and announced that they planned to institute an em-
bargo against northern goods which entered their state. 
Further, they asserted that if the newly proposed Tariff of 
1832 did not reduce impost duties to around the 15 per cent 
average ad valorem level, they would declare the tariff null 
and void in their state and ask other southerners to do the 
same. 
These threats by the Catolinians did not frighten the 
northerners and westerners who wanted a strong d~gree of 
protection. Nevertheless, they ultimately presented a meas-
ure to Congress fol;' cons.ideration which reduced the duties 
from those established in 1828. Yet, in its final foQn, the 
1832 tariff was still highly protective and far above the 15 
per cent level demanded by the Carolinians. 
When the congress~en voted on the Tariff of 1832, a 
strange realignment appeared; no longer were the trans-
montane Virginians and the sugar planters of Louisiana alone 
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in their support for protective tariffs, but they were 
joined by groups of people in every other southern state--
even South Carolina. (Map 42) Thirty-six southern congress-
men favored the tariff, as compared to five in 1828, while 
forty-three opposed the act, and four did not vote. Evident-
ly, the changes which had occurred during the preceding four 
years led to the transformed response by the people even 
though the Soµth was as much an agrarian center as ever be-
foi-e, The western Virginians retained theil;' protectionist 
stance for the same reasons that impelled them to support the 
earlier tariff, and some eastern Virginians who wanted in· 
tern.al improvements, who rejected South Carolina's threats of 
nullification, and who sou$ht moderation, aligned with them. 
The same logic held ·.t:·ru,e for the North Carolinians who cast 
their votes for the tariff. In South Carolina, the enemies 
of Calhoun, the fl;'iends of President Jackson, and the mer~ 
chants voted for the act, while a Jacksonian Democrat in the 
port city of Savannah, Georgia, did the same. Throughout 
the rest of the southwestern states, the votes cakt for the 
tariff evidenced a desire for moderation, reflected regional 
an~mosities, or showed the degree of support for the Presi-
dent rather than for the radicals of South Carolina. Even 
two sugar cane producers of Louisiana supported the act al-
though it reduced the duties on their product by a half cent 
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Although all southerners who opposed the Tariff of 1832 
did so be9ause they believed it was ~till too protective, 
and all who supported it wanted, among other things, modera-
tion, tranquility did not lie ahead. The most violent period 
of tariff reaction ensued as the nullifiers of South Carolin~ 
true to their word, passed the Ordinance of Nullification and 
declared that the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were null and void 
in their state, as of February 1, 1833. They in turn called 
upon all other southern states to sµpport them in this action 
by subscribing to the doctrine of nullification. President 
~ackson, however, quickly countered with his Nul1ification 
Proclamation that declared one state could not nullify a 
federal law, and the Force Bill which asked Congress for the 
right to use coercion in collecting imposts from the recal-
citrant state. 
Throughout the South the various interest ~roups polar-
ized even further; some becoming radical and zealously sup-
porting the doctrine of nullification, others rejecting such 
action and demanding that the Union not be impaired. Union 
~eetings and nullification meetings were held throµghout the 
South, and at one point, civil war seemed innninent. All in-
terest groups turned their eyes toward South Carolina to see 
what would happen next. 
Before noting the resultant reactions of :South Car9li.na,, 
.,t;:~e q~est:ion ·as. ·to· wpat caused :the·;:people of that state to 
become so radical merits consideration. It would appe~r that 
if their extremism was caused by the depression which 
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afflicted their staple crop economy, the states of Virginia, 
South Carolina, and Georgia might become just as enthusiastic 
in their opposition to protection since they too suffered 
economic reverses. But ultimately, South Carolina stood 
alone in he:i; determination to rid the South of the tariffs 
and have them declared unconstitutional. 
The answer to the question seems to lie in a complex 
set of factors, which, when interwoven, produced the reaction 
noted. The planters of Piedmont South Carolina had, after 
the War of 1812, achieved great we~lth in the short staple 
cotton culture, a new found livelihood which united them more 
closely with their lowcountry counterparts who produced short 
and long staple cotton. But by the late 1820's the recently 
found riches eluded them when a depression struck the country 
and when, at the same time, the:lr soils became exhausted and 
the new southwestern states flooded the market with millions 
of pounds of cotton. Mystified, they looked for the cause 
of their sudden precipitous decline of incomes, and in turn, 
blamed their problems on the tariffs. 
However, if one contends the depression caused the peo-
ple of Piedmont South Carolina to become radical, then why 
did not the states of Virginia and North Carolina ally with 
them since they too were severely harmed by a prostrate econ-
omy. The answer is twofold. First, these two states were 
too divided internally, a _£actor which prevented strong 
united action. This istespecially true of Virginia where 
the easterners and westerners were separated from each other 
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by the mountains that dissected the state and by the dif-
ferent ta.riff outlooks which already existed. North Caro-· ·t' 
lina, always a handicapped state because of the poor 
transportation system, was also never able to achieve any 
degree of strong, positive, united action, but contented 
itself with being a negative or obstructionist force on many 
federal issues. Second, the two older states were less 
radical than South Carolina because they had adjusted to the 
economic woes which befell their lands long before the added 
burden of the depression appeared. Virginia's continued 
production of tobacco had long since depleted the soil, and, 
by 1832, many of the once luxurious plantations were being 
sold to pay the debts of the.: 'owners. Seeking a new source 
of wealth, they turned to a new means of income, the sale of 
slaves to the young frontier states of the Southwest. Al-
though Virginia had once been prosperous and had had fertile 
soils at an earlier date, North Carolina had never been 
blessed with a favorable economy and was the most backward 
of any seaboard state. But whatever the reason, the two 
states were used to adversities. Sociological theorists sug-
gest that when a group is doing well, but is met with sudden 
reversals, they are most likely to rebell, while those with 
no hope of change or who have never obtained wealth, usually 
never consider such action. This seems to be the case with 
Piedmont South Carolina when the people became wealthy and · 
had the hopes of a bright future before them, then suddenly 
lost it, and, in a reverse fashion, true of Virginia and 
North Carolina. 
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The citizens of the South Carolina Tidewater, however, 
were in a much better position than that of their struggling 
upland neighbors. Some produced short staple cotton, but 
many raised rice and the popular long staple variety of cot-
ton, both of which were in great demand and never suffered 
as much in the depression. Strangely, though, many of the 
wealthy lower Tidewater planters were more radical than the 
suffering agrarians of the uplands. Evidently the logic 
which impelled them to embrace radicalism was not base4 upon 
the presumed destructiveness of protection but upon the in-
stitution of slavery. 'l'hey realized they, must join the fight 
against the tariffs in order to combat any future attempts 
by the government to abolish their peculiar labor system. 
By reverting to the doctrine of states' rights and winning a 
victory in the argument against protection, they stood a 
better chance of maintaining the slave system against further 
onslaughts; so it was this combined unity of purpose in the 
lowlands and uplands which produced a radical reaction in 
the Palmetto State that was not noted in the re~t of the 
South. 
The degree of unity within South Carolina between the 
depressed planters of the uplands and the slave owners of 
the lowlands,and the determination to use the radical remedy 
of nullification. was unique in that stc:ite alone. The other 
southern states not only refused to come to South Carolina's 
aid by accepting the doctrine of nullification but often de-
nounced such a policy. Al toge!;:her,. in observing the :;I.,~ ·:,;r. 
-"'·. ;_~·.•:-·-· - ' ; :'.": 
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reactions of all of the southern states, and assessing the 
degree of extremism in each, three conclusions, among others 
already mentioned, appear. First, it is concluded that radi-
cal reaction to the tariffs was inversely proportional to the 
degree of prosperity within a given state. Second, radical 
reaction to the tariffs was inversely proportional to the 
degree of friendship and respect the citiiens of a give~ 
state had for Andrew Jackson. Third, radical reaction to the 
tariffs was inversely proportional to the distance of any 
given southern, state from South Carolina. 
All of these factors, and more, are evidenced by the 
actions within each southern state during the tariff era, as 
noted in detail in the preceding chapters, but some cases 
merit special attention, ~· For exam,le, Georgia came closest 
to uniting with her nei'ghbor because her citizens were beset 
with much the same economic problems. Virginia and North 
Carolina were next in line in giving partial support, but 
the states to the west were basking in the aurA::~of newly 
opened cotton lands and the new wealth from the sugar cul~:,,_." 
·.' 
ture, so they opposeq an action which might harm their 
economy. 
Personalities also played a pa.rt in the reactions of the 
southerners because many of the people revered Andrew Jack-
son- -the hero of the common man, the Indian fighter, the 
unionist, and the opponent of John C. Calhoun. Even some 
South Carolinians such as Joel Poinsett, William Smith, and 
other unionists who had known Jackson in the war supporteg 
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their ol~ friend instead of the political upstart and nulli-
fier from their own state. Georgia, although having many 
citizens who liked Calhoun, had a strong faction wpich sup-
ported Jackson because William Crawford, their leading poli-
tician, ~iked the President but despised Calhoun, Also, they 
wanted the Chief Executive to remove the rest of the Indians 
from Georgia. Such territorial gains would more than coun~ 
terbalance any losses from protective tariffs. The states 
further west, Alabama and Mississippi, also liked Jackson 
because they sought Indian removal, and Tennesseeans revered 
him simply because he was from ~:~,th~±r state and because they 
presumed him to be a commoner like themselves. The Louisi-
anians aligned with Jackson as the Hero of New Orleans and 
the man who would preserve the Union: the new frontier 
states could not easily survive on their own. 
Not only did many westerners and southwesterners favor 
Andrew Jackson in his efforts to stop the extremists of 
South Carolina, but it appeared tha~ distance from that state 
served to mute the trend toward radicalism. The people of 
South Carolina learned of the merits of nullification through 
their orators and local newspapers, but the further west one 
traveled, the more the lines of communication decreased. 
Moreover, the people in a region lying in close proximity to 
South Carolina often traded with the area, had personal 
friends or relatives there~ or knew John C. Calhoun person-
ally. Some of the neighboring areas, in turn~ often sup-
ported South Carolina, while the more distant states did not. 
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Although the disputes and alignments continued, the 
question concerning what South Carolina would do still :.::.: · ,. ·· 
awaited an answer, but in the meantime her threats of fu~ure 
nullification as of February 1, 1833, and her demands for a 
lower tariff proved effective. The Carolinians and the other 
opponents of protection throughout the South pressured the 
Congress into restudying the tariff problem, and the sena-
~qFs and representatives, agreeing that many tariff duties 
s~ould be reduced, effected a compromise measure--th~ Tariff 
of 1833. The new act which proposed lowering the tariff 
duties over a nine year period until they reached to old 1824 
levels, seemed acceptable to all. The advocates of protec-
tion supported the compromise because the decreased duties 
would come gradually and because they wanted to avert civil 
war; the free traders also favored it, hoping to prevent 
strife; and even the nullifiers supported it because they 
realized they stood alone in advocating the use of force 
against the federal government. Only two congressmen, one 
man who staunchly supported internal improvements and felt 
lowered tariffs would curtail such endeavors, and another who 
disliked Jackson, opposed the measure. (Map 43) Apparently 
the larger problem of civil conflict was more important than 
the old arguments for protection or free trade. 
A final matter awaited the congressmen's approval: the 
Force Bill. This.measure, though not a tariff act, was 
Jackson's answer to the recalcitrance of the South Carolin-
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citizens read more into the proposed measure than that. They 
believed the President was attacking the age old doctrine of 
states' rights, and this they rejected, but supporters of the 
Old Hero believed passage of the act would me~n a victory for 
. .. .... 
the Union.over the action by one state .• --,The' con.g,ressional .. 
voting pattern on the Force Bill cl~~rly depicts the two 
' ., 
lines of thought. Many people in Louisiana, Tennessee, and 
western Virginia supported Jackson as a personality and 
wanted to maintain the Union so they voted for the act, 
while the scattered votes for the measure in eastern Virginia, 
North Carolina, northeastern South Carolina, and eastern 
Georgia depicted various independent elements who either dis-
liked Calhoun, opposed nullification, or supported Jackson. 
(M~p 44) The second element, those who voted against the 
act as well as those who abstained to show their distaste for 
the measure, believed the Force Bill ran counter to the doc-
trine of state sovereignty and felt the President had over-
stepped the perogative of his office. Many of them also 
harbored a personal dislike for the Ohief E~ecutive. 
The two measures passed in 1833 stemmed the extremism 
on both sides, and the tariff controversies subsided as 
prosperity returned to the nation, but the indendiary re-
marks made by some of the combatants and the spectre of nul-
lification and secession would be long remembered. The 
Americans, with the passage of time, soon dismissed the com-. 
plexities of the situation and the degree of intrastate 
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the time when the South fought the North, and the time when 
the agrarians of the lower United States fought the manufac~ 
turing interests of the other section to maintain free trade. 
The fact that many of the cotton plGnters and other agrarians 
supported some of the protective tariffs quietly slipped back 
into the pages of history. 
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These documents covered the land policy of the 
United States Government toward the states and the 
Indians of the Southwest. 
United States Gover.nment. Bio~raphical Directory of the 
American Congress, 1774-1 61. Washington: Umte<r" 
States Government Pr1nt1ng Office, 1961. 
This volume lists the congressmen ele~ted to the 
various sessions of congress, and tells their political 
affiliation and personal history, · 
United States Government. Executive Docl,,111lents, No. 62, 
20 Congress, I session, III. 
This memorial relates North Carolina's position 
against protective tariffs. 
United States Government. House Report, No. 481, 22 Con-
gress, I session. 
This 1832 petition from the citizens of Louisiana 
to the United States Congress called for lower duties 
on woolens and cottons. 
United States Government. Journal of the House of Re~resent­
atives, Washington: United States-congresS;" 18 8-1833. 
These documents presented the memorials and peti-
tions and other general statements of discontent against 
the various tariffs. 
United .States Government. Tariff Acts Passed .Qy the Congress 
of the United States from 1789to 1897. 'Washington: 
United States Governmeri1:Pririting OTITce, 1899, 
The various official tariffs are compiled in this 
volume. 
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